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Abstract
Intelligent driver warning systems can be found in many high-end vehicles on the road today,
which will likely rapidly increase as they become standard equipment. However, introducing multiple
warning systems into vehicles could potentially add to the complexity of the driving task, and there are
many critical human factors issues that should be considered, such as how the interaction between
alarm alerting schemes, system reliabilities, and distractions combine to affect driving performance
and situation awareness. In addition, there are also questions with respect to whether there should be
any minimum safety standards set to ensure both functional and usage safety of these systems, and
what these standards should be.
An experiment was conducted to study how a single master alert versus multiple individual
alerts of different reliabilities affected drivers' responses to different imminent collision situations
while distracted. A master alert may have advantages since it reduces the total number of alerts, which
could be advantageous especially with the proliferation of intelligent warning systems. However, a
master alert may also confuse drivers, since it does not warn of a specific hazard, unlike a specific
alert for each warning systems. Auditory alerts were used to warn of imminent frontal and rear
collisions, as well as unintentional left and right lane departures. Low and high warning reliabilities
were also tested. The different warning systems and reliability factors produced significantly different
reaction times and response accuracies. The warning systems with low reliability caused accuracy
rates to fall more than 40% across the four warning systems. In addition, low reliability systems also
induced negative emotions in participants. Thus, reliability is one of the most crucial determinants of
driving performance and the safety outcome, and it is imperative that warning systems are reliable. For
the master versus distinct alarms factor, drivers responded statistically no different to the various
collision warnings for both reaction times and accuracy of responses. However, in a subjective post-
experiment assessment, participants preferred distinct alarms for different driver warning systems,
even though their objective performance showed no difference to the different alerting schemes.
This study showed that it was essential to design robust and reliable intelligent warning
systems. However, there are no existing safety standards today to ensure that these systems are safe
before they are introduced into vehicles, even though such systems are already available in high-end
cars. Even though there are tradeoffs in having standards, such as increased time-to-market and
possible loss of innovation, I recommend that safety standards be set nonetheless, since standards will
ensure the safety performance of warning systems, to an extent. In terms of functional safety, safety
standards should be performance-based, and should specify a minimum level of reliability. In terms of
usage safety, the standards should also be performance-based, where driving performance can be
indicated by measures such as reaction time, lane position, heading distance and accuracy of
responses. In addition, multiple threat scenarios should also be tested. In terms of design guidelines,
the various human factors guidelines from different countries should be harmonized internationally to
ensure that manufacturers have access to a consistent set of guidelines. Finally, it is also important that
these standards, especially for usage safety, specify tests with not just the average driver, but also with
peripheral driving populations including novice and elderly drivers.
Thesis Supervisor: Mary (Missy) Cummings
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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), there are more
than 40,000 deaths on highways in the United States each year in spite of the increasing public
concern and awareness of the use of safety restraints and safe driving practices. Thus, other
approaches are needed to improve safety and alleviate the number of highway accident. One of the
most promising is through the use of intelligent driver warning systems, which respond to changes and
threats in the immediate operating environment by alerting operators to potential hazards. Intelligent
warning systems have been shown to have safety benefits in other transportation domains like
aviation, and they are already being used in a variety of systems including aircrafts, nuclear power and
chemical plants and medical instruments. While they are not fully deployed in the automobile industry
yet, intelligent warning systems could potentially increase safety on the roads by mitigating the effects
of time- and safety- critical events.
In the public domain, the U.S. Department of Transportation is focusing research on a variety
of Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS) as part of the Intelligent Vehicles Initiative (IVI) set up in
1998. IVrs mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes by using various intelligent driver
warning systems. In particular, the initiative focuses on implementation strategies and technologies of
intelligent warning systems in both vehicles and the roadway infrastructure. It also calls for the study
of driving performances of different populations of drivers when using such avoidance and warning
systems [1]. Lessons learned from the IVI led to the development of another Federal ITS Initiative in
2004: the Integrated Vehicle Based Safety Systems (IVBSS) initiative. Unlike the IVI which was only
focused on individual intelligent warning systems, the IVBSS initiative focuses on issues dealing with
the integration of multiple intelligent driver warning systems, as well as issues regarding the
partnership between the various industries in order to accelerate the introduction of integrated vehicle-
based safety systems into the United States vehicle fleet [2].
In the private sector, automotive manufacturers also recognize the value that such warning
systems would add to drivers. Even though improvements in passive safety features like seat belts,
crash zones, and air bags have reduced the rate of crashes and fatalities, these features are yielding
diminishing returns as the fatality rate stagnates [3, 4]. Thus, automotive manufacturers are turning
their attention from passive to active safety systems including intelligent warning systems, and they
are augmenting current passive safety programs with in-vehicle collision warning and avoidance
systems [5]. This shift in trends in the private sector reflects a shift in NHTSA's emphasis from
crashworthiness and crash mitigation techniques (e.g., alleviation of the severity of crash-related
injuries) to crash avoidance [6].
1.1 Thesis Motivation
This thesis addresses the gap in the research field of multiple intelligent warning systems in
the driving domain. Specifically, it will look at two issues. First, it will look at the human factors
implications of using alarms with multiple meanings from multiple warning systems, concentrating
specifically on problems of confusion over the meaning of alarms leading to a degradation of driving
performance. This is important since such emerging technologies in automobiles are still very new,
and there are still gaps in the understanding of how drivers will interact with these systems. Second,
focusing solely on the technical solutions to these human factors issues is not a holistic way of
addressing the problems that may arise with the integration of multiple intelligent warning systems
into automobiles. This is especially true since the use of such systems in automobiles will be large-
scale and solutions should extend beyond the engineering solutions to encompass regulatory solutions
as well. Thus, this thesis will examine possible regulatory policies that could be implemented to
mitigate the human factors problems that arise with the integration of multiple intelligent warning
systems into cars.
Driving in a dynamic environment can be a complex task, as it requires drivers to visually
track objects, monitor constantly changing driving situations and road conditions and make decisions
under potentially high workload. The complexity of the primary driving task has been further
increased by the proliferation of in-car technologies and telematics, including systems that aid the
driver in control and navigation, as well as entertainment and communication devices. Introducing
multiple warning systems into vehicles could potentially add to the complexity of the driving task, and
there are many critical human factors issues that should be considered.
In the driving human factors research, most of the focus thus far has focused on driver
performance using a single warning system and has emphasized the design and development of
warning systems in isolation. In addition, research has also been conducted on issues like false and
ambiguous alarms, trust in the warning systems, and alarm alerting strategies and modalities [7-11].
While these studies have comprehensively examined a number of critical issues in the introduction of
intelligent predictive alarms into the driving domain, there is a dearth of research focusing on driving
performance in the presence of multiple warning systems in general: in particular, on a driver's ability
to discern the meaning of the warnings in the presence of multiple intelligent warning systems.
For example, one human factors concern is the confusion over the meaning of the alarms
caused by the presence of multiple alerting systems. Confusion over the meaning of alarms is two-
fold. First, a separate alarm for each kind of hazard may result in too many alarms, making it difficult
for drivers to recognize and remember the meaning of each alarm. Second, when the same alarm
sound is used to represent multiple meanings, mode confusion may result when drivers do not know
which hazard condition the alarm is warning against. If the driver responds erroneously to the warning
alarm because of confusion over its intended meaning, not only would the warning system be rendered
useless, but it may also lead to worse driving performance. As warning systems become increasingly
ubiquitous in cars of the future, this problem will no doubt be a growing concern.
In addition to these human factors issues, there exist important questions about whether there
should be any minimum safety standards for intelligent warning systems and, if so, what these
standards should be. In addition, there are also questions with regard to whether intelligent warning
systems should be standardized across the different automobile manufacturers and suppliers. Problems
of confusion over the meaning of the alerts may be exacerbated, especially if the warning systems are
not standardized and if the implementation philosophies of the warnings are inconsistent [12]. Thus,
another design choice is to allow drivers to customize or personalize these warning systems, and there
may be advantages in doing so. This may be especially relevant if the problems of confusion will be
mitigated if drivers recognize what the alarms mean, since they were the ones who customized them.
Thus, possible regulatory decisions include enforcing minimum standards across manufacturers, as
well as giving manufacturers the option of designing customizable warning systems for their users.
1.2 Research Questions
As previously discussed, there are growing desires to achieve higher safety levels in the
complex operating environment of driving by providing multiple active intelligent warning systems.
However, as these warning systems become increasingly pervasive and as the driving task becomes
increasingly complex, unintended consequences may arise, which could lead to situations that are
worse than if the systems were not used at all [13].
The goal of my thesis is thus to answer the following questions:
1. What are the human factors implications of using alarms with multiple meanings from
multiple intelligent warning systems in the automobile? In particular, are there problems of
confusion over the meaning of alarms, and, if so, what conditions will exacerbate this
problem?
2. Should there be minimum safety standards for intelligent warning systems in automobiles to
mitigate possible human factors problems and to increase overall safety? If so, what should
these safety standards be and what are the implications of the policy decision to enforce the
safety standards?
1.3 Thesis Scope
This thesis will focus on intelligent warning systems in automobiles, particularly light private
vehicles driven by the public; commercial vehicles such as trucks and buses will be out of the scope.
In addition, the thesis will concentrate on safety-critical warning alarms that are auditory, as opposed
to visual or haptic. Even though the context in question is multiple intelligent warning systems, this
thesis will focus on alarms that occur discretely, i.e., multiple threat scenarios leading to alarms that
are presented simultaneously will not be considered. Lastly, this thesis will focus on passive intelligent
warning systems that leave the ultimate reaction decision to the operator. Warning systems that
actively mitigate the hazard without waiting for a response from the operator will be out of the scope
of this thesis.
Although issues arising from the use of multiple warning systems occur in other high-
technology domains such as the medical field, nuclear power and chemical plants and in other
transportation modes such as aviation, maritime or railway, this thesis will focus only on the domain
of automotive transportation.
Throughout the thesis, the terms "alarms," "alerts," and "warnings," will be used
interchangeably to mean the same thing: alarms from the warning systems alerting the operator to a
potential hazard.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a literature review of related work
as well as provide a framework for understanding the solutions seeking to answer the research
questions. Chapter 3 will address the first research question on human factors implications. Chapter 4
will address the second research question on the broader institutional issues. Chapter 5 will conclude
this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter provides an overview of different types of intelligent driver assistance and
warning systems including those in the United States market today. In addition, an overview of human
factors concerns is provided including a review of selected literature relating to intelligent driver
warning systems. The last section provides background on the institutional issues that arise with
respect to the question of setting minimum safety standards for these intelligent driver warning and
assistance systems.
2.1 Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
Driving is composed of three major categories of activity from a task/function analysis
perspective: vehicle control, navigation and collision avoidance, all of which contribute to the overall
workload of the driver [14]. With practice, most drivers can perform these tasks relatively well under
normal driving conditions. Nevertheless, driving is a dynamic control process and as the demands of
the driving task increase due to increasing environmental complexity, the number of critical hazards
that drivers encounter will increase as well. Thus, there is motivation to support drivers with
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), which are systems that assist drivers in the driving
task. Examples of support provided by ADAS include automated assistance in maintaining control, as
well as prevention of accidents and navigational assistance. ADAS that prevent collisions are also
known as intelligent driver warning systems. ADAS alert drivers to critical states via warnings, and
with as number of ADAS in vehicles increases in the future, the number of warnings in vehicles will
likely also increase.
Intelligent driver warning systems (or intelligent warning systems in this thesis) have to be
robust and reliable stand-alone systems in order to assist drivers and they should not add to the
complexity of the driving task. In addition, the design and development of these warning systems
cannot be done in isolation from each other; it is imperative that they are compatible with each other
and integrated because vehicles in the future will have multiple intelligent warning systems that warn
of different hazards [15]. For example, in the event of a multiple threat scenario, if the alerts from
multiple warning systems are not well coordinated, they may compete for the driver's attention. The
driver may become confused as a result of the different warnings and may be unable to cope with
them. Degraded driving performance may even result from the presence of multiple intelligent
warning systems that are not integrated As a result, there are risks associated with the introduction of
ADAS into the market including safety risks for the driving consumers, and financial and legal (e.g.,
product liability) risks for the manufacturers arising from these unintended safety consequences.
Nevertheless, in spite of these risks, there is support for the development of ADAS from both
the private and the public sectors because of the potential benefits that ADAS bring, including
increased safety. In the public sector, ADAS have achieved recognition on a federal level; the United
States government has set up various initiatives to study them and facilitate their deployment, which
will be discussed in Section 2.1.1. In the private industry, automotive manufacturers have also
supported the development of these systems, and this support can be seen in the increasing trend of
more manufacturers offering such warning and assistance systems with their vehicles. The intelligent
driver warning systems that are already available in the market today will be illustrated in Section
2.1.5. In addition, the private industry has also come together in various consortiums such as
"Integrated Project PReVENT" to develop these systems more effectively [16].
2.1.1 Federal ITS Initiatives
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has set up a series of initiatives that
study Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) and their deployment in the US. ITS initiatives can
generally be classified according to their functions, including the following: Advanced Traveler
Information Systems (ATIS), Advanced Traffic Management Systems (ATMS), Advanced Vehicle
Safety Systems (AVSS), Commercial Vehicle Operation (CVO), and Emergency Management (EM).
Of these functions, the one concerned with vehicle-based driver assistance systems and avoidance and
warning systems is the AVSS[17].
Two of the many initiatives concerned with AVSS are the Intelligent Vehicles Initiative (IVI)
and the Integrated Vehicle-Based Safety Systems (IVBSS) initiative. The IVI was introduced in 1997
and authorized in the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), as part of the
U.S. DOT ITS program [18]. The mission of IVI was to reduce the number and severity of crashes on
the roads by using ADAS that assume varying levels of control of the vehicle to help drivers avoid
collisions. This mission represented a revolutionary shift in DOT's vehicle-based safety research
programs as the programs had previously been focused primarily on crash mitigation techniques and
crashworthiness, rather than crash prevention and avoidance. One field operation test (FOT) to
evaluate the performance of Rear-End Collision Avoidance systems integrated with an Adaptive
Cruise Control (ACC) found that the systems had the potential to prevent 10% of all rear-end crashes
[18, 19].
Lessons learned from the IVI initiative, which ended in 2005, led to the development of other
federal initiatives including the IVBSS initiative [1]. Unlike the IVI which only focused on warning
systems in isolation, the IVBSS initiative is focused on issues dealing with the integration of multiple
intelligent warning systems. Its overarching goal is to combine existing safety and Collision
Avoidance Systems (CAS) into an integrated system that can warn drivers of potential crashes.
Existing CAS that are being developed into a single integrated system of intelligent warning systems
are the Rear-end Collision Avoidance, Road Departure Collision Avoidance and Lane Change/Merge
Collision Avoidance Systems [20].
Rear-end Collision Avoidance Systems, also known as Forward Collision Warning Systems
(FCWS), provide drivers with warnings and limited control of vehicle speed to minimize the risk of
collisions with lead vehicles (stationary and moving) and objects in front of the equipped vehicle.
Rear-end collisions account for 25% of all crashes and are the most likely accidents to be fatal [21].
Road Departure Collision Avoidance Systems provide driver warnings when the vehicle is departing
from the intended lane of travel and may provide control advice on the steering or braking response to
correct the problem. Road departure collisions account for nearly 20% of all crashes. These collisions,
which occur mostly at night on high-speed roads and often involve alcohol, are likely to be fatal as
well [21]. Lane Change/Merge Collision Avoidance Systems monitor the relative speed and position
of any vehicle beside and behind the equipped vehicle, and provide driver warnings and assistance to
drivers during a lane change maneuver. Lane change/merge crashes account for 10% of all crashes
[21]. These three systems, the Rear-End Collision, Road Departure and Lane Change/Merge Warning
Systems were chosen to be the focus of the IVBSS initiative because rear-end, run-off-road and lane
change/merge crashes together account for the majority of fatal crashes on the roads [2].
2.1.2 Situation Awareness enhanced by ADAS
ADAS are designed to help improve driving safety by enhancing driver's situation awareness
in dangerous conditions. Situation awareness (SA) is formally defined as "the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning
and the projection of their status in the near future [22]". Thus, there are three levels of SA, each
implying different cognitive processes:
* Level I SA -perception: Perception of basic information.
* Level 2 SA - comprehension: Understanding the meaning of that information.
* Level 3 SA -future projection: Anticipating and formulating projections about what
will happen ahead in space and time.
Figure 1: Driver interaction with the vehicle control loop: conventional driving vs. driving with ADAS
(adapted from [23])
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During conventional driving where no assistance systems are present, drivers have to first
perceive and recognize the driving environment, then make a judgment about an impending hazard
and the future consequences of any actions they take, and finally, take control of the vehicle and
execute the corresponding maneuver to mitigate the hazard. Drivers do these based on monitoring the
feedback of the vehicle behavior (Figure 1) [23]. ADAS can thus be broadly categorized into systems
that provide these varying levels of assistance to drivers and enhance their situation awareness (Table
1). By enhancing drivers' SA, driver assistance systems will ideally allow drivers to function in a more
timely and effective manner. However, it must be noted that ADAS may also cause drivers to have a
loss of situation awareness, especially when an actively intervening system actually takes over the
operation and control of the vehicle during an impending hazard [24]. Thus, the drivers could be out-
of-the-loop if they only monitor the vehicle instead of actually being in control. If drivers do not notice
the hazard, they may not understand the warning system's response to the hazard and may become
more confused as a result. In general, humans are poor at monitoring tasks when they are out of the
control loop [25].
Table 1: Types of ADAS that helps in enhancing different levels of driver's situation awareness.
Enhancing driver's SA level: Assisting drivers in: Examples of ADAS
Perceiving and recognizing Night vision systems that present
Level 1: Perception hazards in the driving information the human eye finds
environment by presenting hard to discern in dark
information that helps to enhance backgrounds.
drivers' perception.
Passive mitigation of hazards:
Providing judgment of hazards Collision avoidance systems like
Level 2: Comprehension by warning the drivers ahead of Lane Departure Warning System
time, thus aiding in the driver's (LDWS).
comprehension of the hazards.
Active Mitigation of hazards:
Intervening to operate and ACC that regulates the vehicle's
Level 3: Future projection control the vehicle to avoid the
own speed without input from thehazard, thus aiding in the driver's driver.
anticipation of the hazard.
Types of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
There are many different ways of categorizing ADAS, such as by the level of assistance that
they provide to drivers. Three broad categories of ADAS may be distinguished as follows (Figure 2)
[24, 26, 27]:
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Figure 2: Behavioral Model of a Driver and Level of Driver Assistance (adapted from [23])
The ADAS that provide the least assistance are those that provide Level 1 control. Such
systems present information obtained from sensors to drivers and assist drivers only with the
recognition of the hazard. Such a system is not a warning system, as it does not provide any warning
alerts; instead, it is a system that enhances the perception of drivers. An example is a night vision
system that aids the driver in the dark by creating a visual image of the roadway ahead based on
thermal imaging technology and infrared sensors, and by providing that image via a Heads-Up Display
(HUD). Thus, this system enhances Level 1 SA of drivers, by aiding in their perception of the driving
environment.
Level 2 ADAS provide additional aid to drivers by providing assistance for both recognition
of the driving environment and judgment of the criticality of hazards by providing warning alarms.
2.1.3
Such ADAS are passive intelligent warning systems, as they only warn drivers but do not actively
mitigate hazards, unlike Level 3 ADAS. Such systems include intelligent warning systems including
Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS), which will be discussed next in Section 2.1.4. Examples of CAS
include Forward Collision Warning Systems or Rear-End Collision Avoidance and Intersection
Collision Avoidance Systems. Thus, these ADAS enhance Level 2 SA of drivers and aid in the
comprehension of the driving environment by alerting drivers to hazards through the use of alarms.
Level 3 ADAS, called active intelligent warning systems, are intervening assistance systems
that have a higher level of automation and lower level of driver control. These systems provide more
assistance to the drivers and mitigate hazards actively without input from the driver. The level of
assistance or the level of automation (LOA) that the ADAS provide can range from intervening and
taking partial control, to full control, which would constitute autonomous driving [28]. These
intervening systems relegate drivers from being manual controllers to supervisory controllers. An
example is an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) System that detects obstacles in front of the driver and
intervenes by using evasive measures such as applying the brake to regulate the speed on it own, such
that the following distance does not exceed a certain threshold. Thus, such systems enhance Level 3
SA of drivers by helping drivers anticipate and taking action to mitigate the hazard by not only
providing warnings, but also by taking partial control of the vehicle. However, as previously
discussed, even though these systems may enhance Level 3 SA of drivers, the SA of drivers may also
be degraded since drivers are out of the control loop and may not know why the action came about.
2.1.4 Types of Collision Avoidance Systems/ Intelligent Warning
Systems
Of all the types of ADAS, the ones with the greatest potential for reducing accidents are the
systems designed to predict, avoid and thus, prevent collisions. This is because if these systems are
reliable and robust, they can warn drivers of impending collisions through alarms before they occur
and can possibly help to prevent collisions. These types of ADAS systems are known as Collision
Avoidance Systems (CAS) (otherwise known as intelligent driver warning systems). The main
purpose of CAS is to alert drivers to a hazardous situation which requires action, typically to avoid a
collision. Additionally, the warnings may also serve to educate drivers by providing feedback
concerning desirable driving practices [29]. CAS should generate at least two levels of warnings
differing in urgency: imminent and cautionary warnings [15]. Collision Avoidance Systems under
development today are generally Level 2 ADAS (see Section 2.1.3) since they assist drivers in both
the recognition of the driving environment and the judgment of the hazard by providing warnings to
the driver through alarms. They do not actively intervene to mitigate the hazard by controlling the
vehicle.
There are two main types of CAS: vehicle-to-vehicle CAS and vehicle-to-infrastructure CAS.
Current vehicle-to-vehicle systems use radar and machine vision to trigger a warning when a vehicle is
potentially about to collide with another vehicle. Examples of current systems being brought to the
marketplace include rear-end collision warning systems or FCWS, and Blind-Spot Information
Systems (BLIS). Vehicle-to-infrastructure driver warning systems are systems that warn of a potential
collision with the roadway infrastructure. An example of a vehicle-to-infrastructure driver warning
system being developed is an intersection collision avoidance warning system. In addition, research
and development is underway for introducing more complex systems into the market that use both in-
vehicle and infrastructure-based technologies, especially communication and positioning technologies.
Thus, in the future implementation of Collision Avoidance Systems, vehicles will detect or
communicate with other vehicles as well as with the roadway infrastructure via sensors and
telecommunication networks such as Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and Wide Area
Wireless Mobile Communications [30].
While ACC systems available in the market today are not collision avoidance systems since
they maintain a preset speed and adjust that speed to maintain a preset following distance from a lead
vehicle, they do have warnings that alert drivers when intervention is required. This distinction should
be made because ACC systems today are separate systems from Forward Collision Warning Systems
(FCWS), which primarily warn of imminent frontal crashes. However, in the future, ACC and FCWS
may be merged into the same integrated system that not only controls and regulates speed and
following distance, but which also warns of impending frontal collisions. The resulting system will be
a Level 3 ADAS, which actively mitigates hazards by providing warnings and by intervening to
operate and control the vehicle.
2.1.5 ADAS in the Market Today
ADAS first began to appear commercially in the high-end luxury car models. Mercedes-Benz
launched Europe's first ADAS, Adaptive Cruise Control Systems, in 1999. Two years before, Toyota
launched the world's first ADAS, Blind Corner Monitor and Radar Cruise Control in Japan [31, 32].
Subsequently, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and Jaguar introduced ACC in the United States in 2000. In
general, the U.S. market trails Europe, and the European market trails Japan by 2 to 3 years [33]. Since
then, more manufacturers, including Audi, BMW, Nissan, Jaguar, Lexus, Citroen and Volkswagen
have introduced basic ADAS into their fleet of vehicles in the Japan, Europe and the U.S. markets.
Nevertheless, these ADAS are still only available as options in selected high-end models and not
widely available to the public yet in the United States.
As of the 2005/2006-model year, ADAS available in the U.S. light vehicle market include
adaptive headlights, parking aids, navigation aids, night vision systems, and auto-dimming rear-view
mirrors [34]. ADAS that enhance drivers' Level 2 situation awareness include those that support
longitudinal control of the car, namely Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), and those that support lateral
control of the car, namely Lane Departure Warning Systems (LDWS). Other driver warning systems
previously mentioned such as systems that warn of forward collisions, lane change/merge collisions,
intersection collisions and blind-spot indications are not available in the U.S. commercial market yet.
U.S. Passenger Vehicles offering Advanced In-Vehicle Devices and Driver Support
Systems (2006/2006 MY Vehicles)
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Figure 3: Vehicles equipped with Advanced In-Vehicle Devices in the U.S. (2005/2006 models) [26].
Figure 3 shows the different ADAS offered in the U.S. market today according to the different
manufacturers (e.g., Mercedes-Benz, Toyota) and model lines (e.g., E-Class, Sienna). The figure also
shows a breakdown of number model lines that offer the ADAS as an optional upgrade, or as standard
feature. For example, there are 9 manufacturers in the United States offering ACC, and from these,
there are 26 model lines offering ACC as an optional feature. Only 2 model lines offer them as
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standard equipment. For more details on the breakdown on the ACC system and LDWS for the
2005/2006 models in the United States market, refer to Appendix A.
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the most common ADAS available today are auto-dimming
mirrors (available on 244 model lines) and navigational systems (available on 165 model lines). In
contrast, ACC (available on 28 model lines) and LDWS (available on 2 model lines) are only limited
to high-end manufacturers and are not widely available to the public yet. Nevertheless, these two
systems and other driver warning systems previously mentioned are expected to be introduced into
vehicles in the future. The following two sub-sections, Section 2.1.5.1 and Section 2.1.5.2 will provide
details on the characteristics and design parameters of the ACC system and the LDWS currently
available on these model lines. The last sub-section, Section 2.1.5.3, will provide details on how these
systems and other ADAS in development vary across different manufacturers.
2.1.5.1 Longitudinal Control Aiding Systems
There are currently nine manufacturers (vehicle makes) offering ACC systems in the U.S.:
Audi, BMW, Cadillac, Infiniti, Jaguar, Lexus, Maybach, Mercedes-Benz and Toyota. In general, this
technology is only available for high-end luxury sedans, although some entry-level models within
luxury brands (e.g. BMW 3-Series) are beginning to offer this feature too [34]. Refer to Appendix A
for more details on the model lines in which these ACC systems are available.
Manufacturers market ACC under a variety of names, including Active Cruise Control,
Intelligent Cruise Control, Dynamic Cruise Control, and Distronic. Despite their different naming
conventions, the systems are functionally similar. For instance, they can only function above the lower
threshold of 20-28 miles per hour (mph), and automatically disengage when the speed drops below
this minimum operating value (with a warning alert to the driver). Drivers can control both speed and
following distance settings and can disengage the ACC using various methods including a brake tap.
All systems provide an approach warning (using both audible and visual cues) to indicate when driver
intervention is required [34].
Despite some key system function and interface characteristics (e.g., minimum operating
speed of 20-28 mph, minimum headway of 1 sec) seemingly standardized across manufacturers, most
design aspects of the ACC are still not uniform across manufacturers. For instance, ACC systems
differ especially with regard to the location and placement of the controls and displays, the use of
warning symbols and how the ACC systems are integrated with conventional cruise control [34].
ACC and warning systems with forward collision warnings are likely to be adopted more
widely in the commercial market when empirical data shows that they are effective at preventing
collisions [35]. However, empirical data can only be collected when these systems are present in the
commercial market. Thus, it is likely that high-end vehicles in the future will be fitted with an
integrated warning system that combines current ACC systems with FCWS. If indeed proven to be
effective in preventing collisions in the high-end market, then these systems are likely to be more
widely adopted and the technology will likely diffuse into a larger market segment.
2.1.5.2 Lateral Control Aiding Systems
At present only Infiniti (the luxury brand of Nissan) offers LDWS in the United States [34,
36]. This feature is optional on two of the luxury model lines: the 2005 Infiniti FX and the 2006
Infiniti M45[37]. Refer to Appendix A for more details on the model lines where these LDWS are
available.
The LDWS uses predictive paths to determine when to warn drivers that the vehicle is
traveling too close to lane markers. An on-board camera tracks the lane markers ahead up to 25
meters. The system will not operate if the camera cannot detect the lane markers, if the vehicle's speed
is below 45 mph, or if the turn signals are activated. If the system determines that there is indeed an
unintentional lane departure, warnings that are both visual (indicator light on the instrument panel) and
auditory (warning chime) are presented to the driver. The driver can manually disengage the system by
using a switch located on the dashboard and an indicator light in the instrument panel provides the
system status. There are no options for customizing the sensitivity threshold at which the warning is
triggered or the volume of the auditory alert.
Unlike the ACC systems that are available on 28 model lines, the LDWS are only available on
two model lines. One of the barriers that limits the number of LDWS in the commercial market is the
high costs of cameras and steering actuators which help to provide torque in the steering wheel to help
drivers stay in the lane. Nevertheless, if camera costs continue to drop and if the LDWS become more
integrated with existing power steering components, then wider adoption of the LDWS may become
possible in future vehicles [35].
2.1.5.3 Variability of Intelligent Warning Systems
The intelligent warning systems and ADAS currently available in the U.S. market not only
vary across different manufacturers in terms of the interface elements (e.g., graphic displays, controls,
warning modalities) and alerting strategy (e.g., level of assistance provided, threshold sensitivity), but
they also often vary across model lines within a brand.
In terms of the level of assistance provided, manufacturers differ with respect to active
mitigation of hazards. In terms of ACC systems, Mercedes-Benz's Distronic Plus proximity control
system on its 2006 models completely halts the car if necessary with a brake assistance program,
which adds brake pressure if an impact is expected. Volvo and Honda also have developed ACC
systems that actively mitigate hazards, by increasing the brake pressure during an impending collision,
although they are not deployed yet. On the other hand, other ACC systems only provide warnings to
the drivers and do not actively mitigate the hazard. Such systems include Jaguar's ACC system on its
2003 models.
The warning design also varies across different manufacturers. For example, Mitsubishi's
Driver Support System, launched in Japan in 2000, warns the driver with a combination of visual,
auditory, and haptic alerts (include steering wheel vibration and steering torque) [38]. Other systems,
such as Volvo's Co-Driver, only use auditory warnings to alert drivers of an impending collision [39].
The introduction of these active safety systems offers benefits including increased safety to the
public. However, these systems may also introduce new risks and unintended consequences. From a
human factors perspective, the wide variations in warning and driver assistance systems may create
problems for drivers, especially problems of confusion. These issues will be further explored in the
following section, as well as in Chapter 3.
2.2 Human Factors Concerns
The introduction of intelligent alarms into vehicles can potentially increase the complexity of
the driving task in a dynamic environment, especially when taking into account the simultaneous
proliferation of in-car technologies and telematics (communication technologies that provide
information to drivers) including navigational, communication, and entertainment systems. This
proliferation of in-car technologies also includes driver warning systems. Multiple uncoordinated and
independent systems could result in lower usability than one well-integrated system. For example, an
integrated system can coordinate alerts from a multiple threat scenario that overlap in time, and then
prioritize and select the right alert to assist the driver. Conversely, in non-integrated systems, different
alerts may compete for the driver's attention and may also cause problems of confusion. However, this
phenomenon may also arise even in integrated systems. In addition, as seen in the previous section,
current intelligent warning systems available in the market today vary widely across manufacturers,
and this variability may create problems of confusion for drivers as well.
Thus, as a result of this potential problem of confusion, it is necessary to understand how
humans process information and how they respond to a stimulus (e.g., a warning alert). Thus, this
section will first discuss human information processing in terms of driver alerting, followed by a
literature review of warning systems research, including modalities of alarms, reliabilities of the
warning systems, and the possible use of a master alarm alerting scheme for multiple intelligent
warning systems in vehicles.
2.2.1 Human Information Processing Model
In order to better understand a driver's reaction to the functions of multiple warning systems,
an information processing model developed by Wickens, the multiple resources theory (MRT), is
discussed. MRT is one theory of attention and workload that explains how humans simultaneously
process multiple tasks [40]. This theory is based on the assumption that people can process some tasks
in parallel without sacrificing performance because there are distinct attentional and cognitive
resources that differ along several dimensions (Figure 4), which will be further explained:
* Processing Stages encompass the three major information processing stages of "perception,"
"cognition" and "response." Available attentional resources are used for tasks in all the three
different stages. For example, in a multiple threat scenario, a driver has to divide his attention
between perceiving a hazard ("perception" stage), understanding another hazard ("cognition"
stage), and making an appropriate response ("response" stage) to avoid the hazard. MRT
explains that a driver requires the same attentional resources to perceive and to understand the
hazards (in the "perception" and "cognition" stages), but separate attentional resources to
respond to the hazards (in the "response" stage).
* Processing Codes refer to the "verbal" and "spatial" processes which can be associated with
the two cerebral hemispheres [41]. Thus, attentional resources can be separated to parallel
process verbal and spatial tasks. An example of a verbally-coded task is listening to a verbal
command, while an example of a spatially-coded task is navigating using visual cues.
* Perceptual Modalities include "visual" and "auditory" modalities as the two major channels
where information is perceived. Thus, information that is perceived in different modalities
uses separate attentional resources. An example of alert information presented through the
visual channel is a visual icon flashing on the dashboard. An example of alert information
presented aurally is an auditory warning alarm. Although the multiple resources model does
not depict the haptic modality, it can also be considered to be a different perceptual modality
from the auditory and visual modality.
Output Responses refer to responses which are "manual" and "linguistic/vocal" in nature. An
example of a task that requires a manual response is steering the wheel and an example of a
task that requires a linguistic/vocal response is verbally acknowledging a hazard or voice
dialing the cellular phone. Tasks that differ in their output responses require different
attentional resources.
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Figure 4: Three-dimensional proposed structure of the processing resources of the multiple resources
theory (adapted from [40]).
MRT predicts that tasks will less likely interfere with each other if they occur during different
information processing stages (i.e., perception and cognition vs. response), use different modalities of
perception (i.e., visual vs. auditory), with different cognitive coding (i.e., spatially-coded tasks vs.
verbally-coded tasks), and require different response outputs (i.e., manual output like steering the
wheel vs. vocal output like saying a command).
In the same way, two tasks that use similar resources (e.g., two visual tasks that both require a
manual response) will more likely interfere with each other and lead to degraded performance.
Wierwille suggested that the visual and manual demands of driving are of primary concern, since most
of the driving stimulus and information are presented visually and most of the driving tasks require a
manual output response [42]. Hence, according to MRT, in a driving environment, using the auditory
modality for presenting alarms, as opposed to the visual modality, should improve time-sharing
performance [43].
Nevertheless, presenting all alarms aurally could also be problematic. If multiple alarms are
presented in close temporal proximity and are presented in the same perceptual modality (e.g., all
auditory alerts), then the alarms could interfere with each other. However, if the alarms are presented
in different modalities (e.g., auditory, visual and haptic), then because drivers will use separate
attentional resources to process information, task-sharing performance could possibly be improved.
Consequently, using multi-modal (e.g., auditory, visual and haptic) information could lead to
increased efficiency in information processing through redundant coding of the information across
various sensory channels. The advantages and disadvantages of using auditory alarms, as well as the
other modalities and multi-modal alarms will be further explored in Section 2.2.3.1.
2.2.2 Two Main Human Factors Concerns: Prioritization and
Confusion
When multiple intelligent warning systems (both independent or integrated) are present in a
vehicle, two fundamental concerns arise which need to be addressed. First, there are issues with
regards to prioritization of alarms. Since multiple warning systems are present, there is the possibility
of multiple alarms activating simultaneously, or in close sequential succession. Humans have a
Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) that limits the ability to respond to stimuli which are presented
in close temporal proximity [44]. Hence, the reaction time of drivers may be delayed when warnings
are presented in rapid succession with other warnings during a multiple threat scenario. In addition,
warning information from these alarms may overburden drivers and compete for drivers' attention,
leading to a longer time for drivers to respond to the hazard. As was just discussed, the MRT predicts
that this delayed response will occur especially when the modalities of the alarms and target response
are the same [45]. Thus, it is important to ensure that multiple alarms from different warning systems
do not occur in rapid succession. One solution is to assign relative priorities to hazards based on safety
relevance to drivers [46]. Thus, a higher priority warning will take precedence over a lower priority
one and suppresses it so that the alarms do not sound at the same time.
Second, there are issues of confusion over the meaning of the alarms caused by multiple
alerting systems. A unique alarm for each hazard type might result in too many alarms in the vehicle,
thus making it difficult for drivers to recognize and remember the meaning of each alarm. However, if
the same alarm sound is used to represent multiple meanings, mode confusion may result when drivers
do not know which hazard condition the alarm is warning against. In this case, drivers may take a
longer time to respond because they will first have to understand the alarm and determine what
hazards it is warning against, before executing a final response.
When the driver misinterprets or misdiagnoses the alarm, he/she may commit an error of
commission and respond erroneously to the alarm. This would result in rendering the warning systems
useless and lead to degraded driving performance. Thus, it must be ensured that the warning systems
assist, rather than confuse the driver. Warning systems should not only alert drivers to the presence of
hazards, but should also communicate the type of hazard and facilitate the appropriate response.
This thesis focuses on the second fundamental concern that alarms from multiple warning
systems, even if they occur discretely, may confuse drivers.
2.2.3 Review of Intelligent Warning Systems Research
This section gives an overview of the research that has been done in the area of intelligent
warning systems. Most of the research thus far has focused on driver performance using a single
warning system and has emphasized the design and development of warning systems in isolation. In
particular, much of the research has been conducted on the driver warning systems interface in terms
of modalities. The effectiveness of warning systems has also been studied, including multi-staged (or
graded alarms) versus single-staged alert strategies for potential collisions [8], and the effectiveness of
warning systems on different age groups [7, 47, 48]. Other related human factors concerns have also
been investigated, including responses to nuisance and false alarms [29, 49], trust in automation (both
too much and too little trust) [50], mistrust in the automation leading to disuse of the systems [51, 52],
level of autonomy given to the warning systems, distraction caused by the alarms [53], over- [54] and
under-reliance on the warning systems [15], perceived criticality and urgency of alerts [55] and driver
acceptance [56].
To further investigate the human factors issues that are most relevant to the focus on multiple
alarms, the following research areas will be further explored in this section: alarm modalities, warning
system reliability (false and missing alarms) and the use of a master alert in multiple warning systems.
Alarm Modalities
Several studies have been conducted to determine the effectiveness of intelligent alerting
systems, particularly on the effectiveness of alarms transmitted through the visual [11], the audio and
the haptic [10] channels in vehicles. Research has shown that the auditory modality generally seems to
be best for conveying warning signals as it appears to reduce reaction time as well as not overload the
visual channel, which is especially relevant for driving tasks [10, 48]. MRT predicted that this would
hold true since there is high demand on the visual channel of drivers as the driving task mainly
involves tracking and monitoring. Thus, if the intelligent driver warning systems use visual displays
exclusively, drivers may experience attention overload which directly affects the perception-to-
response time to stimulus [57]. Auditory alarms tend to have an advantage in being omnipresent,
omni-directional, and for having the ability to get the driver's attention quickly regardless of where
their initial attention is focused [58]. This is especially important in a time and safety critical scenario
where immediate attention and reactions are warranted. In addition, auditory alerts have also been
found to be superior to visual stimuli in facilitating the correct responses [15, 59].
Auditory alerts are generally classified into three main types: verbal/speech, tonal signals
warnings and auditory icons, each of which have various advantages and disadvantages [60]. Verbal
warnings have the advantage of directly conveying the danger to the driver (e.g., "frontal collision,
frontal collision") or providing direct solutions to the operator in terms of follow-up steps to avoid the
hazard (e.g., "Climb, climb, climb!" of GPWS). Thus, verbal warnings tend to be unambiguous and
efficient. However, one main disadvantage of verbal alarms lies in the difficulty of discerning the
warning over background conversations. Moreover, complex verbal warnings also require more
cognitive and attentional resources and therefore may not be suitable for time- and safety- critical
events [46, 61].
Tonal signals, on the other hand, have the advantage of having a commonly recognized
meaning as a result of consistent usage. Tonal signals are also favorable when compared to verbal
warnings since they will not mask other forms of communications. Tonal alerts also result in quicker
reaction time as compared to speech alerts in general [62]. However, tonal alarms have the inherent
disadvantage of not representing the situation they are trying to convey. Also, they cannot be ignored
easily, which can become a nuisance when there is a high incidence of false alarms from the warning
systems [63]. In addition, research has also found that the large number of auditory signals used in
military aircraft, including tonal alarms, made it difficult for the crew to recall the meanings of the
warnings [64]. Moreover, some non-speech signals are sufficiently similar that they may be confused,
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particularly in high workload situations. Thus, tonal auditory alarms are most likely to cause confusion
over since there is usually no straightforward mapping of the tone to the hazard [65].
Auditory alarms should be able to communicate the nature of the hazards to the operators
through an inherent mapping of the sound to the hazard [66]. Besides using verbal alerts that explicitly
communicate the hazard or the follow-up response to take, another alert type that can convey the
nature of the hazards to drivers are auditory icons. Auditory icons are representational sounds that
have stereotype meanings defined by the objects or actions that created the sound [67]. Examples
include glass breaking or tires screeching to indicate a collision, or a virtual rumble strip to indicate
lane departure. Research has demonstrated that auditory icons appear to produce faster reaction time
than conventional auditory warnings (tonal and verbal), but more inappropriate responses [9, 68].
Thus, they have not been successfully implemented because of the incorrect association of the auditory
icons to the actual events [68].
To allow auditory alarms to convey more information, research has demonstrated that spatial
auditory alarms have been shown to significantly improve performance in both the aviation and
automotive domains [69, 70]. Three-dimensional auditory displays are being developed to enhance
cockpit displays in military aircrafts [71]. Spatially-located warnings are also relevant in vehicles,
where they can be used to indicate the direction of the potential hazard (e.g., blind spot/side, forward,
rear). An example of an intelligent warning system that uses spatially-located auditory alarms (in
particular, auditory icons) is a Lane Departure Warning System, where alerts are presented through the
left or right speaker in the car, depending on whether the driver is unintentionally departing left or
right from his lane. The auditory icon in this case could be a rumble strip sound to represent the sound
drivers hear when they leave their lanes.
As compared to visual and auditory displays, haptic displays are not widely used in
automobiles. Research has shown that haptic alerts should generally be used in combination with
visual and/or auditory warnings. This is because haptic alerts often do not convey the representational
meanings of the hazards in order for drivers to form a natural association between the hazards, the
warnings, and the appropriate actions to take. As a result, haptic alerts alone are not often effective
[29]. For example, pedal pressure may be a good warning to indicate a braking response because of the
natural association between the pedal pressure and response; however, it is a less effective warning for
communicating an unintended lane departure as there is not such natural associations [72].
In spite of all the advantages of auditory alarms, they cannot be used exclusively in the driving
environment due to various limitations of the user population, such as degraded hearing abilities.
Research has shown that multi-modal displays may be effective, and performance generally improves
when auditory alerts are used in combination with and are redundant to visual and haptic displays [73,
74]. This is in line with MRT since redundant displays make it more likely that an unused resource
can be allocated to a new potential hazard. Thus, task-sharing performance will improve when
attentional and cognitive resources can be allocated to tasks that differ in the perceptual modality
dimension.
One of the research questions of this thesis is to investigate the implications of using aural
alarms with multiple meanings in the context of multiple intelligent warning systems. Since research
has shown that aural alarms are generally more suited for imminent warnings and are more prevalent
in vehicles today than multi-modal alarms, this thesis will focus on the aural channel only, in spite of
the potential benefits of multi-modal warning systems.
2.2.3.2 Warning System Reliability - False and Missing Alarms
When multiple intelligent warning systems are present in the vehicle, driver performance may
be degraded in many ways. In addition to confusion which was discussed previously, multiple
intelligent warning systems can also degrade performance when the warning systems have a high
incidence of false and missing alarms (Table 2). A false alarm may lead to a sudden reaction from a
driver when no collision is imminent. Thus, when a driver reacts to a nonexistent situation because of
a false alarm, the wrong identification or no identification of the hazardous situations may be a source
of distraction and confusion to the driver, which subsequently degrade his driving performance. In
addition to false alarms, warning systems may also fail to warn of legitimate dangers, which result in
missing alarms. Thus, both false and missing alarms can undermine driver's confidence in the warning
systems and the subsequent willingness to trust and use the warning systems [51].
Table 2: Signal Detection Theory Table
Response (i.e., warning alarm)
Present Absent
Miss(ing) Alarm
Present/Signal Hit - True Positive
Type 1 Error - too
Signal/Stimulus stringent decision
criteria
(i.e., critical hazard)
False Alarm
Absent/Noise Correct Rejection
Type 2 Error - Erring
on the side of caution
Warning systems depend on sensors to detect if the criteria or threshold has been exceeded or
violated. When the cost of a missed signal is high, the decision criteria will tend to be conservative.
However, while a conservative design helps ensure adequate reactions to critical situations, it also
increases the frequency of false and nuisance alarms [51, 75]. For example, the decision criteria of
collision avoidance and warning systems in automobiles may tend be conservative, especially to
address the variance in sensor measurements and unpredictability in the dynamics of the warning
systems [76]. With such a decision criteria, nuisance alarms may also be common. Nuisance alerts
occur when the alarms are correctly generated based on a threshold violation, but trigger because of
insignificant hazards. Thus, false and nuisance alarms may create a false sense of urgency and divert
the attention of drivers. Although the warning systems are performing to pre-defined threshold criteria
and specifications, these false and nuisance alarms will appear as failures of the systems to drivers.
In general, critical hazards such as imminent collisions with a lead vehicle or a stationary
object have very low base rate in reality. Thus, if the false and nuisance alarm rates are high despite a
low a priori probability of critical events, then drivers' confidence in the warning systems will drop
[51]. As the number of false alarms increases, drivers will gradually change their attitudes and beliefs
about the warning systems. They may lose confidence and not trust the warning systems anymore.
Consequently, this change in attitude and beliefs will affect their motivation to accept and use the
systems. As more false alarms get presented, drivers may become annoyed and distracted. If drivers
choose to ignore the alarms, then the purpose of having warning systems is defeated. However, if
drivers take more time to decide their response, then the warning systems are less effective. As a
result, the presence of warning systems with a high false alarm rate, especially for real events with a
low base rate, may degrade overall driving performance.
Elimination of all false alarms is thus ideal, but according to the Signal Detection Theory, the
balance of false alarms and missing alarms is a tradeoff that has to be optimized. Thus, the selection of
an appropriate decision criterion with a threshold that balances the incidence of missing with the early
detection of alarms is crucial. Elimination of all false signals is ideal, but attempts to achieve that goal
by altering sensor detection decision criteria can lead to overly strict detection systems that fail to alert
of true hazards. Instead of generating too many false alarms, warning systems may thus fail to inform
of legitimate danger, leading to the converse problem of missing alarms [77]. If the sensor's decision
criteria is set too strictly, then the sensor may fail to signal developing crises (i.e., missing alarms), or
it may wait too long before warning the operator (i.e., late alarms). Missing alarms are detrimental as
they often lead to operator mistrust in the warning systems [51].
Warning systems with many false or missing alarms are unreliable systems. Research has
shown that excessive problems of false alarms on comparable aircraft intelligent collision avoidance
warning systems, such as the TCAS, have had negative impacts due to operators' mistrust and a lack
of usage [78]. Similarly, in vehicles, not only will low reliability of the warning systems affect drivers'
trust and acceptance of the systems, it can also dramatically and negatively influence driving
performance [8, 79-81 ]. If there is a high incidence of false and missing alarms, drivers may be better
served by not having such intelligent aids at all. Thus, well chosen warning criteria and decision
threshold are important factors that can ultimately affect the market acceptance of these intelligent
warning systems. As a result, there is a crucial need for the development of highly reliable intelligent
warning systems. However, this task will not be trivial since the configurations of the driving
environment are constantly changing.
2.2.3.3 Multiple Intelligent Warning Systems
When multiple warning systems are present, critical issues unique to the integration of
multiple intelligent warning systems include issues of alarm prioritization [82] and conflicting and
contradictory alerts from separate warning systems [83]. Presentations and modalities of multiple
warning systems have also been investigated, specifically the effects of graphic versus text displays on
driver reaction time when warnings from different warning systems were presented simultaneously
[84].
Even though there has been some research on multiple warning systems such as those just
outlined, there is a dearth of research on driver performance and interaction with multiple intelligent
warning systems. In particular, the option of using a master alert as a general alarm as opposed to
using distinct alarms for separate warning systems has not been adequately explored. Individual
alarms for the different warning systems may have disadvantages because a unique alarm for each
hazard type may result in too many alarms in the vehicle, making it difficult for drivers to recognize
and remember the meanings of alarms, as they become overloaded and confused. Thus, this thesis is
addressing the alternative design choice of using a single master alarm and exploring if a master
caution alert for multiple warning systems will make a difference in improving or degrading driver
performance.
A single master alarm has the advantage of communicating the presence of a hazard through a
consistent alert, and drivers will learn to associate that master alert with danger. However, while the
master alert is synonymous with critical situations, it does not necessarily communicate the hazard
type effectively. Thus, drivers will need to direct their attention towards locating the specific hazard
causing the alarm. In cases where the target responses to the multiple alarms and hazards are very
different, it may be insufficient just to alert of the presence of a hazard by a master alert. For example,
an FCWS may warn of a hazard in front of the driver, which requires a braking response, while a
LDWS may warn of unintentional lane departure, which requires a steering correction. Thus, a master
alarm alerting of both an imminent forward hazard and an unintentional lane departure may be
insufficient. The additional time required for drivers to locate the specific hazard and to make an
appropriate response may negate the benefits of a single master alarm warning strategy. In addition,
another disadvantage of using a single master alarm is mode confusion that may result because the
same alarm is used to represent multiple meanings. As a result, drivers may not know which hazard
condition the alarm is warning against.
It is important that alarms are informative in alerting drivers to the condition at hand, without
unnecessarily overwhelming them with too much too often or inadequately. Such information may be
embedded in the nature of the alarm (i.e., a verbal warning or auditory icon), or may come from the
driver awareness of the context [85]. Thus, the issues concerning the presence of a master alerting
scheme of multiple intelligent warning systems in vehicles have yet to be adequately addressed.
2.3 Institutional Concerns
In addition to technical issues, there are various institutional considerations that will also add to
the complexity of the development and implementation of intelligent driver assistance and warning
systems [86]. Institutions may be defined as any form of codes that people develop to determine
how components in society interact. These codes include formal codes, such as judicial
legislation, economic rules and contracts, and informal constraints, such as social conventions and
codes of behavior [87].
Three main institutional issues arise that need to be addressed in conjunction with the
technical development of these systems. First, there are uncertainties concerning the safety impact of
large-scale application of intelligent driver warning systems. It is possible that the intelligent warning
systems may instead lead to worse performance than if they were not present at all [88]. There is no
clear empirical evidence and data supporting the positive impact that these systems will have on
improving safety, primarily because these systems have yet to penetrate the market fully. Currently
results have only been drawn from experiments and simulations.
Second, there are uncertainties regarding the functional design and purpose of intelligent
warning systems with regards social goals and market acceptance. Questions such as what preferences
drivers have with regard to the level of automation and who has the ultimate responsibility in driving
and making decisions (the driver or the ADAS) are pertinent issues that need to be addressed.
Third and last, the issue of liability is becoming increasingly important. Liability surrounding
the use of intelligent warning systems is a major concern, especially in a litigious country like the
United States [89]. Intelligent warning systems in general require a high level of interaction with the
driver, a main aspect of which is the presentation of alerting information. Thus, human-centered
design and a transparent human-machine interface are essential. Nevertheless, standards regarding a
transparent and user-centered interface design have yet to be established. Consequently, without the
presence of clear standards and regulations, there may be uncertainties with regard to liability and
responsibility when accidents occur as a result of using the warning systems. In other words, who will
be responsible - driving consumers, the automobile manufacturers or the warning systems equipment
manufacturers when accidents occur? If there are clear standards for the automotive and equipment
manufacturers, then it may be easier to partition responsibilities in the courts. Nevertheless, the issue
of liability may still arise even if there are clear standards, particularly for cases where the intelligent
warning systems that take partial control of the vehicles. Thus, the level of automation and control of
these systems are engineering design, policy and social decisions that carry huge liability implications.
Implicitly connected with these three main institutional concerns is the setting of minimum
standards and regulations. The important questions regarding if there should be minimum safety
standards and what these standards should be, are questions to be answered not just by the engineers
designing the warning systems, but also by the other major stakeholders who will be most affected by
the outcome of the safety standards and regulations. These main stakeholders are the government
regulatory agencies, automotive manufacturers, and the consuming public. Standards may affect the
automotive manufacturers in terms of their innovation process and how the emerging technology
develops, the consuming public in terms of market acceptance and penetration of these technologies
and all three stakeholders when the benefits and costs of the emerging technology shift from one
stakeholder to the other. Other stakeholders who may have a role in the decision-making process
include the judicial and legislative parties, international organizations such as the International
Standards Organization (ISO) and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), insurance companies
as well as component suppliers.
Before exploring what existing standards and regulations already exist for these intelligent
driver warning systems, it helps to have a framework to understand why and how policy tools such as
safety standards and regulations help in achieving safety, and a finer distinction between standards and
regulations as well as that between the different types of safety standards will be distinguished.
Second, different aspects of safety of intelligent warning systems will be presented so as to understand
the kind of safety that the standards should be ensuring. Finally, existing standards and regulations of
intelligent driver warning systems will be discussed.
2.3.1 Policy Tools to Achieve Safety Levels
2.3.1.1 The Three "E"s: Engineering, Enforcement and Education
There are three common approaches or policy tools that are used to overcome human error,
improve safety levels or to reduce injuries in any type of complex system, including automobile safety
[90, 91]. These three approaches are:
I. "Engineering" or Technology Solutions - These solutions are engineering and
technology solutions that provide automatic and direct solutions, with minimal
participation of the users. Examples of direct technology solutions designed to improve
automobile safety levels include crash prevention technologies such as intelligent driver
warning systems and crashworthiness technologies such as Antilock Braking Systems
(ABS) and air bags.
II. "Enforcement" or Judicial Solutions - These solutions are regulations and
enforcements designed to change people's behaviors so as to bring about increased
safety. An example is mandatory seat belt laws, which together with a system of fines
and penalties, discourage certain behaviors (i.e., not using the seat belts) and encourage
other behaviors (i.e., using the seat belts). Regulations and enforcements can generally
be further split into ex-ante/pre-activity regulations and ex-post/post-activity
regulations:
a. Ex-ante regulations or "Regulations of Safety" - These regulations are enforced
before the technology is introduced and are direct ways to change people's
behaviors. An example is the regulation of mandatory seat belt laws. In that
case, people had to change their behavior to buckle up because of the enforced
legislation. Another regulation is one that states that all vehicles must have air
bags (as of 1998). In this case, the manufacturers had to ensure that their vehicle
fleet met this regulation and thus, a behavioral change of the manufacturers was
induced.
b. Ex-post regulations or "Liability of Harm" - These regulations are enforced
after the technology is introduced and are often indirect means to change
people's behavior. For example, there were no regulations with regard to air bag
installations in vehicles when they were initially introduced. Instead, liability
cases ensured that manufacturers conducted sufficient research into air bags
before releasing them into their vehicle fleet. Thus, liability of harm was an
indirect regulatory solution to bring about behavioral change of the
manufacturers to conduct more research in order to ensure the development of a
safe technology product.
III. "Education" or Social Solutions - These are methods to persuade the user/public to
change their behavior "voluntarily" by influencing them. Another term may be "moral
suasion" which is a persuasion tactic used to influence and pressure (but not force)
people to adhere to a certain behavior or policy. Unlike the previous judicial solution
which forces a mandatory change of behavior by enforcing regulations, this indirect
method of moral suasion influences a change in behavior through incentives. Incentives
encourage a change of behavior since people will want to increase their total utility and
benefit from the incentives. These incentives could be intangible or tangible. Examples
of intangible incentives are the increased safety levels that are derived from the use of
seat belts. The public could be educated through campaigns (both publicly and privately
funded) on these safety benefits and since survival during a crash is generally perceived
to have a higher utility than death, this intangible incentive can be used to persuade
people to use their seat belts. Examples of tangible incentives are the economic
incentives that are provided to encourage drivers to wear seat belts. For example,
insurance premiums could be designed to be lower if drivers wear seat belts during a
crash.
In general, the first approach of ensuring safety by using technology and automatic protection
is the most effective and the third approach of moral suasion is the least effective. The main reason is
because with automatic technology protection, there is little need to rely on driver participation,
whereas the last approach depends mostly on drivers to change their behavior in order for the approach
to be effective [90]. For example, seat belts have been shown to be highly effective in reducing serious
injuries from automobile accidents from studies conducted in the 1960s. Nevertheless, mean seat belt
usage was estimated at only 14.1% in 1978 and best estimates were still hovering around 20% for
1981 [92]. Even in 2005, the average national seat belt usage was estimated at 82%, with rates ranging
from 60.8% in Mississippi to 95.3% in Hawaii [93]. These low utilization rates were in spite of both
government-sponsored and private campaigns to educate the user population on the benefits of using
seat belts. Thus, the method of suasion to change the behavior of the public was not a very effective
policy tool at attempting to improve road safety.
In conjunction with the first method, regulations and enforcements were also employed to
change people's behaviors and to encourage them to wear seat belts. NHTSA mandated in the 1970s
that the engine starter could only be activated if the seat belts were engaged. This law is an ex-ante
regulation that was put in place to "force" a behavior change of drivers - it was mandatory to wear
seat belts in order to start the car! However, due to widespread unpopularity, Congress overruled this
law. In its place, NHTSA passed mandatory seat belt laws for all states, which is another ex-ante
regulation. However, even this second method of regulations and enforcements could not reach the
desired improved safety levels for a variety of reasons. First, there was a need for a system of fines,
penalties and resources to effectively enforce these laws. Second, in the U.S., there was considerably
more opposition to government policies that attempted to regulate the behaviors of individuals as
compared to Europe where mandatory seat belt laws were more effective. Third, economic research
has suggested that people tend to compensate for the increase in safety (when using seat belts, for
example) by engaging in more risky behavior. According to Peltzman, safety is an economic good
(just like time) that people use to trade to increase their overall utility [94]. This phenomenon is known
as risk homeostasis or behavioral compensation [95]. Thus, for these reasons, the second method of
regulatory enforcements to change people's behavior in order to improve safety levels is often not very
effective.
As a result, another more direct solution was needed and technology was developed to
increase safety without the participation of drivers. The technology was air bags, which was pushed as
a replacement for seat belts'. In 1977, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) §208
required that air bags must ensure the safety of unrestrained front seat occupants. Thus, this standard
reflected the beliefs of the decision and policy makers that drivers could not be relied on (either
through soft measures such as public education or hard measures such as law enforcements) to wear
their seat belts. As a result, a technology solution was designed to ensure that these drivers would
nonetheless still be safe [96]. The development of air bags and air bags standards will be further
explored in Chapter 4.
Knowing the various levels of policy approaches can help in understanding existing safety
standards and regulations for intelligent driver warning systems and what policy approaches may be
suitable. However, differences between standards and regulations should first be distinguished.
2.3.1.2 Safety Standards and Safety Regulations
There is a subtle distinction regarding the use of the word "standards" as opposed to
"regulations" in the context of the policy framework outlined in the preceding section. In this thesis, a
finer distinction is made. Standards correspond to the first policy approach of using "engineering" or
technological systems to help improve safety levels. An example of a safety standard is that all air
bags must ensure survival safety of occupants during a frontal collision at 30 mph. On the other hand,
regulations correspond to the second policy approach of "enforcements" and laws. An example of a
regulation is that all vehicles must be installed with airbags starting from 1998. See Table 3 for more
When air bags were first conceptualized in the 1950s, they were developed to replace seat belts. However, we
know today that air bags are more effective when used in conjunction with a seat belt.
examples. Thus, both standards and regulations are safety-related but the distinction lies in the
different policy approaches to which they correspond ("Engineering" vs. "Enforcements").
Table 3: Distinctions between Standards and Regulations for the various safety devices in vehicles [97].
Safety Standards Safety Regulations
(Correspond to engineering or (Correspond to "Enforcement"
technology solutions) or judicial solutions)
Seat Belts Fastened seat belts with lap Lap and shoulder seat belts
and shoulder portions must must be installed at every
meet crash test requirements at forward facing and outboard
30 mph. designated seating position.
Air Bags Air bags must meet crash test Air bags must be installed in
requirements at 30 mph. all vehicles starting from
1998.
Intelligent Warning All warnings from FCWS All vehicles have an integrated
Systems2  must be auditory and all system of ACC and LDWS
warnings from LDWS must be installed.
haptic. 1
2.3.1.3 Design Standards and Performance Standards
Safety standards can be further differentiated into two general categories as follows:
* Performance standards specify a minimum level of performance that must be met
while the system or device (e.g., intelligent driver warning systems) is being used.
Thus, performance standards are technical standards used to guarantee a minimum
safety level [24, 98]. Examples include performance requirements during automotive
certification for air bags and brakes [97]. It is worth noting that because performance
standards are performance-based and technology-independent, they do not limit
innovation since manufacturers have flexibility and incentives to decide on the
optimal way to achieve the performance level with the least cost.
* Design standards include the physical aspects of the system, including factors such as
alert modality and interface layout and location. As design standards are prescription-
based (i.e., they are based on pre-specified procedures or approaches), they are
technology-dependent to an extent, and hence, may stifle innovation. For example,
confining the physical location of a particular control input limits the manufacturers in
the design of a warning system, which may hamper innovation.
2 Since there are no standards or regulations for these systems yet, these are illustrative examples.
Performance standards are generally more common than design standards in the automotive
industry, as seen in the plethora of crashworthiness standards including performance requirements of
brakes and air bags [97]. Distinguishing between the two main types of safety standards can help
answer the question about what minimum safety standards should be applicable to the intelligent
warning systems, and in particular, if performance-based and prescription-based standards should be
used.
2.3.1.4 Standards and Standardization
As illustrated in the preceding sections, there is a spectrum of different policy options,
including standards and regulations that can be used to address the human factors problems that may
arise from the use of multiple intelligent driver warning systems. In particular, the two types of
standards, performance and design standards, can each vary along a particular dimension. One
dimension is the degree of enforcement of the standards by the regulatory agency, which corresponds
to performance standards. Another dimension is the degree of standardization, which corresponds to
design standards.
Performance Standards and Degree of Enforcement:
Performance standards can vary along the dimension with regard to the degree of enforcement
of the standards by a regulatory agency. On one end of the spectrum is the presence of strict standards
and on the other end is the absence of any enforced standards. However, the absence of enforced
standards does not mean that manufacturers are free to do whatever they want. Typically, because of
the reactive judicial system (i.e., the judicial system that responds to the introduction of new
technologies through product liability laws) in most developed societies, the industry typically self-
regulates. Thus, even in the absence of strictly-enforced standards, "de facto" standards, which are
shaped by the leading manufacturers to be informal standards, often emerge. Thus, the degree of
enforcement will dictate whether the performance standards are strict enforced standards, or just de
facto standards.
Design Standards and Degree of Standardization:
Design standards can vary along the dimension with regard to the degree of standardization of
the various design parameters of the warning systems across manufacturers. On one end of the
spectrum, these design parameters may be standardized across manufacturers. In other words, there
will not be any variability in the design and interface of the warning systems because they are
standardized, and drivers will experience the same intelligent warning systems regardless of which
models lines of vehicles they drive. On the other end, there is no standardization of the design
parameters, and manufacturers may be free to design the systems as they wish. Some manufacturers
may even allow their users to customize and personalize the systems according to their preferences.
Thus, since the warning systems are not standardized across manufacturers, they will vary
considerably in terms of their design parameters, such as how alarms are presented.
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Figure 5: Framework for the policy solutions for intelligent driver warning systems
Figure 5 shows how these two dimensions map out to performance and design standards.
These two dimensions are continuous and not discrete. Thus, Figure 5 illustrates the extreme ends of
the spectrum for both the dimensions.
2.3.1.5 Harmonization of Standards
In addition to these distinctions that have been made, a definition of another term,
harmonization, is also necessary. Harmonization of standards is the adoption of unified and
converging international standards, which could be either performance or design standards.
Harmonization is different from standardization, in that harmonization refers to the standards that
converge towards one beyond national boundaries, while standardization refers to the design of the
No
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Standards/
De Facto
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warning systems that converge to one design. For example, within the United States, warning systems
may be standardized across manufacturers because the regulatory agency may have design standards
that strictly outline how the warning systems should be designed. Similarly, in Europe, there may be
design standards that result in the standardization of warning systems there. However, even though the
intelligent warning systems are standardized within the United States and within Europe, they may be
very different because these design standards in the U.S. and in Europe are not harmonized.
Automobiles are highly regulated products for reasons including safety, energy conservation
and environmental protection. Thus, while automobiles may be standardized within national
boundaries, they may be very different across national boundaries. There has been a trend towards the
international harmonization of vehicles standards. At the international level, the harmonization of
vehicle standards and the co-ordination of research (not just safety-related) are advanced through the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE). A specialized ECE body, the Working
Party on the Construction of Vehicles (WP-29) has become a de facto global forum for the
international harmonization of technical standards, including those of safety, for vehicles. WP-29
brings together regulators and representatives of manufacturers of vehicles and parts, consumers and
other stakeholders from different countries [99].
2.3.2 Aspects of Safety of Intelligent Warning Systems
There are different aspects of "safety" when using ADAS and intelligent driver warning
systems in the larger context of the traffic environment. Safety could be compromised in three major
aspects, commonly classified as traffic system safety, usage safety and functional safety [100]. It is
important to distinguish between these three aspects, because one policy approach (as outlined in the
preceding section) may be used to address one aspect of safety, while another policy approach may be
more suitable for another safety aspect. I now explain the three safety aspects in greater detail:
Traffic System Safety: This safety aspect refers to safety issues arising from the traffic
system as a whole (i.e., the entire complex operating system, including interactions
between drivers and other vehicles in the roadway infrastructure). The focus is on
issues such as the way that a particular warning system may influence the behavior of
other users and alter the interaction between the driver, the vehicle, the roadway
infrastructure and other road users. Thus, two examples of standards and regulations
that may address this safety aspect are those that mandate that all drivers go through
training before using a car installed with intelligent driver warning systems, as well as
the regulations that modifies traffic laws to incorporate usage of the warning systems.
* Usage Safety: This safety aspect includes safety issues arising from the usage of the
intelligent driver warning systems, thus focusing on the interaction between the
operator (i.e., driver) and the machine (i.e., warning system). Key issues involve
inappropriate design leading to driver confusion, driver overload or underload,
distraction from driving, the lack of understanding of the capabilities of the warning
systems leading to unjustified over- or under-reliance and mistrust of the warning
systems. For example, standards and regulations may address usage safety by
requiring that the driving performances of selected populations of drivers are not
degraded when using the intelligent warning systems while driving.
* Functional System Safety: This safety aspect includes technical safety issues arising
from both hardware and software design from the system itself. Note that the
"system" here refers to the intelligent driver warning systems, which are different
from the traffic system. The focus is on the technical reliability and robustness of the
warning systems and their propensity towards malfunctions. Thus, standards and
regulations may address functional system safety of the warning systems to ensure
that, at least on a minimum level, the systems are robust and reliable.
2.3.3 Existing Safety Standards and Regulations for Intelligent
Warning Systems
Safety standards on intelligent warning systems are non-existent today. There are no minimum
safety standards that mandate that the warning systems must perform to a certain minimum
requirement (performance-based), or that the warning systems must be designed a certain way
(prescription-based). There are also presently no regulations such as those mandating that drivers
understand and know how to use the driver assistance and warning systems, or that all vehicles must
have these systems installed3. Thus, the questions of whether there should be any minimum standards
at all, and if so, should these standards be standardized across manufacturers, are still open questions. I
address these questions in Chapter 4.
3 However, since the technology is still emerging now, it is more sensible to discuss standards first, then
regulations, which typically tend to be decided later when the emerging technologies are already in the market.
2.4 Conclusions
Ensuring the safety of emerging technologies such as driver assistance and warning systems in
automobiles is essential since these systems were designed to improve safety. In addition, the
assurance of safety of products is also very important to both the public and the regulating authorities.
One way of improving both functional and usage safety is through continued research on
intelligent warning systems, especially on how drivers perform in the presence of multiple warning
systems. One design option is to use a master alert, instead of multiple distinct alerts for the multiple
warning systems. As the number of warning systems in a vehicle increase, the use of a master alert
may be advantageous since it will be synonymous with impending hazards and "danger!" However,
the use of a master alert in warning systems for automobiles has not been sufficiently explored.
Another way to ensure the functional safety and especially the usage safety of these systems is
by designing minimum safety standards. Such standards will assist in eliminating those systems that
are not robust, unreliable and which may degrade drivers' performance. In addition, minimum pre-
market safety standards also aid in informing the public that the particular assistance/warning systems
being marketed are safe, since manufacturers have to meet the safety requirements before their
products are allowed to market.
However, setting standards implies knowing what they should be. In addition, there are also
uncertainties with regard to what a "safe" warning system is. For example, for a collision avoidance
system, in terms of functional system safety, it is not straightforward to design one that is reliable,
with an optimal balance between minimizing the number of false alarms and missing alarms. In terms
of usage safety, it is not clear yet how the presence of multiple warning systems will affect the driver
in terms of various human factors issues. Lastly, in terms of traffic system safety, it is even less clear
how these warning systems will interact with each other in a complex traffic environment. In addition,
there have even been doubts raised regarding the necessity of having safety standards and if there
should be any standards at all.
As a result, there are no performance standards today to ensure the safety of the intelligent
warning systems. Additionally, there are also no design standards that standardize the warning
systems, especially in terms of the alerting strategy, modality presentation, and warning sensitivity.
This lack of standards may not be a problem today, since such systems are not ubiquitous yet.
However, as intelligent warning systems become increasingly pervasive in the future, the issue of
standards and regulations will become more pertinent especially if these standards could help mitigate
some of the technical issues that arise with the presence of multiple intelligent warning systems, such
as confusion. These exact issues are problems in aviation today; a study conducted by the FAA on
issues related to warning systems on aircraft found that inconsistencies in the alert utilization
philosophies, lack of standardization and a rapid increase in the number of alarms in aircraft are major
problems contributing to confusion of pilots and air traffic controllers [101, 102].
Even though there are no minimum standards today, manufacturers are already introducing
these systems into higher-end luxury models. Thus currently, the main motivation ensuring that
manufacturers are making their best efforts to develop safe warning systems is the judicial process.
The burden of proof lies with manufacturers to show that their systems are indeed safe. This financial
disincentive in litigation damages alone is sufficient to motivate manufacturers to conduct extensive
tests and evaluations of their driver warning systems to an extent. However, this policy approach may
not be ideal in the long run. Rather, safety standards may provide the answer to ensure that intelligent
warning systems will improve road safety in the long run.
However, pre-market safety standards are hard to set because they generally provide little
incentive for manufacturers to innovate. Innovation may be major radical shifts in technology, or just
incremental adaptation of existing technologies. In the automotive industry, technological innovation
is an especially significant determinant of economic growth and it is ideal to be a market leader
through innovation [103, 104]. In addition, another reason why safety standards are hard to set is that
the regulatory environment is very complex. Intelligent driver warning systems have not fully
penetrated the market and thus, have unknown impacts concerning the issues regarding safety. The
government has a role to guarantee minimum safety level to the public, yet government officials are
not knowledgeable about the latest technology since the warning systems is an innovation-driven field
where the technical experts are mostly the private manufacturers themselves, and for reasons of
competition, do not divulge competitive secrets. As a result, nobody knows yet if there should be
minimum standards and if so, what these standards should be [105]. This thesis thus aims to explore
this question and consider the tradeoffs between various policy approaches, including setting
minimum safety standards that may be able to mitigate the technical problems of confusion.
Chapter 3
Human Factors of Multiple Alarms
In this chapter, an experiment will be discussed that was conducted to investigate the
effectiveness of several intelligent warning systems with multiple alarms. Details of the experiment
will be presented, in addition to the results, discussions and limitations of the experiment. Finally, the
human factors implications of using multiple intelligent warning systems in vehicles will be discussed.
3.1 Intelligent Driver Warning Systems Study
One goal of the thesis is to answer the following question: What are the human factors
implications of using alarms with multiple meanings from multiple intelligent warning systems in
automobiles? In particular, are there problems of confusion over the meaning of alarms, and, if so,
what conditions will exacerbate this problem?
To address these issues, an experiment in a driving simulator was conducted. The primary
factor of investigation was to compare the effectiveness of a single master alarm warning versus
multiple distinct warnings for the different intelligent warning systems. A variety of different driver
warning systems were chosen for investigation, including systems that signaled impending frontal
(Forward Collision Warning System) and rear collisions (Following-Vehicle Fast Approach Warning
System), as well as unintentional left and right lane departures (Lane Departure Warning System).
Finally, driver performance under different reliability conditions of the warning systems was also
investigated.
3.1.1 Apparatus
3.1.1.1 Simulator Hardware
The experiment was conducted on a fully instrumented, fixed-based driving simulator, a 2001
VolkswagenTM Beetle (Figure 6). The rearview mirror was provided through a projection on the front
screen. Participants interfaced with the brake pedal, accelerator pedal and steering wheel (which
provided force feedback for a degree of realism). The speedometer, turning signals, hazard lights, seat
adjustments, air conditioning were fully functional. Auditory output, namely vehicular motor sounds
and the pertinent alarm warnings were broadcasted through the in-car radio sound system. The virtual
environment was projected onto a large wall-mounted 8 by 6 feet projector screen six feet in front of
the driver. This provided an approximately 40° horizontal field of view. A secondary small screen
connected to a number keypad was on the right side of the driver. Figure 7 illustrates the driving
environment and the secondary screen.
Figure 6: Exterior of Vehicle Simulator
Figure 7: Interior of Vehicle Simulator
3.1.1.2 Simulator Software
A driving simulation test bed was developed using STISIM DriveTM Build 2.06.00 Simulation
System developed by Systems Technology, Inc. Scenarios were built using the Scenario Definition
Language (SDL) and modifications were made using the STISIM DriveTM Open Module code. The
software running in the background recorded all of the participants' actions including the driving
information, the vehicle's speed, steering angle, throttle and braking inputs.
3.1.2 Experimental Design
Three different factors of alarm alerting schemes (master and multiple alarms), driver warning
systems (for signaling front and rear collisions and left and right lane departures), and warning
reliability (high and low) were investigated. First, the impact of using a master alert as opposed to
multiple alarms for the various intelligent warning systems was chosen to be the primary factor of
investigation since as explained in Chapter 2, there may be advantages to using a master alert for
multiple warning systems. This option has not been explored adequately in the driving domain.
Second, different warning systems signaling differing hazards were chosen which included
frontal (Forward Collision Warning System, FCWS) and rear collisions (Following-Vehicle Fast
Approach Warning System, FVFA), as well as unintentional left and right lane departures (Lane
Departure Warning System, LDW). These warning systems were chosen because they will potentially
be among the earlier warning systems to be introduced into vehicles, as opposed to other systems like
intersection collision avoidance systems, which are not likely to be introduced into the market in the
near future. Thus these warning systems investigated both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure driver warning systems.
As explained in Section 2.1.1, current systems being investigated under the federal IVBSS
initiative are Rear-End (or FCWS), Lane Change/Merge and Lane Departure Warning Systems, which
is why the FCW and LDW systems were selected for this study. While the FVFA system is not
currently planned for release in vehicles, unlike the FCWS and LDWS, it was chosen as a third
warning system to complement and complete the fourth cardinal direction, the rear scene.
Third, the reliability of these warning systems was investigated because it is unlikely that any
intelligent driver warning system on the market will be perfectly reliable. As explained in Chapter 2,
there is a tradeoff to be made between false and missing alarms and thus, there will not be any warning
systems without either false or missing alarms. Thus, two different reliability levels of the warning
systems were investigated.
An experiment was conducted using a 2x4x2 mixed factorial design. These three factors will
be explained in further detail in the following sub-sections.
3.1.2.1 Factor 1: Alarm Alerting Scheme
The first factor was the type of alarm alerting scheme: single master alarm or multiple alarms.
This factor was a between-subjects factor. Half of the participants heard a single master alarm for all
the different warnings, while the other half heard distinct alarms for each driving event (frontal and
rear impending collisions, as well as potential left and right lane departures).
All the warning alerts in this study were tonal beeps provided by the Ford Motor Company to
represent realistic warnings in use in cars today. For the single master alarm alerting scheme,
participants heard a generic tonal beeping alarm from both in-car speakers for each of the driving
events of front and rear collisions, left and right lane departures. For the multiple alarms alerting
scheme, participants heard distinct alarms warning of the four different driving events. These alarms
were as follows:
i) Frontal Collision Warning (FCW): a tonal beep consisting of a short phase
difference, conveying a sense of urgency,
ii) Follow Vehicle Fast-Approach (FVFA) Warning: a tonal beep consisting of a
longer phase difference,
iii) Left Lane-Departure Warning (LDW): an alert simulating a low frequency rumble
strip from the left in-car speaker,
iv) Right Lane-Departure Warning (LDW): an alert identical to the Left Lane-
Departure Warning, but presented through the right in-car speaker.
The sound levels of the warning tones were kept at a consistent level across participants. All
participants indicated that they were able to hear and distinguish the alarms above the vehicular motor
and background noise when they sounded. The media files for the sounds can be downloaded in the
"Multimedia Resources" section on the Humans and Automation Lab website: http://halab.mit.edu.
3.1.2.2 Factor 2: Driver Warning Systems
The second factor was the driver warning systems or driving events, and there were four
treatment levels: imminent frontal and rear collisions, and unintentional left and right lane departures.
Even though the left and right lane departure warnings were, in reality, from the same driver warning
system (i.e., LDWS), they were categorized as different treatment levels because the alarms were
spatially located and because they warned of different driving/alarm events (i.e., departure to the left
which required a steering correction to the right vs. departure to the right which required a steering
correction to the left). This factor was a within-subjects factor, thus, every participant experienced all
types of events (i.e., they heard an alarm for potential hazards in the four cardinal directions).
Participants experienced 2 testing scenarios. Each testing scenario contained an equal number
of FCW, FVFA, Left LDW and Right LDW driving events, which were randomly interspersed in the
roadway scenario.
3.1.2.3 Factor 3: Reliability of the Driver Warning Systems
The third factor investigated was the effect of warning reliabilities on driving performance.
There were two treatment levels: high and low reliability across the different warning systems. This
factor was a within-subject factor, and every subject experienced the two treatment levels. One
scenario used highly reliable warning systems, while the other used warning systems with low
reliability. The order in which participants experienced these two different scenarios was
counterbalanced to reduce order effects.
The high reliability condition had a ratio of TP:FP =3:1 (true positive: false positive) while the
low reliability condition had a ratio of TP:FP = 1:3. TP events were actual occurrences of the hazard
for which the warning systems presented the appropriate alarms. TP events did not include user-
triggered events. FP events occurred when an alarm sounded with no actual corresponding event.
Thus, a TP is a "Hit", while a FP is a "False Alarm" (Table 2). In this experiment, missing alarms
were not studied.
3.1.3 Scenario Design
This section gives a detailed explanation of the design of the scenarios, including the number
of events per testing scenario and how events were ordered, the details on the triggering events of the
various driver warning systems (i.e., for the four cardinal directions), the warning algorithms, and how
they triggered and finally, an overview of the secondary task that all participants were asked to
perform during the experiment.
3.1.3.1 Event Order
For each participant, there were two scenarios. Let A be the scenario with highly reliable
warning systems and let B be the scenario with less reliable warning systems. In both scenarios A and
B, participants drove through sections of rural highway, interspersed with dense city driving and
suburban housing estates. There were traffic devices such as traffic lights, stop signs, as well as
pedestrians (see Appendix B for pictures of the different driving environments). Participants drove
through a two-way, two-lane road throughout the scenario, i.e., there was only one driving lane for the
participant. If participants departed from the lane of travel, they would either go into the lane of
oncoming traffic, or onto the shoulder of the road. The participants were not asked to make any turns.
For both scenarios A and B, participants experienced 32 driving events altogether. Since there
were 4 different driver warning systems, there were 8 events (including TP and FP) per warning type
per testing scenario. All 32 events were arranged in a random order for each scenario but all
participants encountered the same order of events. This is because scenarios and the critical events
have to be pre-programmed and cannot occur dynamically for each participant. Table 4 shows the
breakdown of the events per scenario for the 2 different scenarios, A and B.
Table 4: Breakdown of TP and FP events for both Scenario A and Scenario B.
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The scenarios were designed in such a way that the 32 critical events did not overlap in time,
because this experiment was not investigating multiple threat situations. The events occurred
approximately 30-45 seconds apart from each other, which ensured that human PRP is not a limiting
factor in the study. Each scenario lasted approximately 12-15 minutes depending on how fast the
participants were driving. However, scenario B tended to be shorter since there was a higher incidence
of false alarms, as compared to scenario A where there were more true events, which sometimes
caused collisions. Thus, scenario A had a longer average running time than scenario B (see Appendix
C for more information on the exact order of the TP and FP events for both Scenarios A and B).
3.1.3.2 Triggering Events
Descriptions of how the TP events were triggered are provided here (see Appendix B for
pictures of these triggering events).
* Frontal Collision Warning - There were four types of FCW triggering events:
o A lead vehicle on the highway that braked suddenly. If it was detected that the
brakes of the participants' car were applied, then the lead vehicle sped up and
drove away. Otherwise, a collision occurred.
o An oncoming vehicle on the highway passing another car, resulting in an
impending head-on collision. The head-on incoming car swerved back into its
own lane at the last second to avoid a collision, but still triggered the FCW
warning. This is not a prototypical FCW event since many FCW suppress
oncoming traffic. However, this particular triggering event was included to
add more variability to the triggering events. In addition, the purpose of the
experiment was to study how participants react to sudden critical events in the
frontal scene. Since this oncoming vehicle was behind another car and then
overtook at the last minute, it was expected that participants would not be
expecting that event to occur.
o A stationary-parked vehicle that pulled out from the side of the road into the
driver's path. This vehicle was one of the many parked vehicles along the side
of the road. This vehicle pulled out and appeared in the driver's lane of travel
3-5 seconds before impact. The vehicle sped up and drove away if the
participant's brakes were applied. Thus, no collision occurred if the
participants braked before contact.
o A stationary-parked vehicle that backed out from a garage into the driver's
path, and then moved forward into the garage again. The vehicle pulled out
and appeared in the drivers' lane of travel 3-5 seconds before impact. The
vehicle moved forward into the garage again when it was detected that the
brakes were applied and there was no collision.
Follow Vehicle Fast-Approach - There was one type of FVFA triggering event.
o A following vehicle quickly approached the driver from the rear with a
closing velocity of 50 feet/second or 34.1 mph. The rear vehicle approached
and overtook on the driver's left when the two vehicles were within 2 feet of
each other.
Lane Departure Warning - There was one type of LDW triggering event for both the
left and the right lane departure:
o In this experiment, the LDW event was simulated by forcing a lane change
maneuver on the drivers using a "windy" condition. In the real world, lane
departure warnings are potentially useful for drivers who are inattentive,
distracted or drowsy. However, such a scenario cannot be reliably reproduced
during a controlled experimental test. Participants were told before the
experiment that they would experience periodic wind gusts while driving.
When an LDW-triggering "wind gust" occurred, participants experienced a
gradual heading change of the vehicle and if they did not correct to bring the
vehicle back to the lane of travel, there was subsequent lane departure either
to the left lane or right shoulder.
3.1.3.3 Warning System Algorithm Design
For the longitudinal driver warning systems such as the FCW and the FVFA warning systems,
the alarm triggered when the closing distance between the driver's vehicle and the lead/following
vehicle was less than 200 feet apart, or 0.038 miles. Additionally, the warning systems would only
trigger if the closing velocity between the two vehicles was more than 50 ft/sec or 34 mph. Assuming
that drivers would drive at speeds between 45 mph and 65 mph on the driving scenarios, the alarms
would sound approximately 1.05 sec to 3.04 sec before a potential collision.
For the FCWS, the alarms stopped when the driver decreased the closing velocity by braking
or by swerving to avoid the impending frontal collision. For the FVFA system, the alarm stopped
when the driver decreased the closing velocity by increasing the distance from the follow vehicle by
accelerating or by swerving to avoid the impending collision. STISIM DriveTM allowed the brake,
throttle and steering inputs to be calibrated. For example, the brake and throttle inputs were taken
when the pedals were not depressed, and the inputs were taken again when the pedals were depressed
fully. Since the inputs increased in a linear scale, a sharp braking and a sharp accelerating reaction was
defined as times in which the pedals were depressed more than halfway down per simulation update
cycle.
For the lateral control driver warning system, namely the LDWS, the alarm sounded only if
the driver's vehicle was within 3 feet of the edge of the lane (i.e., the lane markings) and if the heading
angle (or yaw angle) was more than 0.5 radians or 28.64 degrees. Lanes were 12 ft wide and vehicles
were 6 ft wide in the scenarios. Additionally, the LDW did not sound if the turning signals were
switched on. This mimicked how LDWS systems on the market today suppress alarms when turning
signals are activated (Refer to Section 2.1.5.2). The left and right lane departure warnings stopped
when the driver swerved back into the intended lane of travel The reaction time determined by how
long it took for participants to perform a steering motion in the opposite direction from the lane
departure.
3.1.3.4 The Secondary Task
Due to the popularity of telematics in vehicles such as in-vehicle navigation, communication
and entertainment systems, attentional distraction is becoming an ever-increasing safety issue in actual
driving. There have been numerous studies that have demonstrated degraded driver performance
mobile phones, in-car navigational systems and entertainment systems are while driving [106].
In order to simulate the use of in-car telematics, a secondary task was designed to take driver's
attention away from the roadway. A visual distraction task was chosen over an auditory distraction
task (e.g., dialing a cell phone using voice recognition and conversing on the phone hands-free)
because many telematics systems are primarily visual. Thus, it was necessary that the secondary task
rely more on drivers' visual attention resources, requiring them to divide their attention between the
driving roadway and the secondary task screen. That way, if the participants were not looking at the
driving roadway when an alarm sounded, it would be possible to see if there was any difference in
drivers' reaction times due to the different alarm alerting schemes. Moreover, a previous pilot study
conducted with the presence/absence of a similar computational task found that drivers' reaction times
significantly increased when they had to drive with the presence of a secondary task [107].
In this study, the secondary task that was performed throughout each scenario A and B, was
simulated by a cognitive task, in which drivers were required to perform a computational task which
was presented to their right on an internal LCD screen (Figure 8). A number string comprising of six
zeros and one non-zero number was presented on the internal LCD screen. After adding the non-zero
number and its position in the number string, participants entered the answer via the number keypad
located just below the internal screen. For example, if the string displayed was "0 0 4 0 0 0 0", the
correct answer was 4+3=7. The secondary task occurred at random intervals. Therefore, the secondary
task could appear at the same time as a critical TP event. The purpose of the secondary task was to
distract drivers visually so that they did not focus entirely on the frontal driving screen.
Figure 8: The Internal LCD Screen for the Secondary Task in the Vehicle Simulator
In addition, the secondary task was set up such that scoring was aggregated for the whole
testing scenario on a percentage scale. Thus, no data were collected on how participants did on each
computational task. Instead, the score on the secondary task represented the final score after the
participants completed each testing scenarios. If participants did not respond within four seconds, the
task would disappear and it would be counted as an incorrect answer.
3.1.4 Dependent Variables
In the study, both objective and subjective dependent variables (DV) were observed. Of the
objective variables, there were two primary and two secondary DV. One of the primary dependent
variables in the experiment was the reaction time to TP events. For a FCW event, the reaction time
was the time taken to take a sharp braking action or sharp steering action to avoid a frontal collision.
For an FVFA event, it was the time to depress the accelerator pedal or take evasive steering action. For
an LDW event, it was the time to apply a sharp steering correction in a direction opposite of the lane
departure. For the true positive events, the warning alarm did not stop until drivers took a corrective
action or until the hazard went away.
The other primary dependent variable was the accuracy of response to the events. A response
to a TP event was accurate if the correct corresponding action was taken to avoid the front or rear
collision and lane departure (known as a "hit" in signal detection theory). A response to a FP event
was accurate if the false alarm was correctly ignored and no corrective action was taken (known as
"correct rejection" in signal detection theory or no response). False alarms sounded for approximately
four seconds. Within this four-second time window, if participants made a significant change in the
throttle, brake or steering input, then that reaction constituted an inaccurate response to a FP event.
Otherwise, the participants' response was considered to be correct.
Even though previous research has indicated that speed and lane position/steering behavior are
important indicators of drivers' responses to driver warning systems, these measures were not
considered [108, 109]. According to the pilot study that was conducted before this experiment, it was
noted that participants were always consistently speeding, possibly due to the lack of peripheral vision
cues [107]. Thus, speed was not a good dependent variable in this experiment. As a result, participants
were constantly reminded not to speed and to check the speedometer to ensure that they were driving
below the speeding limit. Participants were also penalized more heavily for speeding (in terms of
monetary bonus) than for arriving late (See Section 3.1.5 and Appendix F and H for more details).
Even though lane position and steering behavior were not used as dependent variables, they were
indirectly used to determine reaction time, e.g., when drivers took an evasive swerving action to avoid
a hazard. These measures were not directly considered because it was not straightforward and clear
what amount of steering input or lane position change constituted a reaction to the stimulus.
The two secondary DV under investigation in this study were the number of collisions and the
score on the secondary task. The first measure, the number of collisions, reflected the research
interests in the effectiveness of different types of driver warning systems in terms of driving safety. A
collision or crash was defined when any of the following events occurred: a collision with another
vehicle, pedestrians or roadway objects (e.g., construction cones, roadway dividers), or driving onto
the shoulder of the road. The number of collisions is the total (combined) number of collisions that
participants commit in the two testing scenarios. The second DV, secondary task score, was measured
by the overall percentage score on the task. This second measure reflected the effects of driver
warnings on secondary task performance.
Subjective DVs included the preferences and opinions of participants determined from a post-
experiment survey (Appendix G).
3.1.5 Participants
Forty-eight licensed drivers participated in this experiment. Eight participants did not
complete the experiment due to motion sickness from driving through the simulator scenarios. The 40
remaining participants (17 females and 23 males) were divided equally and randomly into the two
treatment levels of alarm alerting scheme (i.e., half heard the master alarm, and the other half heard
distinct alarms). All participants had at least one year of driving experience. Their ages ranged from 18
to 40 years, with the mean age of 25.8 years, and standard deviation of 5.43 years. All participants
were MIT affiliates.
Participants received at least $15 for completing the experiment but had the potential of
earning bonus of up to an extra $5 based on adherence to driving rules and regulations. See Appendix
H for more details on how the performance bonus was calculated.
3.1.6 Experiment Procedure
The entire experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes per participant including filling out
pre- and post-experiment surveys and driving through practice scenarios. Prior to starting the testing
scenarios, all participants filled out an informed consent form (Appendix D), and a pre-experiment
online survey (Appendix E). The pre-experiment survey assessed participants' demographic data,
driving history, tendencies for potential motion sickness as well as experience playing video games.
Next, participants were seated in the driving simulator and had time to familiarize themselves
with the vehicle interface. Participants were told to drive as they normally would, obeying speed limits
and traffic control devices such as stop signs and traffic lights. In order to reduce variability between
participants, pre-recorded instructions were used (see Appendix F for a detailed transcript of the
instructions). Every participant heard the same pre-recorded instructions.
The experiment consisted of three practice scenarios preceding two testing scenarios. Only
daylight and dry road conditions were used but participants were told that it was a windy day and they
may experience strong "wind gusts" that might blow them out of the lane. Participants were told that
the warning systems were not perfectly reliable and that they would experience false alarms. However,
they were not told specifically about the reliability level of the warning systems or the percentage of
false alarms that they would experience. Participants were also not informed about the number of
critical events that would occur throughout the scenarios.
For the three practice scenarios (15-20 minutes in total), participants acclimated to the
simulator and encountered different critical events for the different driver warning systems, heard the
alarms for the all events and also experienced false alarms, as well as practiced on the secondary task.
During the first practice scenario, participants drove through a short highway stretch that did not have
any traffic devices or other cars. After the first practice scenario, all participants were given a short
quiz to test their recognition of the alarms. For example, one of the alarms was played at random and
participants had to answer what they thought that alarm meant. If they did not recognize the alarms,
they were told the answer, and they continued the quiz until they had all the alarms correctly
identified. For participants who only had one single master alert, the quiz was rather straightforward.
After this quiz, participants had two more practice scenarios to acclimatize to the simulator
environment. During the second practice scenario, participants drove through an urban area with
traffic devices (stop signs and traffic lights) and other cars in the roadway. After the second session,
participants were asked to perform a secondary task while driving. Participants were instructed on how
to perform the task and they were asked to perform four computations of the task without driving.
Following that, they drove the third and last practice scenario while performing the secondary task.
Following the practice sessions were the two testing sessions (scenarios A and B). In each
scenario, participants drove through approximately 42,000 feet of roadway consisting of urban,
suburban and highway settings, and encountered the collision events presented in randomized order
(see Appendix C for more details on the exact order of the triggering events). Each testing scenario
lasted approximately between 12 - 15 minutes. Participants were required to drive while performing
the secondary task. After participants completed the testing scenarios, they filled out a post-
experiment survey (Appendix G).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Reaction Time
One of the primary research questions in this study was how the different alarm alerting
schemes, driver warning systems and system reliability affected drivers' reaction times for true
positive events. Figure 9 provides an overview of how these factors affected reaction time.
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Figure 9: Reaction Time to True Positive Events across all Factor Levels
Further analysis was conducted by GLM repeated measures with alarm alerting scheme as a
between-subjects factor, and driver warning systems and reliability as within-subjects factors
(Appendix I). All data met normality and homogeneity assumptions with a = .05. The alerting scheme
factor (single/multiple alarms) was not a significant factor in affecting the TP reaction times (F(1, 38)
= 0.00004, p = 0.995). Types of alarm alerting events (FCW/FVFA/LLDW/RLDW) and system
warning reliabilities (high/low) factors were significant, (F(3, 114) = 91.244, p < .001) and (F(1, 38) =
9.694, p = .004 ), respectively. There was a significant interaction effect between types of warning
systems and reliability (F(3, 114) = 8.559, p< .001) but no significance between alerting scheme and
reliability.
Figure 10 demonstrates that reaction time to FCW alarms were the shortest, followed by that
of the left and right LDW alarms. Reaction times to FVFA events show both a marked increase and a
larger variance in performance. According to Bonferroni pairwise comparisons, the reaction times
were significantly different for all pairings (p < .001) of the warning systems. From the interaction
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graph between the factors of driver warning systems and reliabilities (Figure 11), while reaction times
were relatively constant across low and high reliabilities for the FCWS, Left and Right LDWS, the
FVFA reaction times were significantly longer for the low reliability case as opposed to the high
reliability condition.
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Response Accuracy
Participants were generally accurate in determining the correct response to a given event,
whether it be to intervene in the case of a true event or to take no action in the case of a false alarm.
Over all test scenarios, 72% of the events were handled correctly (Table 5).
Table 5: Response Accuracy across all Factor Levels
Correct Incorrect Missing Total
Response Rate Response Rate Data Rate events
Overall 72% 21% 7% 2480
Alarm Alerting Single 72% 21% 7% 1240
Scheme Multiple 72% 22% 6% 1240
Driver Warning FCW 73% 24% 3% 640
Systems FVFA 58% 22% 20% 640
Left LDW 81% 18% 1% 600
Right LDW 77% 21% 2% 600
Reliability Low 58% 41% 1% 1240
High 86% 1% 13% 1240
Because of the dichotomous nature of the accuracy dependent variable (either correct or
incorrect given the two different TP:FP ratios), a non-parametric chi square test was used to examine
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the main factors. The results are very similar to the reaction time results, in that the multiple versus
single alarm condition was not significant (x2 = .251, df = 1, p = .616), but the different warning
systems and reliability were significant (x2 = 14.121, df =3, p=.003 and x2 = 548.0, df = 1, p < .001
respectively). Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the main effects of driver warning systems and reliability
(missing data not included) respectively. Participants were generally correct (either responding
correctly to a true alarm or not responding to a false condition), but their error rate significantly
increased when they had an unreliable system. Interestingly, Figure 12 shows that the error rates for
responding to alerts in the front and rear quadrant were slightly higher than for the left and right.
Figure 14 illustrates participants' responses for the different warning systems under both system
reliabilities. This further demonstrates that the low reliability condition contributed to participants'
errors in their initial responses. When only examining whether or not the responses to the false alarms
were correct, the different driver warning systems were significant (x2 = 8.31, df = 3, p = .04), but
again the single vs. multiple alarm factor was not ( 2 = .120, df = 1, p = .729).
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3.2.3 Number of Collisions
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was selected to analyze the effect of alarm alerting
scheme (single vs. multiple alarms) on the number of collisions because the alarm alerting scheme was
a between-subjects factor and the frequency data failed the normality test. The reliability of driver
warning system (within-subjects factor) did affect the number of collisions in the driving scenario
according to the Non-Parametric Wilcoxon-Signed test (Z = -2.696, p = .007). This result is expected
since high reliability has more true events and thus, the number of actual collisions will tend to be
higher as well. However, the alarm alerting scheme did not affect the number of collisions in the
driving scenario for both low and high reliability (in the high reliability testing scenario, Mann-
Whitney U = 190.5, p=.784, while in the low reliability testing scenario, Mann-Whitney U = 176,
p=.392.)
3.2.4 Secondary Task Performance
The secondary task score was based on the accuracy of the mental computational task, and
was analyzed using non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. This analysis showed that the alarm alerting
scheme did not affect secondary task performance in the high reliability testing scenario (Mann-
Whitney U = 185.5, p=.693), but it showed a main effect on secondary task performance in the low
reliability testing scenario (Mann-Whitney U = 128, p=.049). Participants performed the secondary
task better with the master alarm alerting scheme than with the multiple alarms alerting scheme when
the reliability of driver warning system was low. Non-Parametric Wilcoxon-Signed test also indicated
that reliability had a marginal significant effect on the secondary task (Z = -1.798, p=.072 ).
Participants performed better on the secondary task in low reliability driving scenario than in high
reliability driving scenario.
3.3 Discussion
This study yielded several important findings which will be discussed below in conjunction
with survey responses obtained from the participants.
3.3.1 Alarm Alerting Scheme
One of the primary research questions in this thesis is how a master warning alerting scheme
impacts driving performance as opposed to individual alarms. Results from this study showed that
there was no significant difference in both drivers' reaction times and response accuracies under the
different alarm alerting schemes, regardless of responses to TP or FP events. This is interesting, since
it may mean that hearing either a master alarm or distinct alarms for different types of warning
systems does not have a significant impact on the reaction time of drivers.
According to the post-experiment survey, 98% of participants reported that they were not
confused by the alarm scheme. Moreover, according to the post survey questions asked to determine
preference for type of alarms, 26% of the participants preferred the master alarm while 74% preferred
having distinct alarms for the different driver warning systems. Out of the 74%, participants generally
preferred auditory beeps as alarms for indicating left and right lane drift, and specific voice alerts (e.g.
"front hazard", "rear hazard") for impending directional collisions (although verbal alerts were not
used in this experiment, participants were given this option in the survey). Even though most people
preferred a distinct warning for different systems and thought that distinct warnings would help them
perform better, their reaction times and accuracy results showed otherwise. Thus, the objective results
(i.e., reaction time and response accuracy) did not corroborate with their subjective preferences. This
dissonance between users' preferences and their performance has been established for visual displays
[110] and this study highlights that this discord can also be true for auditory displays.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that only aural alarms were used in the experiment and results
may differ when combined with haptic and visual alerts or alarms. In addition, only three different
driver warning systems (FCWS, FVFA and LDWS) were tested. In future implementations of warning
systems in vehicles, there may be more systems such as intersection collision avoidance, blind spot
detection systems, etc. Thus, even though warning confusion did not seem to occur in this study, as
evidenced by both the objective performance results as well as by the participants' subjective answers
to the post-experiment survey, the choice and design of the alarm alerting scheme may still be a
significant factor when the number of ADAS and intelligent driver warning systems in vehicles
increases.
3.3.2 Driver Warning Systems
There was a significant statistical difference in drivers' reaction times to the different driving
true (TP) events. Reaction times to the FCW events were the shortest, while those to the Left and
Right LDW were about the same. This is expected, since participants' attention was focused mainly on
the front visual scene. An impending frontal collision elicited a quick reaction time on the order of 0.5
seconds. However, lane drifts did not have this inherent connotation of urgency associated with it,
especially if participants were driving on an empty highway. Thus, reaction times to the left and right
LDWS were about the same, but were both longer as compared to reaction times for the FCWS.
The largest reaction times occurred in the FVFA condition. Reaction times were much longer
for responses to a potential rear collision for a variety of reasons. First, the delay may be caused by
attention allocation. Participants directed most of their attention resources to the forward visual scene
and the secondary task, rather the image in the rear view mirror. In addition, when participants heard
the FVFA alarm, they needed to predict the potential behavior of the rear car. Thus, participants took
longer to decide if the follow-vehicle was indeed closing in on their car or if it was just a false alarm,
and respond accordingly.
As for subjective evaluations, 37% of the participants felt that the FCW alarms offered a
timely warning in alerting them to impending collisions, as compared to a much higher 79% and 74%
for the FVFA and LDW alarms respectively (Table 6). The forward collision hazard may have been
more obvious to participants since their attention was focused more on the frontal visual scene and
therefore, the FCW alarm seemed less useful to them. Alternatively, this difference between subjective
preferences for frontal and rear collision warnings as well as the difference in objective reaction times
may be due to the desire to cognitively offload the rearview monitoring task, especially since
participants were distracted. Because potential critical events in the rear require an extra step of
predicting what the following vehicle may do, as well as additional monitoring, participants tended to
shed the rear-view monitoring task when distracted. This result suggests that for events not taking
place in the frontal view, drivers need warning devices to assist in enhancing their situation awareness.
Table 6: Subjective Evaluation of Helpfulness of Alarms
Were alarms helpful in: Yes No
Avoiding a Frontal Collision 37% 63%
Avoiding a Rear Collision 79% 21%
Keeping in own lane 74% 26%
3.3.3 Reliability of the Driver Warning Systems
There was a significant difference in drivers' reaction times under different system
reliabilities. However, this effect must be evaluated in light of the significant statistical interaction. As
illustrated in Figure 11, the difference in system reliability primarily affected only the FVFA
condition. Under this condition, participants' TP reaction times were shorter for the high reliability
condition as compared to the low. This was generally expected under all conditions but only
demonstrated under the FVFA condition. Since the rear quadrant events were more difficult to detect
and correct for, the addition of an unreliable system caused participants to delay decisions to brake
even further.
While there is a small effect of reliability for participants' reaction times, there is a much more
significant difference in accuracy of responses to the different reliability levels. Responses to the
highly reliable system were much more accurate than for the less reliable system. According to Figure
14, when the reliability level was high, there was essentially no difference between accuracy responses
for the different warning systems, and when it was low, the correct responses to the different alarms
dropped dramatically. Furthermore, correct rejection of false alarms dropped from 98.3% for a system
with high reliability (25% false alarm rate) to 60.7% for the system with low reliability (75% false
alarm rate). Thus, driving performances were negatively influenced as the reliability of the warning
systems dropped.
On the whole, the rates for responding accurately were generally high (Table 5). Most of the
inaccuracies came from responses to the false warnings, which were particularly problematic in the
low reliability condition. While the LDW system appeared to produce the best performance under low
reliability, the remaining systems were between 50-60% in terms of accuracy performance. The
significant drop of error rate across all four warning systems from low to high clearly demonstrates
that reliability of alerting systems is critical in achieving superior human performance.
In terms of subjective assessments, according to post-experiment survey results (Appendix G),
33% of participants felt that the alarms were an annoyance; 27% felt stressed by the alarms, and 22%
felt that the alarms were distracting and adversely affected their driving. These results illustrate that
even if the participants did well in terms of driving performance, many perceived the alarms
negatively. This perception could have been, in part, a function of the nature of the experiments during
which alarms constantly sounded, especially in the low reliability test sessions.
A high percentage of participants reported on the post-experiment survey that they knew when
an alarm was a false one (Table 7). Yet a consistently lower percentage of participants correctly
rejected a false alarm by not responding. This illustrates that even though participants knew or thought
that an alarm was false, they still responded. One reason might be that when the participant heard an
alarm, it was instinctive to respond. Furthermore this could be a "better-be-safe-than-sorry" risk-
averse attitude because no negative costs were incurred if they responded to a false alarm since there
was no penalty for responding to a false alarm. This result also illustrates that there is a bias in
subjective assessment of performance and that the participants tended to overestimate their
performance, which is a well-established phenomenon [ 111].
Table 7: Subjective and Objective Measures of False Alarm Awareness
Did participants know a Subjective Yes - Objective Yes - Based
False Alarm when they heard Based on Survey on Accuracy of Responses
one? Questions to FP events
FCW alarm 92% 48.8%
FVFA alarm 88% 51.9%
Left LDW alarm 82% 66.3%
Right LDW alarm 88% 52.5%
3.3.4 Secondary Task Performance
The secondary distraction task was intended to serve as a surrogate for visually and
cognitively demanding in-vehicle tasks such as navigation, communication and entertainment devices.
While of statistically marginal significance, it appears that participants performed slightly better on the
secondary task in the unreliable systems condition. This suggests that participants were aware that the
false alarm rate was high and thus directed more attention towards better performance on the
secondary task. Since the TP condition was usually not imminent in the low reliability condition,
participants adjusted their strategy accordingly and completed the secondary task. In the high
reliability condition, participants appropriately ignored the secondary task to concentrate on the more
frequently occurring TP hazards.
3.4 Limitations
These experimental results must be verified in more realistic settings since they are
constrained by the test methods and simulator used. These results are subject to the following
limitations, as will be illustrated in this section.
3.4.1 Field-of-View
The field-of-view was only limited to the front, and no side-mirrors were provided. This
limitation caused some serious problems in the driving simulation including a lack of peripheral cues
and an inability to detect blind spots. As a result, many participants drove at higher speeds than they
thought they were. In addition, when the following vehicle in the FVFA triggering event was
overtaking the participants' vehicle on the left, participants could not see where it was. This limitation
was not a serious one in this experiment as participants always knew when the following car was
behind their vehicle (in part due to the warning of the FVFA system which caught their attention).
Thus, participants knew when the following car was overtaking them. However, if the field-of-view
could be expanded to include side mirrors and blind spot as well, the scenarios could then be changed
to a multiple lanes scenario (instead of two-way, two-lane roads), and other warning systems like the
Blind Spot Detection Systems could be investigated as well.
3.4.2 Degree of Realism
The simulator was not very realistic in a few ways. First, it is in a laboratory setting and not in
the real world. Participants know that they are participating in an experiment and hence may be more
vigilant than normal. Second, there was a high density of alarms in a short period of testing time. As
previously discussed, true positive critical events in the real world occur with a much lower base rate.
Thus, for participants to hear 32 alarms in 15 minutes (32 TP and FP events per testing scenario) is
unnatural. Third, the left and right lane departures were triggered by simulating a strong wind gust
blowing the car out of the traveling lane. However, unlike in reality, no haptic feedback was provided
via car movement when a windy event occurred. Additionally, some participants also became
confused because the trees did not move during the windy events. Thus, if these factors could be
improved in future laboratory simulation, then the degree of realism of using wind gusts to simulate
lane departures would be increased.
3.4.3 Follow-Vehicle Fast Approach Missing Data
It was difficult to automatically detect reaction times for the FVFA alarm due to lack of
sensitivity in the hardware and software, which led to missing data. According to Table 5, there was
20% of missing data for the reaction times to the FVFA events, as compared to 1% - 3% of missing
data for the other three warning systems. The main reason for this was because of the way the warning
system algorithm was designed. As previously explained, reaction time was defined as the difference
in time from the onset of the alarm sounding to the time an evasive response was detected. In the case
of FVFA warning events, this evasive response was either a sharp steering action to move to the side
of the road to allow the following vehicle to overtake, or a sharp depression of the throttle to increase
speed and separation distance between the vehicles. The missing data occurred when drivers were
already depressing the throttle pedal fully when the alarm sounded. In other words, drivers perceived
the following vehicle as a potential hazard before the alarm warning sounded. Since participants were
already fully depressing the pedals and if these participants did not perform a steering action, then
there was no way the algorithm was able to capture their reaction time. Thus, in future studies, this
data collection method and the algorithm to capture the drivers' reaction times to the alarms should be
further studied and refined.
3.5 Conclusions
An important finding from this study is that even though participants preferred distinct alarms
for different driver warning systems, their objective performance showed no difference in both
reaction times and accuracy of responses regardless of whether a single master alarm or multiple
distinct alarms was used. That may mean that participants were able to discern, recognize and
remember what the alarms meant, as there were few incorrect responses to the alarms. Thus,
regardless of whether participants heard a single master alarm or multiple distinct alarms, they were
able to both respond accurately and in a timely fashion to avoid the hazards. However, this finding
was found under the particular experimental settings, and where only auditory alerts were used. In
addition, the number of driver warning systems tested was limited to the FCW, FVFA and LDW
warning systems. Nevertheless, this is an important finding, and if future studies find that driving
performance is indeed truly unaffected regardless of alerting schemes and the number of alarms, then
this finding may mean that there may not be any need for the design of the warning systems, in terms
of alarm presentation, to be consistent across automotive manufacturers. In the extreme case scenario,
manufacturers may even be able to customize the alerting schemes of driver warning systems to the
customers' desires, or use a simple master alerting scheme for vehicles.
Furthermore, while not unexpected, the results demonstrate that low reliability can
dramatically (and negatively) influence human performance. Even though drivers may not be confused
by the alarms from the warning systems, they may still experience other negative emotions, including
stress, annoyance and anxiety. Thus, these findings further highlight the need for the development of
highly reliable intelligent warning systems. While intelligent driver warning systems can serve as an
additional protection to drivers in times of urgent or emergent events, as demonstrated in this study,
decreased system reliability can dramatically increase incorrect responses to these systems. If there is a
high incidence of false alarms for intelligent warning systems, drivers might be better served by not
having such aids at all.
This study served as an initial study seeking to address the gaps in the research of driver
performance in the presence of multiple driver warning systems. However, these results were found in
a laboratory setting and may not generalize to actual driving scenarios. One artifact of experimental
studies such as this one is that participants experienced an unusually high incidence of potential
collision events and lane departures in a compressed time period. Thus, participants are expecting the
alerts to sound and assume a higher mental alert state in response to the test conditions. However, in
reality the frequency of these critical events will be much lower for an average driver. In addition,
since the warning alarms sounded every 30-45 seconds in the experiment, participants were more
likely to be able to recognize and remember the meaning of the alarms. However, since TP events
would be relatively rare occurrences in reality, whether drivers would know what these distinct alarms
meant given sporadic usage still remains an open question. It is nonetheless encouraging that a single
master alert appears to work as well as multiple alerts even in a laboratory setting. This might be
explained by the fact that the driving context usually defines the nature of the hazard. A master alert
associated with a lane departure, for example, will generally be interpreted as such when the driver
perceives the vehicle's lane position and yaw angle. Similarly, a master alert for a forward collision
threat will also generally become apparent once the driver focuses attention to the forward visual field
and sees a vehicle or obstacle ahead.
Future studies should investigate more driver warning systems, examine multiple threat
scenarios and investigate the effects of multi-modal warning alarms. Additionally, the collision
avoidance systems and driver warning systems tested in this study were Level 2 ADAS (i.e., systems
that aid drivers in recognizing a hazard and in providing judging for the criticality of the hazard).
Future studies may also investigate effects of using Level 3 ADAS (i.e., active intelligent warning
systems that intervene to take control and operate the vehicle in order to mitigate the hazard).
Additionally, the secondary distraction task used in this experiment was a visual task that involved
simple computational addition. Future studies may use an actual navigational tool as a distraction task
(e.g., drivers having to navigate using GPS) to mimic what drivers may experience in reality.
Chapter 4
Safety Standards and Implications
of Policy Decisions
The goal of the chapter is to answer the following question: Should there be minimum safety
standards for intelligent warning systems in automobiles to mitigate possible human factors problems
and to increase overall safety? If so, what should these safety standards be and what are the
implications of the policy decision to enforce the safety standards?
As previously discussed, intelligent driver assistance and warning systems are technology
solutions designed by engineers to help reduce the number of highway collisions and to improve
overall road safety by preventing collisions. These intelligent warning systems can be either passive
warning systems (i.e., Level 2 ADAS), that passively mitigate hazards by providing drivers only with
warning alarms, or active warning systems (i.e., Level 3 ADAS), that actively intervene to mitigate
hazards by taking over partial to full control of the vehicle. Previous focus on automotive safety has
been on crashworthiness technologies to mitigate the severities of injuries during collisions. However,
that focus is now shifting to developing intelligent crash avoidance and prevention technologies. Since
intelligent warning systems are considered emerging technologies, there are many unanswered
questions such as the large-scale effects and safety benefits of these technologies. One of these
unknowns is how drivers will respond to intelligent driver warning systems especially during threat
scenarios, and if safety levels will indeed be improved with the presence of these systems.
Intelligent warning systems technologies differ from traditional automotive technologies in
that the critical component is the interaction between the humans and the systems. Unlike
crashworthiness technologies which have minimal driver interaction, most intelligent driver warning
systems depend on appropriate input from the drivers in order for the technologies to work as
designed. Thus, if drivers become confused and do not take the appropriate response intended to avoid
the hazard, then the systems have failed. In comparison, crashworthiness technologies fail when there
are flaws in the product design, development or manufacturing process.
There are two broad solutions that can be used to address the human factors issues that arise
due to the introduction of collision avoidance and warning systems into vehicles. First, technology can
be developed to address these issues, such as more sensitive sensor systems or optimal alerting
strategies for alarm presentation. Second, standards and regulations can also be made to provide
solutions to these issues. For example, policy decisions such as the standardization of the driver
warning interface may be able to mitigate problems of confusion for drivers. This may especially be
important if inconsistencies in alarm utilization philosophies, lack of standardization, and a rapid
increase in the number of alarms in vehicles all contribute to the problem of confusion, leading to
driving degradation. However, setting safety standards includes knowing what the definition of a
"safe" warning system is, if there should be minimum safety standards in the first place and, if so,
what these standards should be.
This chapter will address these questions and explore the tradeoffs between various policy
solutions. First, a case study will be presented on air bags technologies. This case study explores how
standards and regulations for this older passive technology can inform the standards case for
intelligent driver warning systems. Next, existing safety standards, or the lack thereof, for intelligent
driver warning systems will be presented. The different policy solutions presented in Chapter 2 will be
outlined again and following that, the major tradeoffs to these policy solutions will be explored. After
exploring the tradeoffs to the different policy solutions, the question of whether there should be any
minimum safety standards will be addressed, and finally, recommendations of what minimum safety
standards should be and their implications will be given.
4.1 Case Study: Air Bags Standards and Regulations
In this section, a case study of the air bags technology is presented because it is a well-
established automotive safety technology that has been recently developed, and it provides an
illustration of how standards and regulations develop in conjunction with the introduction an emerging
technology. Important lessons can be learned from how these standards of air bags were shaped and
can be applied to intelligent driver warning systems.
4.1.1 Why Air Bags were Developed
In spite of different policy approaches such as "education" (e.g., campaigns) and
"enforcement" of regulations (e.g., mandatory seat belt laws) used prior to the 1950s to improve road
safety, driving habits did not change and the rising number of collisions indicated that another solution
was needed. Instead of attempting to change and influence drivers' attitudes and behavior through
social and judicial techniques, another more direct "engineering" or technological approach was
warranted to compensate for the shortcomings of drivers. In particular, air bags were developed in the
1950s to mitigate the severity of injuries during a crash. Air bags were designed to compensate for
irresponsible human actions (i.e., not using seat belts) by ensuring survival during crashes even for
unrestrained occupants. Thus, air bag technologies sought to eliminate the need to rely on drivers to
engage the safety restraint. Human responsibility was to be replaced with an engineering solution.
4.1.2 Resistance to Air Bag Technologies
Initially, when air bags were introduced during the 1960s, many resisted the technology,
especially those in automobile companies. This was due to three major reasons [112]. First, air bags
and other crashworthiness technologies represented a major foundational shift in automobile safety
trends. Before the 1950s, automobile manufacturers only had to ensure that the control components of
the vehicle (namely the brakes, throttle and steering) did not fail. Drivers were responsible for their
own safety. The advent of interest in crashworthiness technologies such as air bags represented a
radical shift that transferred responsibilities to automobile manufacturers in ensuring that vehicles
were safe. Thus, there was resistance against the increase in liability that manufacturers would
potentially face. Before, automobile manufacturers were only held liable if an accident was caused by
a steering or braking failure that was directly due to a production fault. The introduction of air bags
and other crashworthiness technologies meant that manufacturers could potentially be held liable
regardless of whether the drivers were reckless or not, since they now had a responsibility in ensuring
that cars could protect its occupants even during a crash. Second, air bags were extremely expensive
and installing them in vehicles meant significant changes in the assembly lines. Third, there was the
general attitude among automobile manufacturers that "safety doesn't sell."
However, by the 1990s, the resistance to air bag technologies had disappeared. Today, that has
changed dramatically with manufacturers using safety as a huge innovation and selling factor (e.g.,
Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Infiniti, etc have installed LDWS and ACC in some model lines). There were
three major reasons for this shift in viewpoints, which occurred approximately in the 1970s. First, the
rapid development in sensors and microelectronics technologies made air bags more reliable, and
manufacturers were thus more receptive to installing them. Second, there was an increase in public
interest in safety devices, which helped convince manufacturers that safety could sell. Third, because
of the increased interest in seat belts, NHTSA did not promulgate the impression that air bags were
designed to replace seat belts, as originally thought. Tests showed that air bags were more effective
when used together with seat belts. Thus, manufacturers were not entirely responsible for ensuring
survival during crashes (i.e., with air bags); instead, drivers were also responsible and were expected
to buckle up [112]. Thus, the liability of manufacturers was decreased.
4.1.3 Formation of NHTSA
Regulatory standards are typically established by a government agency and in the United
States, NHTSA is the federal agency that has a legislative mandate under Title 49 of the U.S. Code,
Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle Safety, to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) found
in Part 571 [113]. The legislation (standards and regulations) of air bags was tied intrinsically with the
creation of NHTSA itself, which was formed to regulate manufacturers at a time when the paradigm
shift in thinking regarding the responsibilities of automobile manufacturers occurred. The National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act passed by Congress in 1966 led to the creation of NHTSA,
whose role is to "establish appropriate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards" that can "meet the
need for vehicle safety" [114]. Thus, NHTSA is responsible for establishing and enforcing rules that
would force manufacturers to build vehicles that could better avoid and withstand accidents. The
creation of NHTSA was an effort to protect the common public good of safe automobile travel from
both irresponsible drivers and irresponsible manufacturers by requiring that vehicles meet certain
minimum levels of safety standards [112].
4.1.4 Market-Driven Innovation
As previously mentioned, by the 1990s, resistance to the air bag technology disappeared and
air bags were installed widely in the vehicle fleets of various manufacturers. For example, in 1983,
Mercedes-Benz was the only manufacturer to offer driver-side air bags in the United States; in 1989,
only 3.2% of vehicles had air bags; in 1991, that number had risen to 33.2% and by 1994, driver-side
air bags were standard equipment in 91% of vehicles [115, 116].
It may be postulated that air bags were installed so widely because of regulatory pressure from
NHTSA. However, that was not the case, since NHTSA's regulations mandating all vehicles have air
bags did not come into effect until 1998. Thus, since the air bags were installed as standard equipment
ahead of the regulatory schedule, the significant driving force behind the use of air bags was market
demand. Consumer behavior research showed that drivers were willing to pay for safety features such
as air bags, especially in the larger-car market segments [115]. Predictably, air bags first appeared in
large cars where the willingness to pay was the highest. As economies of scales brought
manufacturing costs down, air bags began to appear in smaller-sized cars as well. Thus, it was not only
regulatory pressure, but additionally, market demand factor also played a role in shaping the
introduction of air bags as standard safety features into vehicles.
4.1.5 Air Bag Standards and Regulations
At the same time that manufacturers were developing air bag technologies, NHTSA was
shaping the related safety standards and regulations. FMVSS Standard No. 208, called Occupant Crash
Protection, is the frontal impact protection standard and regulation in the United States, whose purpose
is to reduce the fatalities and severity of injuries to occupants involved in frontal crashes, which
account for the majority of vehicle fatalities in the United States [97]. This standard includes air bags
and specifies performance requirements for anthropomorphic test dummies seated in the front seats of
passenger cars.
From 1969 through the 70s and 80s, NHTSA attempted to mandate air bags as standard
equipment for all cars in the United States. However, as mentioned earlier, automakers were resistant
because of liability and litigation costs. Thus, air bag regulations were not enacted until years later.
Nevertheless, even though the regulations of air bags were not formally set in place, NHTSA did
specify minimum safety standards for how air bags should perform (note: this is the difference
between standards and regulations). Air bags were required to deploy in a 30 mph frontal barrier crash
test with two belted and unbelted 50 th percentile 5-ft-8, 167-lbs male dummies. NHTSA specified that
the tests that ensured survival on the median male were only minimum requirements to judge the safety
effectiveness of air bags; it was up to the manufacturers to exceed the requirement standards to ensure
that air bags were safe for the whole spectrum of drivers, including smaller-stature female drivers and
child occupants.
As air bags began to appear more widely in vehicles in the 1990s, an unanticipated
consequence surfaced. By the mid 1990s, the number of deaths caused by air bags, specifically for
out-of-position (OOP) occupants such as smaller-stature females and children began to rise sharply.
NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation program concluded a total of 158 fatalities were caused by air
bags as of April 2000, of which 92 were children, 60 were drivers, and 6 were adult passengers [117].
Research found that in order for air bags to be effectively deployed to ensure safety of the unbelted
median male, a minimum inflation force was necessary. Consequently, this force proved fatal to
smaller-stature occupants, who were often seated closer to the air bags when they deployed and for
whom the air bags were causing more danger than safety. Not surprisingly, there was an increase in
public outcry over the danger of airbags to these occupants. Thus, the public wanted the choice of
deactivating air bags in their vehicles. Nevertheless, NHTSA, the automobile industry, and insurance
and safety organizations knew the air bags did indeed save many lives and should not be completely
abandoned as a technology. Between 1986 to March 2000, NHTSA estimated that air bags saved 5303
front seat occupants, including 4496 drivers and 807 right front passengers [117]. NHTSA also
projected that the lives saved by air bags would increase even more if more people used seat belts
during crashes. This is because some drivers stopped wearing seat belts, thinking that air bags were a
replacement for seat belts. As a result, air bags indirectly caused some fatalities as well. Thus, while
air bags did indeed save lives in high-speed crashes, they also caused fatalities, especially to
unrestrained OOP occupants and children in relatively low speed crashes.
Due to this unintended safety consequence caused by air bags, decision-makers agreed that it
was necessary to redesign air bags so that they would be safer for a wider passenger population. The
longer-term solution was to develop more innovative technological solutions that can improve safety
levels for all occupants during high-speed crashes, while, at the same time, reduce air bag-induced
risks to OOP occupants, females and children. One of these new innovative technology solutions is
advanced air bags, which can tailor the inflation force and deploy in a low-risk manner if warranted.
For example, design features of advanced air bags will include multiple inflation force levels,
improved folding patterns, and sensors to detect seat belt usage, occupant seat positions and
occupant's weight. Thus, advanced air bags can determine the severity of potential impact and deploy
with a lower force for OOP occupants, smaller-stature females and children.
While advanced air bags promised a long-term technology solution to irresponsible behavior
(i.e., not using seat belts), regulatory changes were a short-term solution to fine tune the existing air
bag technology in order for it to be safer for the general driving population. Thus, in March 1997,
NHTSA made three interim regulatory changes that were extended until September 2000 to reduce air
bag-induced risks. First, NHTSA amended FMVSS Section No. 208 to test vehicles with less
aggressive sled tests as opposed to the previously used frontal rigid barrier test. Unlike the barrier test,
no crashes occurred during sled tests. Instead, test vehicles were placed on sled-on-rails and
accelerated backwards. Thus, the unbelted and belted dummies would move forward inside the vehicle
in the same way that occupants would in a frontal crash. Air bags were then deployed at a pre-
determined time and were kept consistent across manufacturers. This new performance standard of
using sled tests allowed manufacturers to "de-power" or reduce air bag inflation forces by 20-35% so
that they were less likely to injure occupants closer to the air bags. Starting in the 1998 model year,
most vehicle models were sled-certified.
The second interim regulatory solution was that NHTSA permitted manufacturers to offer
manual on-off switches in vehicles that did not have rear seats to accommodate rear-facing infant
restraints. The manual on-off switches allowed drivers to deactivate air bags for their infants in the
front passenger seats. In that way, air bag technology was not completely abandoned. Additionally,
providing on-off switches in all vehicles meant reduced production costs for manufacturers since they
did not have to have separate assembly lines during production. The third interim solution that was
made by NHTSA allowed manual on-off switches to be retroactively fitted in vehicles. Around the
same time that NHTSA amended the safety standards in FMVSS Standard No. 208, they also made a
new regulation that required air bags to be installed in all vehicles as of 1997 (by the 1998 model
year).
The sled test was an effective interim solution because manufacturers could de-power air bags
to meet the performance requirements of the sled tests easily. On the other hand, developing new
technologies, such as advanced air bags, required a longer time frame but was a better long-term
solution. Thus, since manufacturers knew that the sled tests were a temporary solution, they could
develop advanced air bags while meeting the interim amended standards of the sled tests.
Since then, air bag standards and regulations of the FMVSS have changed. Congress
mandated that the introduction of advanced air bags should begin no later than September 2003, and
be completed by September 2006. Starting from 2004, 35% of manufacturer's fleet in the U.S. was
equipped with advanced air bag systems and that number rose to 100% by 2006. FMVSS Standard No.
208 also now specifically requires air bags to be designed so that they are more effective for a broader
range of occupant weights, including the 5th-percentile adult female dummy, infant and child
dummies, in addition to the 50th-percentile male dummy [118]. This change of standards that requires
manufacturers to test air bags on a wider population reflected the interest and need in ensuring that the
air bags technology will be safe beyond the average male adult. In addition, the new performance
standards also phased out the interim sled tests and, again, phased in the more effective frontal rigid
barrier crash tests at 25 mph for unbelted dummies and 30 mph for belted dummies. Also,
manufacturers also have to meet more stringent injury performance standards. Thus, the current
FMVSS Standard No. 208 for air bags provides a higher minimum level of safety standards.
4.1.6 Performance Standards and Innovation Implications
The increased minimum level of performance standards provided vehicle manufacturers with
the incentive to develop advanced air bags. Note that the performance standards only specified that the
unbelted dummies should survive at 25 mph and the belted dummies should survive at 30 mph. They
did not draw out the specific design of any particular air bag technology (such as how air bags must be
designed with weight sensors or occupant position sensors). Thus, manufacturers have the freedom to
innovate and develop the advanced air bags in any way they desire, as long as the air bags could meet
the stringent performance standards.
However, the setting of minimum safety standards is problematic in terms of whether
innovation is encouraged or impeded. On one hand, the standards must be set high enough to
encourage innovation; at the same time, the standards should not be set so high that it is not feasible
for manufacturers to reach them.
4.1.7 Comparing Intelligent Warning Systems with Air Bags
Like air bags, intelligent driver warning systems represent another technology solution to
improve safety levels on the roads. Data have shown that crashworthiness technologies have reached a
stage of diminishing returns as the number of deaths from highway crashes has been stagnating at
more than 40,000 each year in spite of these improving technologies. Thus, another major paradigm
shift is needed, and technologies that can help prevent and avoid collisions, such as intelligent driver
warning systems, are seen as the next solution.
4.1.7.1 Uncertain risks and benefits
When air bags were developed, there was significant uncertainty surrounding their benefits.
Until air bags became widely installed in vehicles, their benefits were predicted primarily from
engineering simulations and laboratory tests. Similarly, there are also uncertainties today regarding the
safety benefits that intelligent warning systems can bring, and these uncertainties exist because there is
not enough empirical evidence in support of these forecasted benefits. Just like for air bags,
unintended consequences can appear after widespread diffusion and adoption of this emerging
technology. Air bags, which were designed to protect occupants during collisions, were actually
causing some deaths, and the extent of this problem was not foreseen during laboratory testing
sessions before the air bags were actually marketed. Similarly, there are many concerns regarding the
potential degradation of driver performance when using intelligent driver warning systems.
Thus, further human factors research into these issues is warranted before a definitive
conclusion can be drawn. These negative effects of the warning systems are "known unknowns" (i.e.,
issues that are already forecasted to be potentials for serious effects if no solution is found) of the
emerging technologies, which must be adequately addressed before the warning systems are deployed
into vehicles. In addition, there are also the "unknown unknowns", which are unintended
consequences that no one is able to forecast and predict. For air bags, the "unknown unknowns" were
the air bags-induced deaths caused to children and female drivers that were not forecasted at all. Thus,
due to these "unknowns", it is necessary that more human factors research is conducted on intelligent
driver warning systems before they are released into the market.
4.1.7.2 Driver Population
Another similarity between intelligent driver warning systems and air bags is that certain
populations of drivers may be protected at the expense of other populations. For example, in the case
of air bags, the initial air bag design protected the typical male occupant at the expense of smaller-
stature females and children. Similarly, for intelligent driver warning systems, certain high-risk
drivers, such as novice and elderly drivers may face increased risks from the usage of these warning
systems. Novice drivers have the least driving experience, and warning systems may increase their
workload or distract them, thus degrading driving performance. Elderly drivers have naturally
diminished cognitive and perceptual abilities that may limit the effectiveness of the warning systems.
If safety standards for these intelligent driver warning systems are only specified and mandated for
testing with the average driver, then unintended safety consequences may then arise for these risk-
prone drivers. As shown from the development of air bags and the subsequent regulatory amendments
made in 1997 to account for female drivers and child occupants, it is important that a larger driving
population extending beyond the average is tested during the evaluation and certification tests of
future warning systems before they are introduced into the market.
4.1.7.3 Minimum Standards
The case study on air bags technologies illustrates that manufacturers rarely innovate to
exceed the "minimum" specified standards. Even though NHTSA mentioned that the performance
standards of testing with the median male dummy was only a minimum requirement, and that it was
up to the manufacturers to ensure that the air bags were safe for a wider population, that was not the
case as the number of air bags-induced fatalities to women and children increased. This finding has
implications for the setting of "minimum" safety standards for intelligent driver warning systems. If
the regulatory agency should indeed set minimum standards for warning systems, then they must also
ensure that the standards specify testing for a wider population range, especially for risk-prone drivers.
4.1.7.4 Market-Driven Innovation and Liability Concerns
Like air bags, the pace of warning system development and adoption may ultimately be
market driven. For example, the introduction of air bags into the market began with the high-end
market, which then diffused to the smaller-car market segment. Similarly for intelligent warning
systems, ACC and LDWS have already appeared in the high-end consumer market and as interest in
intelligent driver warning systems grows, it can be expected that these systems will soon be available
in the smaller-car market segment. In addition, air bags were standard equipment in most vehicles by
1994, ahead of the regulatory schedule because of market forces. Advanced air bags also appeared in
vehicles ahead of NHTSA's regulatory schedule of the phase-in of advanced air bags. Similarly,
intelligent warning systems may very well become standard equipment in vehicles ahead of regulatory
schedule.
Another similarity is that air bags were initially resisted by the industry primarily because of
increased liability concerns for manufacturers. Similarly, for intelligent warning systems, liability
concerns will also likely play a significant role and may potentially delay the introduction of
intelligent warning systems into the market, especially Level 3 ADAS. In such cases, manufacturers
may be reluctant to introduce the systems into the market, even if research proves that these systems
are beneficial to drivers. This is because taking control away from drivers may result in increased
liability concerns for manufacturers when accidents occur, especially when the Level 3 ADAS fail.
Differences between Air Bag Technologies and Driver Warning
Systems
Despite all the parallels between intelligent driver warning systems and air bags, it must be
noted that the one main difference between them is the critical component of driver-system interaction.
For crashworthiness technologies such as air bags, little driver interaction is required in order for the
devices to be effective. For example, drivers could not actively jeopardize the safety benefits of air
bags by their actions or by their interactions with the air bags (unless they deliberately deactivated air
bags using the on-off switches). On the other hand, for intelligent warning systems, the interaction
between the driver and the warning system is critical for a safe outcome. Regardless of how
"intelligent" these systems are, if drivers deliberately ignore the alarms, or if they are confused by the
warnings and make inappropriate responses, then the warning systems will not be effective.
Another difference between air bags and intelligent driver warning systems may lie in the type
of safety standards that exist. As illustrated in the air bags case, all the safety standards for air bags to
date have been performance-based and none are prescription-based. For example, the safety standards
amended by NHTSA in 2003 were performance standards (25 mph for unbelted male and female
dummies and at 30mph for the same belted dummies). These safety standards were not prescription-
based in that they did not mandate the use of a certain design such as a particular folding pattern,
inflation force design, weight sensors, seat belts usage sensors, or occupant position sensors in order to
ensure that the advanced air bags were able to protect the wide range of occupants and seating
positions. Instead, only performance standards were set, and manufacturers were free to innovate and
develop the advanced air bags technology to meet the minimum performance standards.
However, intelligent driver warning systems may need prescription-based standards in
addition to performance-based standards because of the human-in-the-loop and interaction component
of intelligent warning systems. Thus, design standards that actually specify the parameters of the
warning systems may be warranted in order to mitigate some of the human factors issues that may
arise. For example, design standards may specific that all alerts should be multi-modal. This
specification may be warranted if future research shows that multi-modal alarms do indeed improve
the performance of how drivers interact, accept, use and trust the systems.
The following sections will discuss what safety standards for intelligent driver warning
systems currently exist and examine what type of standards should be applicable for intelligent driver
warning systems, and what these standards should be.
4.1.7.5
4.2 Existing Safety Standards for Intelligent Warning
Systems
As introduced briefly in Chapter 2, there are neither minimum performance or prescription-
based standards, nor are there regulations that currently require the standardization of warning
systems. Thus, manufacturers can introduce intelligent driver warning systems into their fleet of
vehicles today in the United States without having to meet any minimum performance standards,
unlike those required for advanced air bags today.
Nevertheless, there are human factors guidelines, which are design-based, created for display
devices by both the ISO and the SAE. These guidelines are only recommendations for the design
parameters of the intelligent warning systems and are non-binding for automotive and equipment
developers of the systems [119, 120]. In the United States, these documents address user interface
requirements for the Forward Collision Warning Systems and Adaptive Cruise Control Systems. In
Europe, an example of a similar non-binding document is the "Statement of Principles on Human
Machine Interface" from the European Commission [121].
Even though there are no formalized design standards today for intelligent warning systems,
there is an international Working Group, WG14 (Vehicle/Roadway Warning and Control System) set
up under ISO/TC204 with the aim of developing standardized intelligent driver assistance and warning
systems across manufacturers. In particular, WG14 is tasked with investigating if current design
guidelines suffice for vehicle-roadway warning and control systems, and if not, what new safety
standards should exist. The scope of WG14 includes any driver assistance/warning systems that does
the following: monitor the driving situation, warn of impending danger, avoid crashes, advise drivers
of corrective actions and partially or fully automate driving tasks [122, 123]. Thus, WG14 is tasked
with the standardization of driver assistance and warning systems that range from Level 1 to Level 3
ADAS. The existence of an international working group tasked with investigating what standards to
set for intelligent driver warning systems further illustrates that these issues are important and more
specifically, that it is important to incorporate human factors knowledge and principles into the design,
deployment, and evaluations of these intelligent driver warning systems.
4.3 Policy Solutions
From the policy discussion in Chapter 2, it can be seen that there are a number of policy
decisions that can be made with regard to the setting of safety standards. Policy solutions include
varying how strictly safety standards are enforced by the regulatory agency. On one end of the
spectrum, there are strict standards enforced by the regulatory agency. On the end of the spectrum,
there are no enforced standards at all. However, the absence of any enforced standards does not
literally translate to no standards, because more often than not, the industry self-regulates since
liability concerns motivate manufacturers to ensure that their products are indeed safe. Thus, de facto
consensus standards are developed, which are typically led by the leading manufacturers.
In addition, these standards can be either performance standards or design standards.
Performance standards are typically technical standards that specify equipment performance (i.e.,
functional safety) or human performance (i.e., usage safety). Design standards typically specify
principles and features appropriate to the technology. When design standards exist, there typically
tends to be standardization of the warning systems across manufacturers. As previously discussed,
automotive traditionally been performance-based but for intelligent driver warning systems, it is an
open question as to whether there should be design standards too, and this is one of the questions this
thesis address. Due to the large component of driver-system interaction and the human factors
limitations of drivers, design standards may be warranted.
The best policy solution is the one that maximizes the benefits from the emerging technologies
and utility to the stakeholders, while minimizing the costs (safety, health, environmental, economic)
and unintended negative consequences. The benefits and costs of the various policy decisions will be
discussed in the next section.
4.4 Tradeoffs Between Policy Solutions
The tradeoffs between the two types of policy solutions, having strict standards or not having
any standards, are presented in this section. The tradeoffs are framed in terms of the overall welfare
level of society, and are represented by the different welfare measures, including safety, time-to-
market, innovation and economic costs.
Safety level is a tradeoff that can either be increased or decreased depending on which policy
solution is chosen. Time-to-market represents the tradeoff of how soon the emerging technologies are
introduced into the market, and how soon the public can enjoy the benefits of the technologies.
Innovation represents the tradeoff of how superior the technologies that are present in the market are,
and whether they are the state-of-the-art. Finally, economic costs represent the tradeoffs that tend to
affect manufacturers in terms of financial outcomes. The category of economic costs will be explored
in terms of liability concerns to manufacturers, which translate into significant economic costs.
Economic costs that are incurred because of expensive certification, the research and development
process, or benefits that are obtained based on sale of products are not considered. The tradeoffs of
these four factors will now be explored, for the two extreme spectrums of the policy solutions: having
no enforced standards at all and having strictly enforced standards. Table 8 summarizes the tradeoffs
between these two policy solutions, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Table 8: Summary of Tradeoffs between the Policy Solutions
Tradeoffs Policy Solution #1 - No enforced Policy Solution #2 - Enforced standards
standards, i.e., de facto consensus by the regulatory agency
standards set among manufacturers
Manufacturers Public Manufacturers Public
Safety OVERALL (-) OVERALL (+)
Levels N/A (-) / Costs: N/A (+) / Benefits:
No minimum level All systems
of safety perform with the
performance same minimum
ensured. level of safety.
Time-To- OVERALL (+) OVERALL (-)
Market (+) / Benefits: (+) / Benefits: (-) / Costs: (-) / Costs:
Faster time-to- Get to benefit from Policy cycle normally Would not get to
market because the technologies takes longer than the benefit from the
no need to wait sooner. technology/innovation technologies even
for the policy cycle. Thus, they may if the technologies
approval have delayed entry were ready and
process. into the market, safe.
Innovation OVERALL (+) OVERALL (+ or -)
(+) / Benefits: (+) / Benefits: (+) / Benefits: (-) / Costs:
Innovation Would benefit from If standards are Regulatory
likely because it technologies performance-based capture may occur
is good to be the resulting from and if they are set high which discourages
first to market. competition. enough, they can innovation.
encourage innovation.
Economic OVERALL (-) OVERALL (+)
Costs (-) / Costs: N/A (+) / Benefits: N/A
Increased Decreased liability
liability due to because of presence of
lack of clear, clear and transparent
transparent rules standards.
and standards.
Open market leads to
increase in trade and
capital flows.
Policy Solution 1: No Standards/De Facto Standards
The first policy solution is the option where the regulatory agency does not enforce any
minimum performance or design standards. Thus, there are no enforced standards. Rather, the industry
self-regulates, coming up with de facto standards. The tradeoffs are discussed in this section.
4.4.1.1 Safety: Overall Cost
The tradeoff of safety is an overall cost in this case. This is because there are no minimum
safety standards that manufacturers have to meet and therefore, it is possible that some warning
systems may not be as safe as compared to the case where standards are strictly enforced, since there is
no agency regulating the warning systems. Some people may argue that even without the presence of
enforced safety standards, the industry will still self-regulate, which is enough to ensure safety of the
warning systems. While this may be true, I think that overall safety tends to increase with the presence
of a regulatory agency providing oversight by enforcing the safety standards and deciding if the
particular technologies get to market. Thus, without minimum safety standards, the public is more
likely to be exposed to safety risks.
4.4.1.2 Time-to-Market: Overall Benefit
Time-to-market is an overall benefit because there is no policy process that may hinder the
introduction of the intelligent driver warning systems into the market. In general, if there are no
standards, when manufacturers feel that their systems are ready and safe for the market, they can
introduce them into their vehicle fleets without having to go through tedious certification and testing
process. This is also a benefit to the public since they will be given faster access to the emerging
technologies.
4.4.1.3 Innovation: Overall Benefit
The tradeoff of innovation is an overall benefit because innovation tends to increase when
there are no standards present, as opposed to the presence of any standards. This is because standards
typically tend to impede innovation, unless the standards are performance standards, which are set
high enough so that manufacturers have to innovate in order to reach that minimum level.
In the automotive industry, technological innovation is an especially significant determinant of
economic growth and it is ideal to be a market leader through innovation [103, 104]. Innovation can
include major radical shifts in technology or just incremental adaptation of existing technologies.
4.4.1
Thus, there are incentives for manufacturers to innovate and be the first to market, based on the "safety
can sell" concept. Increased innovation will also benefit the public because, theoretically, if there is
free competition, superior technologies will tend to survive and benefit society. Thus, if there are no
enforced standards, then innovation will typically increase.
4.4.1.4 Economic Costs: Overall Cost
The absence of safety standards is an overall cost for manufacturers, in terms of litigation
costs arising from liability. In the absence of government regulations that state clearly what the
minimum safety performance and design standards are, the burden of proof lies with the vehicle
manufacturers to ensure that their intelligent warning systems are safe. Thus, without the presence of
clear and transparent minimum safety standards, it may not be clear to the manufacturers when they
should stop the research and development process, and market the intelligent warning systems in their
vehicle fleets.
In addition, without the presence of clear standards, should an accident occur arising
implicating intelligent warning systems, then manufacturers will likely be held liable in the judicial
system, especially product and tort liability law. For cases of product liability, if there is a defect in the
product (i.e., the intelligent warning systems) such that safety is compromised, manufacturers would
be liable to the plaintiff (the driving consumer). For cases of tort liability, if manufacturers were found
to be negligent, they would be liable to the driving consumer as well. In the United States, in addition
to compensatory damages (from product and tort liability), there may also be punitive damages,
assessed by the court to punish the manufacturers. Because there are no pre-market safety standards
for intelligent warning systems, the court has the power to rule on a case-by-case basis. Ruling on a
case-by-case basis may not be optimal for manufacturers because the judicial system may not
necessarily rule in their favor. Thus, due to this reason, there is a negative economic costs tradeoff for
manufacturers if there are no safety standards.
4.4.2 Policy Solution 2: Strict Enforced Standards by Regulatory
Agency
The second of the policy solution is the other alternative where the regulatory agency enforces
minimum performance or design standards. In this case, the manufacturers must meet minimum safety
standards in order to market their systems. The tradeoffs are discussed in this section.
Safety: Overall Benefit
In general, safety levels improve with the presence of safety standards, because safety is a
large selling factor and high safety standards can assure that intelligent driver warning systems are
safe. Thus, intelligent warning systems that are developed in the presence of enforced standards should
generally have a higher safety rating than if there were no standards.
In addition, the presence of standards also communicates a message to the public that the
warning systems are in the market because they have met a certain minimum safety requirement. Such
standards balance the information asymmetry between manufacturers and the public, allowing the
public to make informed choices based on how well the warning systems perform on the standards.
Information asymmetry refers to situations during market transactions when one party has more
information than the other party [124]. For example, in the case of intelligent driver warning systems,
the automotive manufacturers have an information advantage because they develop the systems, while
the public does not have much knowledge of the warning systems such as the safety performance of
the systems. Thus, regulatory standards help to balance the information asymmetry by shifting more
information to the public.
Thus, overall safety may potentially be increased if there are minimum standards, since
consumers have a way of evaluating which warning systems are safer than others and can thus make
more informed choices. Additionally, standards are a way of ensuring and controlling the quality of
products in the market.
4.4.2.2 Time-to-Market: Overall Costs
The process of forming and harmonizing standards, especially on an international level, is a
slow process. This is because time is needed in order to first set the standards, and then to test and
certify that the warning systems meet the required minimum level of standards. For example, it can
take 43 months to set standards in the ISO. This process is typically longer than technological
development. Thus, standards always trail technological development. If the emerging technologies
and products have to wait for the policies and standards to be shaped before they can be introduced
into the markets, this poses an economic inefficiency to society, since the public cannot enjoy the
potential benefits of the technologies. In addition, by the time the standards are set for a particular
technology, the industry has probably moved beyond that initial development. Thus, having standards
may sometimes lock-in inferior technologies.
4.4.2.1
Innovation: It Depends
The presence of safety standards could either help encourage innovation, or impede
innovation, depending on the situation. On one hand, if the standards set are high enough so that
manufacturers have to innovate in order to meet them, then innovation can be encouraged. In addition,
performance-based standards (rather than prescription-based standards) can also encourage innovation
since manufacturers will be motivated to meet, if not, exceed the minimum level of safety performance
of their intelligent driver warning systems.
However, standards can also impede innovation. This can happen when the standards are not
set high enough, primarily because of the phenomenon of regulatory capture. Regulatory capture is an
economic theory of regulation, put forth by Stigler, which occurs when stakeholders who are supposed
to be regulated (e.g., the automotive manufacturers) use the regulatory powers of the government to
shape laws and regulations in a way that is beneficial to them [125]. For example, when the leading
firms have developed a technologically superior product, they will benefit from a more stringent
standard since they, and no one else, are able to meet it. Thus, these firms may try to convince the
regulatory agency to use their technology as the standard and thus, they would have effectively
"captured" the regulations to their advantage.
This phenomenon presents an inefficient economic outcome to society because regulatory
capture by dominant firms results in the reduction of competition and the increase of barriers to market
entry by other firms. Regulatory capture may also impede innovation, especially for the leading firms,
who capture the standards so that they can comfortably meet them without developing superior
products.
Thus, the tradeoffs of this policy solution of having standards are the innovation losses which
can occur when the standards are "captured." The costs of innovation losses would then translate to
welfare losses of society, who would have benefited from a more innovative and efficient product had
the regulations not been "captured."
4.4.2.4 Economic Costs: Overall Benefit
In terms of economic costs, manufacturers will get to benefit from the presence of minimum
standards for two major reasons: 1) The decrease in liability concerns because of the presence of
transparent standards and 2) The increase in trade and capital flow arising from the formation of an
interoperable and open market.
4.4.2.3
First, there are economic benefits to having enforced standards with transparent rules because
manufacturers do not have to worry as much about whether their products adequately ensure safety. If
there are clear standards that dictate whether the intelligent driver warning systems are certified safe or
not, manufacturers would not be held completely liable for accidents arising from the use of the
intelligent warning systems. For example, in the case of air bags safety standards, NHTSA's minimum
standards dictated that air bags should be able to save the average male during a frontal barrier
collision. However, when females and children were killed, manufacturers were not completely liable
for the "failure" of the air bags, since their air bags were designed to perform to this minimum
standard. In that case, it was NHTSA who had to make changes to the standards and to offer an
improved solution. Hence, in terms of the extent of liability concerns, there are benefits to
manufacturers in having clear minimum safety standards.
Second, having standards can also reduce barriers to trade in order to aid the opening of
international automotive markets. The presence of standards and the harmonization of standards is
crucial at a national and international level because they improve economies of scale and competition
through the integration of infrastructure and markets. With respect to safety performance and design
standards, if they are standardized across manufacturers and transcend national boundaries, then
manufacturers will be able to make use of the interoperability of the markets and benefit especially
from economies of scales and increasing rates of return. Thus, harmonized requirements that are
standardized across manufacturers have economic benefits since the elimination of standards-related
market barriers can help stimulate free trade and capital flow [103, 126].
4.5 Should There Be Safety Standards?
Driver warning systems were originally conceptualized to improve safety. However, despite
the fact that intelligent driver warning systems such as the ACC and LDWS are already in the market,
there are no regulatory standards to ensure that these systems are safe and that driving performance is
not degraded when they are used. Moreover, as illustrated by the experiment conducted, unreliable
warning systems can negatively and significantly affect driving performances. Thus, it seems
necessary to have safety standards that ensure that intelligent driver warning systems in the market are
reliable.
Because the interaction between these alarms and driver-machine interaction is still not well
understood, improvement in automobile safety is not guaranteed by the presence of these emerging
technologies. Thus, I argue that safety standards must be designed and set as soon as possible in order
to ensure that future warning systems meet a minimum level of safety before they are introduced more
widely into the market. In general, safety levels improve with the presence of safety standards,
because safety is a large selling factor. Moreover, standards that are set high enough can provide
incentives (especially performance standards) for manufactures to innovate, in order to meet and
exceed a minimum performance requirement. Thus with safety standards, the intelligent warning
systems that are developed should generally be of a higher performance level than if there were no
standards. In addition, the presence of standards also communicates a message to the public that the
warning systems in the market have been approved because they have met a certain minimum safety
requirement.
Furthermore, in spite of the costs of having formalized standards, I argue that the benefits
outweigh these costs, especially since the most salient benefit is increased safety. Costs that come with
having safety standards include regulatory capture, the possible impediment of innovation, and the
delayed introduction of the technologies into the market. Of these costs, one significant tradeoff is the
increased time-to-market of the intelligent driver warning systems. Since there are no existing safety
standards today, they would first have to be set, and this process can take a long time. Typically, the
policy cycle is much longer than the technology/innovation cycle and thus, even though automotive
manufacturers may be ready to introduce warning systems into the market, they have to wait and
comply with the standards process, which can be tedious. Nevertheless, I argue that there is greater
welfare gain to society of waiting for safe technologies to be developed, rather than to have the
technologies in the market soon, but which may pose huge risks.
In addition, another cost associated with minimum standards is reduced open market
competition, which arises because of regulatory capture, where leading firms may try to influence and
capture the minimum standards to their advantage in order to prevent competition and increase the
barrier to market entry by weaker firms. Unfortunately, this phenomenon of regulatory capture will
always be present in any complex regulatory framework consisting of the various stakeholders such as
the regulatory agency and industry. There have been debates with respect to the origins of standards in
terms of whether standards were developed by the government in order to protect the public-interest
goals (e.g., safety) or whether standards were actually initialized and requested by manufacturers as
their way of securing government's assistance in order to transfer wealth to themselves, through
regulatory capture [127]. The general consensus among academics has been that most standards were
initiated by firms to secure assistance from the government in transferring wealth to themselves, in
100
ways not attainable without government intervention or regulation at the expense of competitors and
the public [125, 128].
Lastly, another cost is the impediment of innovation with the presence of safety standards.
This occurs if the standards are not set high enough to, or are not designed to encourage innovation.
For example, if standards are not set high enough, if manufacturers capture the standards to reflect the
current-state-of-the-art, then there are no incentives for them to innovate. In addition, if the standards
specify the use of certain technologies or certain designs for intelligent warning systems, then there is
little incentive for manufacturers to innovate and try to develop superior products beyond the pre-
determined standards.
However, in spite of these costs arising from having standards, they can be minimized and
addressed. If the standards are set high enough, then they will not inhibit innovation to a large degree,
particularly if they are performance-based. However, it is true that regulatory capture may prevent
these performance standards from being set too high, because manufacturers have an incentive to want
the safety standards to be easily attainable. Thus, the risk of regulatory capture is a serious tradeoff in
terms of leading to less open-market competition as well as less innovation. However, if the sharing of
information is facilitated between the manufacturers, the regulatory agency, and the public, then
regulatory capture may be minimized. This is because the regulatory agency will have the information
needed in order to evaluate and to set the standards. In addition, the engagement of the public in the
decision-making process can also reduce the extent of the capture phenomenon because the public's
main concern will lie with the assurance of safety of intelligent driver warning systems.
Thus, because it is possible to minimize many of the costs and negative tradeoffs that come
from having minimum standards, and because there are also long-term benefits in terms of improved
safety, I argue that minimum safety standards are warranted. In addition, having safety standards can
help to address latent problems and minimize unintended consequences. These latent and unintended
risks that could arise from the widespread adoption of intelligent warning systems without any safety
standards are irreversible (e.g., deaths that will be caused by poor designs are irreversible). Thus, I
argue that overall safety in the longer run will be improved with the presence of safety standards.
Since safety is of utmost importance, it should not be compromised at the expense of other benefits,
especially economic, regulatory and judicial ones. Thus, it seems essential to err on the side of caution
by enforcing safety standards in order to ensure that a minimum level of safety is maintained for
intelligent driver warning systems.
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4.6 What Safety Standards Should There Be?
As discussed in Chapter 2, safety standards can either be performance-based or prescription-
based. Aspects of safety can be grouped into three main categories of functional safety, usage safety
and traffic safety. In other words, for each of the safety aspects categories (especially for functional
and usage safety), there can be safety standards set. These safety standards can further be divided into
either performance-based or prescription-based standards.
Of the three, the first two safety aspects can be addressed using policy measures such as
standards. The last aspect, traffic safety, incorporates large-scale interactions between drivers and the
environment and is beyond the scope of this discussion. My recommendations for the types of
standards to ensure functional and usage safety will be presented below.
4.6.1 Functional Safety: Performance Standards
Recall in Chapter 2 that functional safety of the intelligent driver warning systems is defined
as the technical safety issues arising from both hardware and software design. The focus is on the
technical reliability and robustness of the warning systems and their propensity towards malfunction.
Thus, standards that address the functional system safety must ensure that at least on a minimum level,
that the systems are robust, reliable, and fail-safe.
In terms of functional safety, the standards should be performance-based and set so as to
ensure the development of reliable and robust systems. As seen from the previous experiment, warning
systems with a reliability level of 25% induced poorer driving performance and produced more
negative emotions in drivers, than those with a reliability level of 75%, which produced faster and
more accurate responses. Since reliability of warning systems can be a critical determinant of the
safety outcome of intelligent driver warning systems, it is imperative to set minimum performance
standards to ensure that these systems perform to the specified requirement.
While I am not recommending these particular minimum levels of reliability, I do recommend
that the performance standard for the assurance of functional safety include a specified minimum level
of reliability of the intelligent warning systems that manufacturers have to meet. That way,
manufacturers can innovate and use the least-cost method in order to design their systems in order to
meet that minimum level of performance. In this way, innovation will be encouraged and not impeded,
and at the same time, the public can also be assured of safe products in the markets.
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Since multiple warning systems will be used together, it is imperative that performance
standards specify performance requirements for multiple warning systems. This is crucial because
certain interactions may arise when multiple warning systems are used together, but which do not arise
when the individual warning systems are used in isolation. In addition, it is also important that the
warning systems maintain robustness and reliability during multiple threat scenarios. Even though
multiple threat scenarios (such as a lane departure causing a potential frontal as well as blind-spot
collision at an intersection) may not be as common as single threat scenarios (such as lane departure or
frontal collision), crucial issues may arise only during multiple threat scenarios, and these issues
should be addressed as early as possible.
Finally, these performance standards should be harmonized internationally if possible, so as to
ensure a consistent level of safety certification of intelligent warning systems beyond national
boundaries. While I recommend performance standards to ensure functional safety, I do not
recommend any prescription-based standards for functional safety. This is because specifying the
actual design of the warning systems, such as the types of sensors to be used or the specific decision
criterion for the warning systems, is unnecessary. As long as the final performance requirement is met,
it is not crucial to standardize the design aspects of the warning systems that ensure functional safety.
In addition, these design standards may also discourage innovation.
4.6.2 Usage Safety: Performance Standards and Design Guidelines
Recall in Chapter 2 that usage safety represents issues arising from the use of the warning
systems. Thus, usage safety focuses on the interaction between drivers and the warning systems. Key
issues involve inappropriate design leading to driver confusion, driver overload or underload,
distraction from driving, lack of understanding leading to over or under-reliance and mistrust of the
warning systems.
Thus, performance safety standards must ensure that driver performance is not degraded and
that drivers comprehend the meaning of alarms and are able to respond with the appropriate action to
mitigate the hazard. When developing these standards, it is important to have consistent testing
scenarios and performance indicators across manufacturers so as to measure the driving performance.
In addition, the indications must be objective and verifiable. For example, performance indicators
could include reaction time, lane position, headway distance and accuracy of response. Testing
scenarios should include all possible hazardous situations that can occur in reality and should also
include multiple threat scenarios. Furthermore, other than objective driving performance as measured
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by these driving performance indicators, how the drivers respond to multiple threat scenarios should
also be captured, including their affective state. This is important because as demonstrated in the
experiment presented in Chapter 4, as well as in previous research, negative emotions can quickly lead
to mistrust, lower acceptance and use of the warning systems, thus rendering them ineffective.
However, one main difficulty faced when developing usage safety standards is that critical
scenarios and hazards are generally very rare (i.e., have low base rates). Thus, subjecting test drivers to
multiple threats in a short period is unrealistic and does not mimic real driving conditions. Mimicking
a low base probability of critical threats presents a tradeoff of increased costs stemming from longer
testing periods and the need for a larger driver population. However, this tradeoff is necessary because
the aim is to mimic real driving situations as closely as possible in order to support ecological validity.
There have certainly been long-term large studies that were conducted, and such studies show that it is
indeed important to conduct tests beyond the simulation in the laboratory [129]. In addition, unlike
crashworthiness performance standards which are fairly mechanical since they involve dummies,
testing and certifying the performance of the warning systems is only possible with real drivers. Thus,
this is another complication and costs that will be incurred with the testing process.
However, despite these increased costs and tradeoffs to long-term research and testing, it is
imperative that there must be performance-based standards to ensure usage safety of driver warning
systems. This process will be slow initially but as more research is conducted and more data are
obtained, the rate of returns will increase. Consequently, the level of safety of warning systems will be
potentially raised as well.
In addition to performance standards for usage safety, there should also be prescription-based
codes since the design may significantly affect how drivers interact with the warning systems.
Nevertheless, I recommend that these codes should be recommended guidelines instead of standards,
which the current status quo. In addition, I recommend that the many guidelines already present
should be harmonized. As previously mentioned, there are many design guidelines which have been
developed in countries including those in North America, Europe and Japan. Thus, while I recommend
that design guidelines suffice (and design standards are not necessary), I strongly recommend that
these guidelines be harmonized beyond national boundaries so as to share knowledge and to ensure
that the latest human factors guidelines are available to manufacturers internationally.
Moreover, I argue that design guidelines suffice because it is still too early in the research and
development process to determine optimal design parameters of intelligent warning systems. As such,
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it is not efficient for an inferior set of design parameters to be the standard. These technologies are still
rapidly emerging and many human factors issues will likely arise from unanticipated driver-warning
system interaction. Thus, if design standards are determined too early, they could lock-in an inferior
set of design parameters. It is also not practical to wait for the research to develop and elucidate
optimal design standards, since there will be the cost of delayed time-to-market.
The presence of performance standards for usage safety should ensure that future intelligent
driver warning systems in the market are safe. However, the lack of design standards means that these
warning systems will not be standardized across different manufacturers. Nevertheless, as long as
usage safety is not compromised, then the lack of design standards should not be a crucial worry. As
more manufacturers adopt these guidelines and more empirical data become available from the
market, the optimal design parameters of warning systems can be developed, and these guidelines can
then be potentially enforced as design standards. Examples of design guidelines can include whether
to include a master alarm for integrated warning systems, how far apart temporally the multiple
warning system alarms should occur, and the recommended modalities of the alarms. For example, if a
master alert is indeed proven to be empirically better than multiple distinct alerts for the various
warning systems, then the use of a master alert should be specified into prescription-based design
standards later.
Nevertheless, even though the lack of design standards may mean that the warning systems in
the market will likely not be standardized across manufacturers, I believe that customization of the
warning systems is not a good option to offer drivers because design parameters, such as alarm
presentation, is a safety critical feature. In addition, design parameters could also potentially have
human factors implications. For instance, even though the experiment conducted did not show that a
master alert had any affect on drivers' reactions as opposed to distinct individual alarms, one choice of
alarm presentation may indeed be better than the other. In addition, the modality of presentation, such
as auditory, visual, or haptic, may also affect how alarms are perceived. Thus, since design parameters
are safety critical and may potentially have human factors implications, manufacturers should decide
on the design parameters and not allow drivers the freedom of choice, since users may not always be
right in wanting what is best for them [130]. In addition, from the manufacturers' perspective, it is also
unlikely that they will allow the personalization of design parameters such as the choice of alarms
because of the potential liability implications.
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"Minimum" Standards
I also argue that it is not sufficient to have strictly "minimum" standards in the literal sense,
because manufacturers will seldom exceed the standards, unless they have a vested interest such as
economic profit to do so. Usage safety of intelligent driver warning systems should go beyond the
strict minimum and include not only the average driver, but also include those of other higher-risk
groups such as novice and elderly drivers. This standard must be enforced by the regulatory agency
and should not just be a recommendation to manufacturers. I argue that this testing is necessary
because the potential driver degradation that may occur with the use of intelligent driver warning
systems is most likely with these risk-prone driving populations. In addition, the risks may be beyond
what we are able to forecast today, and the extent of "unknown unknowns" and unintended
consequences may be large. Thus, it is imperative to ensure that the warning systems work with all
driver populations and to ensure that these emerging technologies will be safe for a wide driving
population, even at the expense of the delayed market introduction of the warning systems.
4.6.4 Post-market Surveillance & Policy Flexibility
People will always find ways to maximize their personal benefits and utility derived from the
use of the intelligent driver warning systems. In addition, people have an inbuilt target level of
acceptable risk, which tends not to change. As a result, when new technologies such as intelligent
driver warning systems are introduced into vehicles, people may drive faster or more recklessly since
they want to maintain the same amount of target risk level, and are always seeking to increase their
overall utility. This phenomenon is also known as behavioral adaptation or risk homeostasis. Since this
phenomenon is unavoidable and people will always adapt their behavior to new technologies, it is not
possible to forecast all risks and uncertainties associated with emerging technologies before they are
actually in the market. As a result, while it is important to ensure that the intelligent driver warning
systems are reasonably safe before they enter the market, it is also important to ensure that the
technologies are introduced into the market without unnecessary delay so that the pubic can benefit
from the use of these technologies.
As seen in the air bag example, it is impossible to forecast and detect all the risks from
emerging technologies before they are actually used by a bigger population. Thus empirical data,
informed by reasonable hypotheses, are necessary in order to learn how these warning systems will
actually be used and accepted by drivers. Large-scale empirical data can only be obtained through
post-market surveillance, which may be conducted by either manufacturers or a regulatory agency.
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4.6.3
This can occur by keeping in contact with buyers, updating database of accidents caused/prevented by
the warning systems, and conducting surveys, etc. to keep track of the potential effects of the warning
systems. Post-market surveillance is even more crucial in the case of intelligent warning systems as
compared to other automotive technologies because of the large component of driver-system
interaction and the uncertainty of how drivers will respond to these systems.
In addition, flexibility should be designed into the policy-making process so that solutions can
be easily changed and adapted as new information becomes available with empirical data from the
post-market surveillance. Post-market surveillance and flexibility in adaptation are important because
even though one policy solution may be optimal in a particular time period, that policy solution may
not be suitable later.
It is often easier to maintain the status quo than to make a change. However, it is imperative
that both the regulatory and engineering processes are adaptive such that technology lock-in and
policy lock-in will be minimized, if not prevented. Lock-in tends to occur because there are increasing
rates of return associated with maintaining the status quo of the incumbent technologies or policy
decisions [87]. Increasing rates of return happens when there is a greater increase per unit output (e.g.,
economic gains) with a proportional increase per unit input (e.g., development and production costs).
For example, as more factories are built to manufacture the particular product, it becomes increasingly
cheaper to develop each marginal additional product. Increasing rates of returns will bias the decisions
towards maintaining the current technology and policy decisions, rather than to making a radical
change to adopt a new technology (even if that technology is superior) or to make changes to the
policy decisions [131]. Thus, both policy and technology feedback are essential to foster learning and
anticipation of change in the policy decisions. This feedback can be obtained via close-monitoring and
post-market surveillance.
4.6.5 Importance of Sharing Information
Also important is the exchange of information between the main stakeholders: the regulatory
agency whose job is to ensure minimum safety standards are met, the automotive manufacturers
whose interests lie with profit maximization, and the public whose interest lie in increasing their
overall utility. However, if regulatory agents do not have the information that the manufacturers have
about their warning systems such as the state-of-the-art of the emerging technologies, then regulatory
capture may occur, as manufacturers try to influence and shape the regulations and standards to their
advantage. Unfortunately, regulatory capture is a phenomenon that is going to be present in any
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complex regulatory framework. For example, in the case of setting minimum safety standards for
intelligent driver warning systems, there are international organizations set up to look into these issues
such as the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). However, these organizations are mainly
composed of the manufacturers themselves, who are likely to influence the final outcome of what
safety standards are set. Thus, to reduce regulatory capture, it is important to facilitate the exchange
and sharing of information between the and the regulatory agency so that the regulatory agency will
have the information to evaluate and set the standards. In addition, the engagement of the public in the
decision-making process can also reduce the extent of the capture phenomenon because the public is
more concerned about the assurance of safety of the intelligent driver warning systems than profit
maximization.
4.7 Conclusions
Until now, the development of intelligent driver warning systems has been strongly
technology driven, and minimum safety standards are non-existent today that ensure that these systems
are safe. With the absence of any enforced performance or design safety standards, it is possible that
intelligent warning systems could actually degrade driving performance in some situations. Even
though there may be certain benefits that come with not having any enforced standards, there are more
justifications to having a minimum level of safety standard for intelligent warning systems before they
enter the market. The main and most salient benefit from having enforced minimum standards is that
safety levels will be ensured and increased in the long run. Other benefits of having standards include
clear and transparent rules so that manufacturers know exactly what levels of safety are required, and
innovate accordingly, as well as possibly increased levels of innovation if standards are set high
enough.
In terms of functional safety, there should be performance-based standards to ensure that the
warning systems will not fail. These performance standards should be standardized across
manufacturers and if possible, harmonized internationally, so as to ensure a consistent level of safety
certification. In terms of usage safety, there should be performance standards as well. Indicators that
measure driving performance and usage safety include drivers' reaction time to critical hazards, lane
position, headway distance and accuracy of response. It is also imperative to develop standardized
driving scenarios in evaluating driving performance and thus, usage safety. Furthermore, how drivers
respond to critical hazards should also be captured, including their affective state. Like the standards
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for functional safety, performance standards for usage safety must also include multiple threat
scenarios to investigate how drivers will respond to multiple intelligent warning systems.
Since the design parameters of the warning systems may actually be significant factors that
affect driving performance, there should also be design guidelines in addition to performance
standards. However, since it is too early in the development process to formalize strict design
standards, I recommend that the current status quo of having human factors guidelines suffice.
However, the various design guidelines developed from the various organizations including those in
North America, Europe and Japan should be harmonized beyond national boundaries. That way,
manufacturers across the world can be consistent in the design of the intelligent driver warning
systems.
The presence of performance standards for both usage and functional safety should ensure that
future intelligent driver warning systems in the market are safe. The lack of design standards means
that these warning systems will not be standardized across different manufacturers. Nevertheless, as
long as usage safety is not compromised, then the lack of design standards should not be a crucial
concern. As more empirical data and research become available on the operational use of the warning
systems, then these design guidelines can be adapted as design standards.
Moreover, since the industry cannot be relied on to go beyond the "minimum" standards, it is
imperative that the "minimum" safety standards of the warning systems include driver performance of
different driving populations, extending especially beyond the median driver to include risk-prone
populations. This is especially important since these are the populations at the most risk from the
introduction of the intelligent driver warning systems into vehicles.
Finally, since it is impossible to detect all risks before the warning systems are fully
introduced into the market, it is important to follow-up with rigorous post-market surveillance of how
the warning systems actually perform empirically. The regulatory framework consisting of the
decision-makers and major stakeholders should be flexible enough to allow for adaptation and change
of policy decisions, safety standards, and regulations to ensure that the technologies available in the
market are the best possible. This is important because a flexible regulatory system can minimize, if
not prevent, technology lock-in to inferior technologies and regulatory lock-in to inferior policies.
Finally, to ensure that the intelligent driver warning systems being developed will be superior and
safe, it is important for information to be shared and exchanged between the various stakeholders.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis was concerned with examining multiple intelligent driver warning systems that
will soon be installed in a significant number of vehicles. Specifically, driving performance
implications in using a master alert as opposed to multiple distinct alerts from multiple warning
systems were examined. Additionally, this thesis was concerned with exploring whether there should
be minimum safety standards for intelligent driver warning systems, and if so, what these safety
standards should incorporate, as well as the potential implications of setting safety standards.
5.1 Driver Experiment
A 2x4x2 laboratory simulation experiment with a mixed factorial design was conducted to
determine if a master alarm would impact driving performance differently in the presence of multiple
intelligent warning systems, as opposed to distinct individual alarms. The three factors designed in the
experiment were alarm alerting scheme (master vs. multiple alerts), driver warning systems (front and
rear collision warnings, left and right lane departures), and reliability (high and low reliability levels).
Reliability was also chosen to be one of the factors tested since no warning systems will be perfectly
reliable. A secondary distraction task was included to draw drivers' attention away from the roadway
and to emulate in-car telematic distraction. The auditory modality was chosen as the channel of alarm
presentation because of its omni-presence and its ability to direct attention of drivers, regardless of
initial attention focus.
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The experiment showed that the master alert did not make a difference in drivers' performance
for both reaction time and accuracy of response when compared to multiple distinct alarms. On the
other hand, both reliability and the specific driver warning systems were significant factors that
affected driving performance. Expectedly, reaction times were very different for the four different
types of hazards. For example, reaction time was expected to be shorter for responses to mitigate
frontal collisions than those for rear collisions because drivers generally can be expected to focus more
on the frontal visual scene as opposed to the rear visual scene. The factor of reliability was also
significant in affecting both the reaction times and the accuracy of responses of the drivers. When
participants drove with more reliable warning systems, their reaction times were shorter and more
accurate. Warning systems with low reliability also negatively influenced drivers' affective state, such
as creating stress and anxiety. This finding highlights the need to develop reliable and robust warning
systems that have low incidences of false, nuisance and missing alarms. Another important result from
the study was that even though driving performance was not affected by the use of either a master
alarm or distinct alarms, participants' responses in the post-experimental survey indicated they
generally preferred distinct alarms, instead of a generic master alert.
There are three design implications of the results from this experiment. First, designing
systems that are reliable is of paramount importance. In other words, if warning systems are not
reliable (i.e., there are many false, nuisance, and missing alarms), then drivers are potentially better off
without them. Unreliable systems tend to increase stress and anxiety levels of drivers, leading to
distrust of and a lowered confidence in the warning systems, which subsequently lowers acceptance of
the driver warning and assistance systems. Previous studies have also demonstrated this effect where
unreliable systems degraded driver performance as well as negatively affected drivers' emotions.
Thus, the reliability of these intelligent driver warning systems is one of the most crucial determinants
of driving performance.
A second implication of the results is that the use of a master alert did not make a difference in
either improving or degrading driving performance. However, this result must be evaluated in light of
the circumstances in which the experiment was conducted: only auditory alarms were tested, a limited
number of driver warning systems were tested, and there were a high number of critical hazards that
occurred in the testing period. Results may be different if multi-modal alarms are used and if more
warning systems are tested to reflect the proliferation of warning systems. Additional research into the
implications of using a master alarm for multiple warning systems should be done before a definitive
conclusion of whether a master alarm helps to increase or decrease driver performance.
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Another implication from the post-experiment survey administered was that participants
generally thought that they would do better with distinct alarms than a master alert. The implication of
this finding is that if further research also shows that driving performance is indeed unaffected by the
alarm alerting scheme, then perhaps manufacturers can cater to the preferences of drivers by allowing
drivers to choose and personalize the alarms from the warning systems in their vehicles.
5.2 Importance of Setting Minimum Safety Standards
Driver warning systems were originally conceptualized to improve safety. However, despite
the fact that intelligent driver warning systems such as the ACC and LDWS are already in the market,
there are no regulatory standards to ensure that these systems are safe and that driving performances
are not degraded when they are used. Because the interaction between these alarms and driver-
machine interaction is still not well understood, and improvement in automobile safety is not
guaranteed by the presence of these emerging technologies, I argue that safety standards must be
designed and set as soon as possible in order to ensure that future warning systems meet a minimum
level of required safety. These safety standards should be met before the intelligent warning systems
are introduced more widely into the market.
In general, safety levels improve with the presence of safety standards because safety is a
large selling factor and performance standards that are set high enough can provide incentives for
manufactures to innovate. Thus, with safety standards, intelligent warning systems that are developed
should generally be of a higher performance level than if there were no standards. In addition, the
presence of standards also communicates a message to the public that the warning systems in the
market have been approved because they have met a certain minimum safety requirement.
Nevertheless, there are tradeoffs that come with the presence of minimum standards. One
significant tradeoff is the increased time-to-market created by the presence of standards. Since there
are no existing safety standards today, they would first have to be set and this process can take a long
time. Typically, the policy cycle is much longer than the technology/innovation cycle and thus, even
though automotive manufacturers are ready to introduce warning systems into the market, they would
need to wait and comply with the standards process, which can be tedious. Another cost associated
with minimum standards is in terms of reduced open market competition which can arise because of
regulatory capture. Lastly, innovation may also be impeded with the presence of safety standards,
especially if the standards are not set high enough to encourage innovation.
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In order to minimize the phenomenon of regulatory capture, it is important to facilitate the
exchange and sharing of information between manufacturers and the regulatory agency so that the
regulatory agency will have the information needed to evaluate and set the standards. The engagement
of the public in the decision-making process can also reduce the extent of the capture phenomenon
because the public's main concern will lie with the assurance of safety of the intelligent driver warning
systems. Thus, the exchange of information is crucial to prevent regulatory capture from negatively
impacting safety standards.
Nevertheless, in spite of the potential tradeoffs that may occur with the presence of safety
standards, the benefits of improvements in safety that come from having minimum standards are long-
term and are thus warranted. In addition, the risks from the widespread adoption of intelligent warning
systems without any safety standards are often irreversible (e.g., deaths that will be caused by poor
design are irreversible). Furthermore, safety has an intrinsic value to consumers and thus, it should not
be compromised. Thus, it is essential to enforce safety standards in order to ensure that a minimum
level of safety is maintained for intelligent driver warning systems.
5.3 Recommendations for Minimum Safety Standards
In terms of what minimum standards should be set, I recommend that safety standards be set
for both functional and usage safety of intelligent warning systems. In terms of functional safety,
standards should be performance-based and must be set to ensure the development of robust and
reliable systems. As seen from the experiment conducted, warning systems with a reliability level of
25% induced poor performance, as compared to those with a reliability level of 75%. While I am not
recommending these particular minimum levels of reliability, I do recommend that the performance
standard for the assurance of functional safety include a specified minimum level of reliability of the
intelligent warning systems that manufacturers have to meet. That way, manufacturers can innovate
and use the best available technologies in order to meet and exceed the performance standards.
However, for functional safety, there should not be any design standards because such standards
would discourage innovation.
In terms of usage safety, standards must also be performance-based to ensure that driver
performance is not degraded by the warning systems. However, at this point in time, it is too early to
dictate specific design standards, so I recommend that the current design guideline status quo is
sufficient. However, there are many human factors design guidelines which have been developed in
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North America, Europe and Japan. Thus, I also strongly recommend that these guidelines be
harmonized beyond the national boundaries so as to share knowledge and to ensure that the latest
human factors guidelines are available to manufacturers internationally. In addition, not having any
design standards for the systems will also allow a quicker time-to-market of the warning systems. If
design standards are set early in the process, more human factors research will have to be done and
this may unnecessarily delay the introduction of otherwise safe warning systems into the market.
Thus, the presence of performance standards for both usage and functional safety should
ensure that future intelligent driver warning systems in the market are safe. However, the lack of
design standards would mean that these warning systems would not be standardized across different
manufacturers. Nevertheless, as long as usage safety is not compromised (by the presence of
performance standards), then the lack of design standards should not be a crucial concern. However, I
argue that in the long run, there should be design standards, especially when it becomes clear that a
particular design configuration is superior. I also recommend that warning systems be standardized
across manufacturers in the long run. For example, if a master alert is indeed proven to be empirically
better than multiple distinct alerts for the various warning systems, then the use of a master alert
should be specified into the design standards.
One crucial point to note is that when setting these "minimum" safety standards, especially for
performance-based standards, it is imperative that the standards account for a wide driving population,
extending beyond the median driver to include risk-prone populations like novice and elderly drivers.
This standard must be enforced and should not just be a guideline to manufacturers. As seen with the
development of air bag technologies, performance standards initially only included the median male.
However, as air bag-induced fatalities began to rise for females and children, NHTSA amended the
standards to include performance tests for female and children dummies as well. Likewise, for
intelligent warning systems, it is absolutely imperative that the performance standards are not just
tested with the average driver, but also for peripheral driving populations. In addition, we can learn
from the air bag example and ensure that minimum standards include a wider driver population in
order to address these forecasted risks before wider market proliferation.
5.4 Recommendations for other Policy Measures
While it is important to set safety standards to certify that warning systems are safe before
release into the market, it is also important not to delay the introduction of such potentially beneficial
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technologies. This is because it is impossible to detect all risks from emerging intelligent driver
warning systems until they are fully introduced into the market. Thus, it is important to introduce the
systems into the market as soon as possible so that the public can benefit from the technologies. At the
same time, it is imperative that manufacturers and regulatory agencies conduct rigorous post-market
surveillance of how these warning systems perform empirically, as a follow-up to this initial
introduction. This post-market surveillance is even more crucial in the case for intelligent warning
systems because of the large component of driver-system interaction and the uncertainty of how
drivers will respond to the systems.
Post-market surveillance may shed light on unintended safety consequences as more empirical
data is collected over time. When there is an indication of such risks, the regulatory system should be
flexible enough to allow for adaptation and change of the policy decisions and safety standards in
order to ensure that new risks are addressed. If this flexibility and adaptation is incorporated into the
regulatory framework, then both technological lock-in to inferior technologies as well as regulatory
lock-in to inferior policies can be minimized, if not avoided.
Lastly, it is also important that information is shared between the major stakeholders
consisting of the regulatory agency, the industry (the manufacturers) and the public. This exchange of
information is important to ensure that the regulatory agency will have sufficient knowledge and
information about the current state-of-the-art of the intelligent warning systems in order to minimize
the phenomenon of regulatory capture and to be able to set minimum safety standards that will
encourage manufacturers to innovate. In addition, public opinion is also very important and should be
heard in the decision-making process. This is especially true for intelligent warning systems, which
have a large component of driver-machine interaction. Thus, choices made regarding the design and
development of intelligent warning systems are also social ones that public should have a say in. The
role of the regulatory agency is to ensure that emerging technologies such as intelligent driver warning
systems in the market are safe, but their role is not to ensure that the technologies available are the
most superior technologies. However, if more stakeholders such as the public are included in the
decision-making process of deciding on both the direction and development of these technologies as
well as on the minimum levels of safety desired, then it can be ensured that the technologies in the
market will be superior to those that would exist if there was no public scrutiny. This is because if
consumers can input their wants and needs into the decision-making and design process, then they can
help shape the development and innovation of the technologies to be as close to the ones desired as
possible. Thus, if this exchange of information is facilitated between the major stakeholders, then
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economically efficient outcomes of having both superior and safe intelligent driver warning
technologies will be achieved.
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Appendix A
Tables Al and A2 shows the list of vehicles equipped with systems that support lateral control
of the vehicle, namely, Lane Departure Warning Systems (LDWS) and systems that support
longitudinal control, namely, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) Systems available in the United States
light vehicle market for the 2005/2006 model year. The Tables Al and A2 categorize these ADAS
(i.e., ACC and LDWS) according to the vehicle manufacturer (i.e., Mercedes), model line (i.e., E-
class), and model trim level (i.e., E500).
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List of Vehicles with ACC
Table Al: List of Vehicles equipped with ACC (2005/2006 models). [31]
Make Model Trim Level Year
Audi A8 LW12 Quattro, L42 Quattro, 4.2 Quattro 2005
BMW 3 Series 325i, 330i 2006
5 Series 525i & 525xi, 530i, 530xi & 530xi Sportswagon
545i 2005
6 Series 645Ci
7 Series 750i, 750Li, 760i, 760Li 2006
Cadillac STS V8 2005
XLR
Infiniti FX FX35, FX45 2005
M M35, M35xAWD, M45, 2006
M35 Sport, M45 Sport
Q Q45 2005
QX QX56
Jaguar S-Type 3.0, 4.2, 4.2 VDP Edition, S-Type R 2005
XJ-Series Super V8, Vanden Plas, XJ8, XJ8L, XJR 2005
XK-Series XK8, XKR 2006
Lexus GS 300, 430 2006
LS430 - 2005
RX 330 2005
Maybach -- 57, 62 2005
Mercedes-Benz CL-Class CL500, CL55, CL600, C165 2005
CLS-Class CLS500, CLS55 2006
E-Class E55 2005
S-Class S350, S430, S500, S55, S65, S600 2006
SL-Class S1500, SL55, SL600, SL65 2005
SLR - 2005
Toyota Avalon Limited 2005
Sienna XLE Limited 2005
List of Vehicles with LDWS
Table A2: List of Vehicles equipped with LDWS (2005/2006 models)[31].
Make Model Trim Level Year
Infiniti I FX I FX35, FX45 1 2005
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M M35, M35xAWD, M45, 2006
M35 Sport, M45 Sport
I · - · -
.A
Appendix B
FCW Triggering Events
1. Oncoming vehicle on highway that overtakes another car, resulting in a head-on
impending collision. The head-on oncoming car does not swerve back into its own
lane.
Figure 1: At Top of Hill, an Oncoming Car Appears
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Figure 2: Oncoming Vehicle Imminent Collision
2. Lead moving vehicle on highway that brakes suddenly.
Figure 3: Suddenly Braking Car
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3. Stationary parked vehicle that pulls out from the side onto the driver's path.
Figure 4: Stationary Car Pulling into Driver's Path
4. Stationary parked vehicle that backs out from a garage onto the driver's path, and then
backs into the garage again.
Figure 5: Rows of Parked Cars in Housing Estate
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Figure 6: Car Backing Out & In of Garage
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FVFA Tri*ering Events
There is basically one type of FVFA triggering event, which was a vehicle that quickly
approaches the driver from the rear, with a closing velocity of 50 feet/second more than the speed of
the driver. There were two ways by which the other vehicle could retreat at the last moment without
crashing into the subject driver:
1. The moving rear vehicle surges up to the driver, and then backs off at the last moment
when the 2 vehicles are within 2 feet of each other.
Figure 7: Rear Car Approaches Driver As Driver Reaches End Of Downhill
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Figure 8: Rear Car Gets Closer to Driver
Figure 9: Rear Car Then Backs Away
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2. The moving rear vehicle surges up to the driver, and then overtakes on the driver's left
when the 2 vehicles are within 2 feet of each other.
Figure 10: Rear Car That Overtakes Driver on Left
Figure 11: Rear Car Speeds off after Overtaking
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LDW Triggering Events
The unexpected "wind gust" will force a gradual heading change and subsequent lane change
to the left or right of the participant's vehicle. Participants will then experience a heading change of
their vehicle and will have to correct the departure by steering back into the lane of travel.
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Appendix C
Testing Scenario A (TP:FP = 3:1)
Table C1: Random Order of Appearance of the Critical Events (TP & FP) in Scenario A
Distance (ft) TP/FP Left LDW Right LDW FCW FVFA
2900 TP TRUE 1
4340-4500-5300 TP TRUE 1
6350 TP TRUE 2
7900 TP TRUE 1
11300 FP FALSE 1
12380 TP TRUE 2
13900- 14200 TP TRUE 1
15300- 15880 TP TRUE 2
17500 - 18300 TP TRUE 3
19600 TP TRUE 3
22000 TP TRUE 4
22500 TP TRUE 2
24300 TP TRUE 3
25600 FP FALSE 1
26380 TP TRUE 4
27800 FP FALSE 2
29300 TP TRUE 4
32000- 35000 TP TRUE 5
33800 TP TRUE 5
36500 TP TRUE 3
37500 TP TRUE 4
38800 FP FALSE 1
39000 FP FALSE 2
40200 TP TRUE 5
41590 -40650 TP TRUE 5
42500 FP FALSE 1
44000 TP TRUE 6
45000 FP FALSE 2
46380 FP FALSE 2
47800 TP TRUE 6
48500 TP TRUE 6
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Testing Scenario B (TP:FP = 1:3)
Table C2: Random Order of Appearance of the Critical Events (TP & FP) in Scenario B
Distance (ft) TP/FP Left LDW Right LDW FCWS RCWS
2500 FP FALSE 1
3800 FP FALSE 1
6500 FP FALSE 1
7900 TP TRUE 1
9900 FP FALSE 2
11300 FP TRUE 1
12380 FP FALSE 2
13150 FP FALSE 1
14148 FP FALSE 2
15500- 16000 TP TRUE 1
17000 FP FALSE 3
19200 TP FALSE 3
20900 TP FALSE 2
21900- 23000 TP TRUE 2
24300 TP FALSE 3
26200 TP FALSE 3
27000 FP FALSE4
27800 FP FALSE 4
29000 TP TRUE 1
31200 FALSE 4
33200 FP FALSE 5
34000 FP FALSE4
35200 TP FALSE 5
36650 TP TRUE 2
37600 TP TRUE 2
38700 FP FALSE5
39700 TP FALSE 5
41500 FP FALSE 6
46000 FP FALSE 6
47300 TP TRUE 2
48500 FP FALSE 6
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Appendix D
Participants' Informed Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
NON-BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Multiple Warnings and Driver Situation Awareness
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Angela Ho and Dr. Mary
Cummings from the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). You were selected as a possible participant in this study
because you are between the ages of 18 and 55 and hold a valid drivers license. You should
read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand before
deciding whether or not to participate.
* PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to choose whether to
be in it or not. If you choose to be in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at
any time without penalty or consequences of any kind. The investigator may withdraw you
from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.
* PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The study is designed to evaluate how different alarms in Collision Avoidance Systems affect
human performance.
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* PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to:
(1) First fill out pre-test questionnaires on your driving tendencies and experiences.
(2) Sit in and drive the vehicle simulator "Miss Daisy" through a virtual environment as
part of acclimatizing yourself with the simulator environment for up to 15 minutes.
(3) Various different experimental runs will follow during the next 45 minutes. You will
be asked to drive through a series of simulated scenarios which will test your ability to
discriminate between different types of aural alarms (forward collision & real
collision). Driving data will be collected based on different responses to alarms
triggered by the collision avoidance systems.
(4) Lastly, fill out a post-test questionnaire on your simulator experience.
* POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no major risks anticipated from participation in this study. There is a slight chance
of experiencing simulator sickness a similar experience to motion sickness. Please inform the
experimentor at the first sign of any discomfort. Should you wish to stop or delay the
experiment, you are free to do so at any time.
* POTENTIAL BENEFITS
You will have a chance to participate in research that will increase knowledge of human
behavior and response to different alarms in Collision Avoidances Warning Systems. In the
future this data may contribute to affecting designs of these systems, and be used to improve
vehicle and roadway safety.
* PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
Participation in this study is strictly on a volunteer basis and no compensation other than the
gratitude of the investigators and possibly free snacks and drinks will be provided.
* CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with
you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by
law. You will be assigned a subject number that will be used on all related documents to
include databases, summaries of results, etc. Only one master list of subject names and
numbers will exist that will remain only in the custody of Professor Cummings.
* IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Angela
Ho (617-452-4785) or Dr. Mary Cummings (617-252-1512).
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* EMERGENCY CARE AND COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
In the unlikely event of physical injury resulting from participation in this research you may
receive medical treatment from the M.I.T. Medical Department, including emergency
treatment and follow-up care as needed. Your insurance carrier may be billed for the cost of
such treatment. M.I.T. does not provide any other form of compensation for injury.
Moreover, in either providing or making such medical care available it does not imply the
injury is the fault of the investigator. Further information may be obtained by calling the MIT
Insurance and Legal Affairs Office at 1-617-253-2822.
* RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this
research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding
your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use
of Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T., Room E32-335, 77 Massachusetts Ave,
Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253-6787.
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
Name of Subject
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable)
Signature of Subject or Legal Representative Date
SIGNATURE: OF IN VESTIGATOR :
In my judgment the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent and
possesses the legal capacity to give informed consent to participate in this research study.
Signature of Investigator Date
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Appendix E
Participants filled out a pre-experiment survey on a desktop computer, and their answers were
electronically stored. The survey questions are reproduced below:
Pre-experiment Survey
Hello and thank you for participating in the Driving Study conducted by Professor Mary L Cummings and
Angela Ho.
Please fill out the following Pre-Simulation Questionnaire. We look forward to your participation at E40-292
If you have any questions, please direct them to AngelaHo@mit.edu. Thank you.
Please fill in blanks or circle the one best response unless otherwise noted.
Your answers to these questions will be held confidential.
1. What is your subject ID (Parti)?*
Please ask the research assistant for your Subject ID.
2. What is your subject ID (Partl)?*
Please ask the research assistant for your Subject ID.
3. How old are you?
4. What is your gender? male female
5. What is your occupation? If student, list your major.
6. How many years have you had a valid driving license (answer in years)?
7. On which side of the road are you used to driving? If your'e comfortable driving on both sides, select
"both." For example, in the US and Canada, select "right" side of the rod. In united Kingdom and
Commonwealth countries, select "left" side of the road.
-Right _Left _Both
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8. Do you have a:
a. US License
b. Canada License
c. If International, which Country?
9. When was the last time you drove? Choose your timescale and write it in next to your answer. For
example "1 month ago" or "2 days ago" or "5 years ago"
10. In the last year, how often did you drive? Each 'time' is defined by each trip you make on a car.
a. 5 days a week or more
b. 3 - 4 days a week
c. a few times each month
d. Less than 10 times a year
e. Less than 5 times a year
11.In the last year, on a typical weekday, what is the total distance and time you drove?
Please answer considering a day which is typical for you, or approximate the average time you would
spend driving on a weekday. _ miles hours
12. On a scale of 1-10, how would you characterize your typical driving behavior?
1 being least aggressive, and 5 being most aggressive.
1 2 3 4 5
13.When you drive, do you have difficulty keeping to your own lane? No
Yes. Please further explain when does that happen, and why?
14. Do you feel drowsy right now? Yes no
15. In which, if any, of the following do you usually get motion sick? (check all that apply)
o Playing Video Games
o A train facing backwards
o A train facing forwards
o A bus
o The driver seat of a car
o The passenger seat of a car
o The back seat of a car
o An airplane
o Moving boat
o Other please specify
o None of the above
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16. Do you take motion sickness medication, such as Dramamine, before traveling in? (circle all that
apply)
o A train
o A bus
o Car
o An airplane
o A boat
17. How often do you play video games (PS, Xbox, Computer, Arcade, etc)
Never. No time.
I play it a few times a year
I play it a few times a month
I play it a few times a week
I play it more than a few times a week, but I can control how much I play.
I'm addicted. I have withdrawal symptoms if I don't play. Help!
Thank you for completing the survey! Don'tforget to go to E40-292 on your scheduled day for the experiment.
Thanks!
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Appendix F
Transcripts of Voice Instructions
All participants heard pre-recorded voice instructions, spoken by a female American, so as to
reduce any variability between participants with respect to the instructions heard. The following shows
the transcripts of these instructions.
Introductions
01.SILENT_PHONE.mp3
Please remember to turn your cellular phone to the silent mode.
01.INTRODUCTION.mp3
Hello and welcome to the MIT driving lab.
Please make yourself comfortable, and adjust your seat as you would if you were driving a real car.
This car functions as an automatic so you will not need to shift or use the clutch.
Look directly ahead and you will see a large screen, which will soon display the driving course.
On the right side of the screen, a rearview mirror is projected.
The simulator also has a working speedometer and functional turning signals.
During the simulated drive over the next 40 minutes, you are going to drive through different types of
environments.
You will be hearing warning alarms sound during your drive.
This may mean that you are encountering a potential frontal collision, rear collision, or that you are
drifting out of your own lane.
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In such cases, if you do not take a corrective action, a crash is imminent.
However at other times, the warning alarms may just be false alarms. This means that there are no
potential collisions taking place, and the warning alarms are false alerts.
You will now hear some examples of the warning alarms.
Introduction - Master Alarm
Plays either master alarm or the distinct alarms. Alarm alerting scheme is a Between-
Subject factor, so half of the subjects under the Master alarm alerting scheme heard the
following instructions while the other half heard another set of instructions:
02A1.MasterAlarm.mp3
If you are about to have a frontal collision, a rear collision, or
If you drift out of your lane onto either the left or ride side of the road, you will hear this alarm sound:
* Plays master alarm
02A2.AfterMasterAlarm.mp3
You have heard the same alarm sound.
When you hear such an alarm, it may mean that you are experiencing a variety of events.
Firstly, you may be about to have a frontal collision. To avoid a crash, you can either apply the brakes
or swerve onto the sidewalk
You may also be about to have a rear collision. To avoid being rear-ended, you can either Speed Up or
swerve onto the sidewalk.
In addition, you may also be drifting out of your lane.
When this happens, you should maintain control of the steering wheel and go back into your lane.
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Introduction - Multiple Distinct Alarms
The other half of the participants under the multiple alarm alerting scheme heard this set of
instructions.
02B 1.FrontAlarm.mp3
If you are about to have a frontal collision, you will hear this alarm sound:
* plays alarm.
02B2.AfterFrontAlarm-BeforeRear.mp3
When you hear such an alarm,
You can either apply the brakes or swerve onto the sidewalk to avoid a frontal crash.
If you are about to have a rear collision, you will hear this alarm sound:
* plays alarm.
02B04.AfterRearAlarm-BeforeLeft.mp3
When you hear such an alarm,
You can either Speed Up or swerve onto the sidewalk to avoid a rear crash.
If you drift out of your lane onto the left unintentionally, You will hear this alarm sound:
* plays alarm.
02B06.AfterLeftLane-BeforeRight.mp3
When you hear such an alarm,
You should maintain control of the steering wheel and go back into your lane.
If you drift out of your lane onto the right unintentionally,
You will hear this alarm sound:
* plays alarm.
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AfterRightlane-fast
When you hear such an alarm,
You should maintain control of the steering wheel and go back into your lane.
Introduction - Continue
Now, all participants will hear the same set of instructions from now.
03.IntroductionCont.mp3
Please note that the alarms for the left and right lane deviation sound the same, but you have heard the
left alarm through the left speaker, and the right alarm through the right speaker.
Please keep in mind that when you hear a warning sound, it may also just be a false alarm.
The drive is divided into 5 sessions -
3 training sessions, and 2 testing sessions.
At all times during your journey, please stay on the main road without turning off at intersections.
You will hear additional instructions for the training sessions before we begin the testing sessions.
Do you have any questions?
Speedlimit.mp3
If you look at the speedometer, the numbers above represent speed in miles per hour, and the numbers
below represent speed in kilometers per hour.
Speed limits are given in miles per hour.
Throttle.mp3
Please make use of the practice sessions to get used to the throttle and breaking sensitivities of the car.
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Practice Session Instructions
04.FirstTraining.mp3
You will now begin your training sessions.
The training sessions will not be scored, so take your time driving, maintain the posted speed limit,
and follow any traffic control signs or signals.
During your drive, you will experience windy conditions.
When that happens, you may unintentionally drift out of your own lane. You will hear an alarm
sound, and simply steer back onto your lane.
If you feel uncomfortable in any way, stop driving, close your eyes, and speak with the research
assistant.
Please make sure the steering wheel is straight and your foot is off the accelerator and brake.
Soon you will see an image of a road in front of you.
When you see that image, begin driving by pressing the gas pedal.
Do you have any questions?
* STARTS FIRST PRACTICE SCENARIO
05a.FirstEnd-AlarmQuiz.mp3
You have just completed the first training session.
* Ends here for single alarm scenarios, continues for multiple alarm scenarios.
Before the next training session begins, you will do a little quiz on the alarms.
You will hear an alarm sound, and after that, please say out loud what alarm you think that was for: A
frontal collision, a rear collision, a left lane drift, or a right lane drift.
* Plays alarms until he gets the quiz right
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reminder.mp3
Please be reminded of the following:
Firstly, if you see a potential rear collision, please jam the throttle and speed up or swerve onto the
sidewalk.
Secondly, if you see a potential frontal collision, please jam the brakes or swerve onto the sidewalk.
Thirdly, please do not speed. You should monitor your speed from time to time, as the simulator does
not give a good impression of speed.
Lastly, please stop right at the stop sign and right at the traffic light, and not before.
05a.SecondTraining.mp3
Now that you recognize the alarms, we will begin the next training session.
For this next training sessions and subsequent driving to come, you will hear music playing through
the radio but you are not allowed to have a choice of stations.
Please make sure the steering wheel is straight and your foot is off the accelerator and brake.
Do you have any questions?
* STARTS SECOND PRACTICE SCENARIO
05a. SecondEnd-TryTask-TaskInstructions.mp3
You have just completed the second training session.
For this next training scenario, you will be asked to complete a task while driving.
Your responses to the task will be recorded for scoring purposes.
Let's try the task.
You are now going to be asked to use the screen to your right to complete the next task.
You will see 7 numbers in succession on the screen, of which there will be 6 zeros and 1 other non-
zero number.
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Your task is to do math addition, adding up the position of the non-zero number, and the number itself.
You will use the number keys on the number pad, to respond.
For example, if you see 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 displayed on the screen, the correct answer is the total sum of the
non-zero number, 2, and its position, 2, which equals 4.
You will enter 4 on the number key pad as the right answer.
However, if you see 0 5 0 0 0 0 0, the correct answer is the total sum of the non-zero number 5, and its
position 2, which equals 7.
You will enter 7 on the number key pad as the right answer.
The task will occur at points during your drive.
Once you complete the task, please look ahead to the screen in front, and continue driving.
Your score will be computed at the end of each drive, on a percentage scale.
Let's practice this task.
Do you have any questions?
* Practice Secondary Task
05a.Prac3Intro.mp3
Now that you recognize the alarms, we will begin the next training session.
You will drive through the last training session and perform this task at the same time.
Prac3-Fast.mp3
The task is designed to be difficult for everyone. That is, everyone will not be able to answer every
question correctly and maintain good driving at the same time.
Please keep in mind that your primary job is always to maintain safe driving
Take your time driving, maintain the posted speed limit, and follow any traffic control signs or signals.
If you feel uncomfortable in any way, stop driving, close your eyes, and speak with the research
assistant.
Please make sure the steering wheel is straight and your foot is off the accelerator and brake.
After this training session, you will hear additional instructions, before you begin the testing segments.
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Do you have any questions?
* STARTS THIRD PRACTICE SCENARIO
Testing Sessions Instructions
07.StartTesting.mp3
Now that you are familiar with the driving simulator, it is time to start the testing sessions.
07.StartTesting-MONEY -BREAK
You will earn $15 for completing the drive and up to an additional $10 bonus depending on your
driving performance and your performance on the task that you just practiced.
Therefore, if you perform well, you will earn up to $25 today.
In addition, if you have the highest score in this experiment compared to other participants, you will
get at $100 Amazon.com voucher.
You will be penalized $1 if you do not stop at a stop sign, or if you run a traffic light.
If your drive time exceeds 15 minutes, you will be penalized $1 for every minute that you arrive late.
However, you will be penalized $2 for every crash that occurs and $2 if you speed excessively during
the drive.
During the drive, the speed limit is 55 miles per hour on most parts of your journey.
Like in real life, you are more likely to receive a ticket for going 80 miles per hour than for going 65
miles per hour on the journey.
You will have to monitor your own speed as you will not be pulled over for speeding and traffic
violations.
Please note that you will be penalized more for crashes than for traffic violations and that you will be
penalized more for speeding than for arriving late.
If you follow the posted speed limits, you will be able to complete your journey in time.
Before we start the next testing session, would you like to have a break?
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reminder.mp3
Please be reminded of the following:
Firstly, if you see a potential rear collision, please jam the throttle and speed up or swerve onto the
sidewalk.
Secondly, if you see a potential frontal collision, please jam the brakes or swerve onto the sidewalk.
Thirdly, please do not speed. You should monitor your speed from time to time, as the simulator does
not give a good impression of speed.
Lastly, please stop right at the stop sign and right at the traffic light, and not before.
08.Testingl.mp3
You are about to begin a testing segment.
Your scores will be recorded for scoring purposes, and you will be penalized for crashes, traffic and
speeding violations.
You will have to perform the task while driving, and will also be able to earn bonuses based on your
performance.
Please keep in mind that your primary job is always to maintain safe driving
Remember not to turn off at intersections, and maintain the posted speed limit.
If you feel uncomfortable in any way, stop driving, close your eyes, and speak with the research
assistant.
Please make sure the steering wheel is straight and your foot is off the accelerator and brake.
When you see the image of the road in front of you, you may begin by pressing the gas pedal.
Do you have any questions?
* STARTS FIRST TESTING SCENARIO
09.InBetween.mp3
You have finished the first testing scenario.
Great job!
143
break.mp3
Before we start the next testing session, would you like to have a break?
10.Testing2.mp3
You are about to begin the last testing segment.
When you see the image of the road in front of you, you may begin by pressing the gas pedal.
Do you have any questions?
* STARTS SECOND TESTING SCENARIO
11.END.mp3
You have now successfully completed the testing sessions.
Congratulations! We hope that you have enjoyed your drive.
You may now exit the car.
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Appendix G
Participants filled out a post-experiment survey after they completed the testing sessions on a
desktop computer and their answers were electronically stored. The survey questions are reproduced
below:
Post-experiment survey
Hello and thank you for participating in the Driving Study conducted by Professor Mary L Cummings and
Angela Ho.
Please fill out the following Post-Simulation Questionnaire. If you have any questions, please direct them to
AngelaHo@mit.edu. Thank you.
Please fill in blanks or select the best response unless otherwise noted. Please answer all questions. Your answers
to these questions will be held confidential.
Please do NOT discuss the contents of the experiment with anyone as the experiment is still on-going. Thank
you.
1. What is your subject ID (Partl)?*
Please ask the research assistant for your Subject ID.
2. What is your Subject ID (Part2)*
Please ask the Research Assistant for your Subject ID (part2) S _ M_
HEALTH
3. What kind of emotions did you feel while you were driving through the simulation scenarios?
I did not feel this at all. I felt this somewhat. Describes exactly how I felt
Challenge
Enjoyment
Boredom
Stress
Frustration
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4. Do you feel unwell right now or during the simulated drive?
5. If you answered "Yes to the previous question, how well does each of the following describe how you
feel now?
I do not feel this at Describes exactly how II feel/felt this somewhat
all. feel/felt.
Nausea 0 1 2
Headache 0 1 2
Eye Strain 0 1 2
Drowsy 0 1 2
Dizzy 0 1 2
6. At which point during the experiment did you start to feel unwell and experienced the above-
mentioned symptoms?
ALARMS
7. While driving, did you think that the alarms gave you timely alert in order to:
a. Avoid a Frontal collision Yes No
b. Avoid a Rear Collision Yes No
c. keep in your own lane (left and right) Yes No
8. In what ways were the alarms helpful and/or not helpful in the above situations?
9. When you heard the alarm for the following conditions, did you know what triggered the alarm?
Alarm warning of a Frontal collision
Alarm warning of a Rear Collision
Alarm warning of a Lane Drift
Yes
Yes
Yes
10. If you answered "no" to any part of question 9, why not?
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Yes No
11. While driving, you encountered many False Alarms - alarms that went off for apparently no reason.
Under the conditions listed below, when you heard such an alarm, were you able to recognize if it
was a False Alarm?*
Alarm warning of a Frontal collision
Alarm warning of a Rear Collision
Alarm warning of a Left lane drift
Alarm warning of a Right lane drift
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
12. If you answered "no" to any part of question 11, why not?
13. If the alarms were not helpful to you, and/or if they also induced a negative emotive response, please
elaborate on what these responses were.
If you did NOT think that the alarms were unhelpful, you do NOT need to answer this uestion.
Frontal Rear Left Lane Right LaneEmotive Responses Collision Collision Drift Alarm Drift AlarmAlarm Alarm
Ineffective - You saw the event before
you heard the alarms, but the alarms
didn't affect you negatively.
Annoying - The alarms were not helpful
and you wished that you turn them off.
Stressed - In addition to the impending
collision, you were stressed by the
alarms.
Distracting - In addition to being
unhelpful, they adversely affected your
driving.
14. Would you prefer the same warning alarm for all 4 types of events, or different alarms for each of the
types of events?
Same Different
15. What type of alarms do you think that you would have preferred for the following conditions?
Beeps Generic Voice Alert Specific Voice Others
("danger" or "hazard" etc) Alert ("front",
"rear" etc)
Alarm warning of a frontal
collision
Alarm warning of a
rear collision
Alarm warning of a
Left lane drift
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Alarm warning of a
Right lane drift
16. If you answered "other" to any part of the question above, please elaborate.
PRACTICE & TESTING SCENARIOS
17. While driving through the test scenarios, were there instances where you saw the following condition
happening, but was waiting to hear the alarm before you took an aversive action?*
Frontal Collision
Rear Collision
Left Lane Drift
Right Lane Drift
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
18. Did you have enough practice time for the following before the actual testing scenarios?*
Getting used to the throttle, brakes, and steering of the car
Understanding the number task
Knowing what the alarms meant
19. Did you think that the length of the actual TESTING scenarios were:
1" testing -
2nd testing -
Too short
Too short
Too long
Too long
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Just Right
Just Right
20. Did you find the number task challenging enough to perform, while maintaining safe
driving at the same time?*
Yes No
Comments
21. Do you have any comments /constructive criticisms /ideas/suggestions for improvements on
Practice scenarios?
Testing scenarios?
How the experiment was conducted, in terms of experimenter's conduct and overall experience?
This survey in terms of format, clarity, and succinctness of questions asked, and length?
Any other comments?
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the:
PRACTICE 
& TESTING 
SCENARIOS
Any other comments?
Appendix H
Performance Bonus Calculation
This $5 bonus was performance based and money would be deducted based on the number of
traffic violations such as running traffic lights and speeding, the number of collisions and roadway
departures off the shoulder as well as driving over the allotted time of 15 minutes. The $5 bonus also
took into account their score on the secondary task on both Scenario A and B. Thus, the bonus gave
participants an incentive to "perform well," which was weighted across safe driving (no collisions),
keeping within speeding limits, following traffic laws, and performing well on the secondary task.
Additionally, participants were not encouraged to drive too slowly as the bonus would be affected if
they went over the allotted time of 15 minutes too. Throughout the driving scenarios, there are
speeding limits with signs put up intermittently along the road. Participants were defined to be
speeding if they drove over the speed limit for that particular section for more than 5 seconds.
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Appendix I
GLM Analysis: SPSS Output
LEGEND: The three factors are:
o "Alarm", or alarm alerting scheme (i.e., master vs. single)
o "direct", or direction or driver warning systems (i.e., FCW, FVFA, Left LDW, Right
LDW)
* "1" represents FCWS condition
* "2" represents FVFA condition
* "3" represents Left LDWS condition
* "4" represents Right LDWS condition
o "Reliab" or reliability (i.e., high vs. low)
* "1" represents the high reliability condition
* "2" represents the low reliability condition
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Statistics for Reaction Time Data
Descriptive Statistics
Alarm type Mean Std. Deviation N
High reliability FCW Multiple .4568 .13741 20
single .5016 .12948 20
Total .4792 .13371 40
High reliability FVFA Multiple 1.5080 .65030 20
single 1.5004 .61452 20
Total 1.5042 .62451 40
High reliability Left LDW Multiple 1.0660 .10652 20
single 1.1209 .11081 20
Total 1.0935 .11083 40
High reliability Right LDW Multiple .9789 .11208 20
single 1.0205 .08313 20
Total .9997 .09965 40
Low reliability FCW Multiple .5197 .52044 20
single .3279 .25292 20
Total .4238 .41540 40
Low reliability FVFA Multiple 1.9764 .89893 20
single 1.9248 .85890 20
Total 1.9506 .86819 40
Low reliability Left LDW Multiple 1.1443 .11154 20
single 1.2280 .16087 20
Total 1.1861 .14305 40
Low reliability Right LDW Multiple .977 .1115 20
single 1.006 .1652 20
Total .991 .1398 40
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE 1
Type III Sum
Source of Squares df Vean Square F Si
reliabi Sphericity Assumec 1.129 1 1.129 9.694 .004
Greenhouse-Geiss( 1.129 1.000 1.129 9.694 .004
Huynh-Feldt 1.129 1.000 1.129 9.694 .004
Lower-bound 1.129 1.000 1.129 9.694 .004
reliabi * Alarm Sphericity Assumec .088 1 .088 .751 .391
Greenhouse-Geiss( .088 1.000 .088 .751 .391
Huynh-Feldt .088 1.000 .088 .751 .391
Lower-bound .088 1.000 .088 .751 .391
Error(reliabi) Sphericity Assumec 4.427 38 .117
Greenhouse-Geiss( 4.427 38.000 .117
Huynh-Feldt 4.427 38.000 .117
Lower-bound 4.427 38.000 .117
direct Sphericity Assumec 65.986 3 21.995 91.244 .000
Greenhouse-Geiss 65.986 1.259 52.419 91.244 .000
Huynh-Feldt 65.986 1.316 50.140 91.244 .000
Lower-bound 65.986 1.000 65.986 91.244 .000
direct * Alarm Sphericity Assumec .246 3 .082 .341 .796
Greenhouse-Geiss( .246 1.259 .196 .341 .613
Huynh-Feldt .246 1.316 .187 .341 .622
Lower-bound .246 1.000 .246 .341 .563
Error(direct) Sphericity Assumec 27.481 114 .241
Greenhouse-Geissf 27.481 47.835 .574
Huynh-Feldt 27.481 50.009 .550
Lower-bound 27.481 38.000 .723
reliabi * direct Sphericity Assumec 3.091 3 1.030 8.559 .000
Greenhouse-Geiss( 3.091 1.469 2.104 8.559 .002
Huynh-Feldt 3.091 1.554 1.989 8.559 .001
Lower-bound 3.091 1.000 3.091 8.559 .006
reliabi * direct * Alar Sphericity Assume( .207 3 .069 .573 .634
Greenhouse-Geiss( .207 1.469 .141 .573 .516
Huynh-Feldt .207 1.554 .133 .573 .525
Lower-bound .207 1.000 .207 .573 .454
Error(reliabi*direct) Sphericity Assume( 13.726 114 .120
Greenhouse-Geiss( 13.726 55.831 .246
Huynh-Feldt 13.726 59.052 .232
Lower-bound 13.726 38.000 .361
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancet
F dfl df2 Sig.
High reliability FCW .876 1 38 .355
High reliability FVFA .010 1 38 .920
High reliability Left LDW .133 1 38 .717
High reliability Right LDW .427 1 38 .517
Low reliability FCW 3.815 1 38 .058
Low reliability FVFA .121 1 38 .730
Low reliability Left LDW .458 1 38 .503
Low reliability Right LDW .394 1 38 .534
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is
equal across groups.
a.
Design: Intercept+Alarm
Within Subjects Design: reliabi+direct+reliabi*direct
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1
Transformed Variable: Average
Type III Sum
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 372.244 1 372.244 1707.048 .000
Alarm 8.26E-006 1 8.26E-006 .00004 .995
Error 8.286 38 .218
Estimated Mar-inal Means
1. Alarm type
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
Alarm type Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
Multiple 1.078 .037 1.004 1.153
single 1.079 .037 1.004 1.153
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Pairwise Comparisons
Measure: MEASURE 1
Mean 95% Confidence Interval for
Difference Difference
(I) Alarm type (J) Alarm typE (I-J) Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound
Multiple single .000 .052 .995 -.106 .105
single Multiple .000 .052 .995 -.105 .106
Based on estimated marginal means
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no
adjustments).
2. reliabi
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
reliabi Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 1.019 .026 .966 1.072
2 1.138 .037 1.062 1.214
Pairwise Comparisons
Measure: MEASURE 1
Mean 95% Confidence Interval for
Difference Differencea
(I) reliabi (J) reliabi OI-J) Std. Error Sig.a Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -.119* .038 .004 -.196 -.042
2 1 .119* .038 .004 .042 .196
Based on estimated marginal means
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no
adjustments).
3. direct
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Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
direct Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 .452 .034 .382 .521
2 1.727 .100 1.524 1.931
3 1.140 .017 1.105 1.175
4 .995 .014 .967 1.024
Pairwise Comparisons
Measure: MEASURE 1
Mean 95% Confidence Interval for
Difference Differencea
(I) direct (J) direct I-J) Std. Error Sig. a  Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -1.276* .105 .000 -1.489 -1.063
3 -.688* .039 .000 -.767 -.610
4 -.544* .034 .000 -.612 -.476
2 1 1.276* .105 .000 1.063 1.489
3 .588* .108 .000 .368 .807
4 .732* .101 .000 .528 .936
3 1 .688* .039 .000 .610 .767
2 -.588* .108 .000 -.807 -.368
4 .144* .023 .000 .098 .191
4 1 .544* .034 .000 .476 .612
2 -.732* .101 .000 -.936 -.528
3 -.144* .023 .000 -.191 -.098
Based on estimated marginal means
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no
adjustments).
4. Alarm type * reliabi
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
Alarm type reliabi Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
Multiple 1 1.002 .037 .927 1.078
2 1.154 .053 1.047 1.261
single 1 1.036 .037 .961 1.111
2 1.122 .053 1.014 1.229
5. Alarm type * direct
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
Alarm type direct Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
Multiple 1 .488 .049 .390 .587
2 1.742 .142 1.455 2.030
3 1.105 .025 1.055 1.155
4 .978 .020 .937 1.019
single 1 .415 .049 .316 .513
2 1.713 .142 1.425 2.000
3 1.174 .025 1.125 1.224
4 1.013 .020 .972 1.054
155
6. reliabi * direct
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
reliabi direct Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 1 .479 .021 .436 .522
2 1.504 .100 1.302 1.707
3 1.093 .017 1.059 1.128
4 1.000 .016 .968 1.031
2 1 .424 .065 .293 .555
2 1.951 .139 1.669 2.232
3 1.186 .022 1.142 1.230
4 .991 .022 .946 1.036
7. Alarm type * reliabi * direct
Measure: MEASURE 1
95% Confidence Interval
Alarm type reliabi direct Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
Multiple 1 1 .457 .030 .396 .517
2 1.508 .141 1.222 1.794
3 1.066 .024 1.017 1.115
4 .979 .022 .934 1.024
2 1 .520 .091 .334 .705
2 1.976 .197 1.578 2.374
3 1.144 .031 1.082 1.207
4 .977 .032 .913 1.041
single 1 1 .502 .030 .441 .562
2 1.500 .141 1.214 1.787
3 1.121 .024 1.072 1.170
4 1.020 .022 .976 1.065
2 1 .328 .091 .143 .513
2 1.925 .197 1.527 2.323
3 1.228 .031 1.165 1.291
4 1.006 .032 .942 1.069
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Statistics for Response Accuracy Data
Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
Step Variables scheme(1) .251 1 .616
0 type 14.121 3 .003
type(1) 2.558 1 .110
type(2) 5.699 1 .017
type(3) .981 1 .322
reliability 547.997 1 .000
reliability * type 15.072 3 .002
reliability by type(l) 1.499 1 .221
reliability by type(2) 9.228 1 .002
reliability by type(3) .128 1 .721
scheme * type 3.519 3 .318
scheme(1) by type(l) .267 1 .605
scheme(1) by type(2) .585 1 .444
scheme(1) by type(3) 1.481 1 .224
reliability by scheme(1) .091 1 .764
Overall Statistics 567.093 12 .000
Statistics for Secondary Dependent Variables: Number of Collisions and
Secondary Task Performance
Legend:
* Ascore: Score on Secondary Task under High reliability condition
* Bscore: Score on Secondary Task under Low reliability condition
* Acritical: Number of collisions under High reliability condition
* Bcritical: Number of collisions under Low reliability condition
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Wilcoxon Sinned Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Bscore - Ascore Negative Ranks 12 a 16.04 192.50
Positive Ranks 22 b  18.30 402.50
Ties 6 c
Total 40
Bcritical -Acritical Negative Ranks 26d  15.54 404.00
Positive Ranks 6e  20.67 124.00
Ties 8'
Total 40
a. Bscore < Ascore
b. Bscore > Ascore
c. Bscore = Ascore
d. Bcritical < Acritical
e. Bcritical > Acritical
f. Bcritical = Acritical
Test Statisticsc
Bscore - Bcritical -
Ascore Acritical
Z -1.798a -2.696b
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .072 .007
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Based on positive ranks.
c. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Mann-Whitenev Test
Ranks
alarmtype N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Ascore multiple 20 21.23 424.50
single 20 19.78 395.50
Total 40
Bscore multiple 20 16.90 338.00
single 20 24.10 482.00
Total 40
Acritical multiple 20 20.03 400.50
single 20 20.98 419.50
Total 40
Bcritical multiple 20 21.70 434.00
single 20 19.30 386.00
Total 40
Test Statisticsb
Ascore Bscore Acritical Bcritical
Mann-Whitney U 185.500 128.000 190.500 176.000
Wilcoxon W 395.500 338.000 400.500 386.000
Z -.395 -1.968 -.274 -.856
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .693 .049 .784 .392
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed a a a a
.698 .052 .799 .529
Sig.)]
a. Not corrected for ties.
b. Grouping Variable: alarmtype
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